Israel and Palestine in a new world (1)

The Hamas attack on Israel of 7 October 2023 holds international politics in a tight grip. Now, a few days after the initial attack by Hamas, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have largely expelled Hamas fighters from Israeli territory. Seemingly, the conflict at this moment mainly consists of artillery fire in both directions. Of course, there is still a minor threat of Hezbollah entering the conflict from the north, establishing a serious multi-front attack on Israel. Yet currently, the conflict is all about Israel’s retaliation. It has begun an endless bombardment of Gaza, especially Gaza City, in which more than 2,700 civilians have died—a death toll that surely will rise much more if a ground invasion takes place. Amongst the victims are more than one thousand children, a staggering amount, as well as countless parademics and other first responders, including UN personnel. Estimates suggest that, as of 16 October, more than 45 entire families have been killed by Israeli bombs—complete bloodlines, eradicated by bombardments on apartment buildings, hospitals, schools, and refugee camps.

Together with the blockade of food, water, medicine, and electricity into Gaza and the confirmed use of forbidden weapons like white phosphorus, these actions constitute clear war crimes committed by a state actor. (The importance of this cannot be overstated. Both the Israeli military’s war crimes and the Israeli state's human rights violations have been well-documented for years. Now that the IDF appear to be free from any guardrails under Netanyahu’s radical right-wing government, which is uttering genocidal language, no red lines seem to have been drawn. These missing lines apparently are also geographical, as Israel has bombed Syrian airports and parts of southern Lebanon, in which at least one Reuters journalist was murdered.) It begs the question how long the international community will tolerate the IDF’s excesses, now that the principal threat seems eradicated and its actions are meeting a global audience.

While attention is on the atrocities committed by Hamas and the increasing assault on Gaza by the IDF, the roles played by important regional and global actors, ranging from the United States in support of Israel to Iran in support of Hamas, also deserve scrutiny. The developments in Israel give a strong sense that there has been a lot going on, behind the curtains, on a state level. There are enormous interests in the Israel–Palestine conflict, and broader in the Middle East: it is one of the most complex and important geopolitical regions in the world, if not the most. For many states, the stakes are high.

Personally, I make two observations, which I will describe in two separate posts. First, I assume that many things have been going on behind the ‘geopolitical curtain’. There are still numerous unknowns. They range from the question why the Egyptian government publicly claimed it warned Netanyahu days before the attacks took place to the question how and why Russia and Wagner were involved in Hamas' preparations. Second, I think the West made a fundamental mistake by siding fully and unapologetically with the Israeli government, even after it expelled Hamas fighters from its territory and now continues its vindictive assault on Gaza. This cannot but have big consequences for the West’s standing in the rest of the world. It might also seriously hurt the West’s efforts to gain support in the global South for Ukraine.

A large pro-Palestine protest takes place in Amman, Jordan on 13 October 2023. Israel's assault sparked an international outcry.

The complexity of the Middle East

The Middle East is a very complex region. It consists of a wide range of religions and political systems, which all to different degrees make states either allies or enemies. The region is home to several long-term conflicts in which all regional actors have their own interests. Most importantly, there is the perennial hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which dominated the region ever since the 1970s (read this book)—a predominantly religious conflict between the region’s leading Shia power, Iran, and its leading Sunni (and Wahhabi) power, Saudi Arabia. The regional Muslim schism between Shiism and Sunnism was also evident in the devastating Syrian civil war and the Yemeni civil war, with the latter being commonly considered a proxy conflict between the Houthis (Iran) and Yemen (Saudi Arabia). Only recently, in March 2023, there have been signs of a serious rapprochement between the Saudis and the Iranians, when China got both sides to agree to a renormalization accord.

The current conflict does not involve a schism between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In fact, they now share something that transcends the Sunni–Shia divide: anti-Zionism. Because if the Arab world was not complicated enough, the foundation of the State of Israel after the Second World War made the region’s politics even more layered. For decades, the new Israeli state lacked friendly relations with others in the region, and its very existence frequently caused tensions in the Middle East.

While the United States under Trump and Biden has begun pushing for normalization accords between Israel and Arab states, both in an attempt to safeguard Israeli interests and impede Iran’s regional ambitions, these Abraham Accords are not much more than financial incentives for Arab states to tolerate Israel’s existence. Bahrain, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and others were promised lucrative arms sales by Washington, and saw opportunity for trade with the Israelis. Durable, ideological peace accords they are thus not. Israel, as a Jewish state, remains a thorn in the side of most of its regional neighbours. Tellingly, on 12 October, the Iranian President and the Saudi Crown Prince for the first time had a phone call—a milestone development in the bilateral relationship, and for a very long time unthinkable. It would not have happened without them sharing Israel as a common foe.

Of these two states, it appears that Iran’s agency in the current Hamas–Israel conflict is much more significant. Unlike the Saudi kingdom, Iran is a direct sponsor of Hamas, one of the many organisations and fighting groups in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq that is supported financially and materially by Tehran. It also holds significant sway over Hezbollah, with many analysts referring to Hezbollah as the "proxy of Iran". In Iran's anti-Zionist project, Hezbollah's position at the Israel—Lebanon border is very helpful, as such controlling militant groups both to Israel's north and south.

Iran praised the Hamas attack immediately on 7 October, congratulating the organisation for its "anti-Zionist resistance". On 14 October, Iran's Foreign Minister met with the political chief of Hamas in Doha. Besides expressing his support for Hamas and the people of Gaza, he also warned Israel that "[i]f the Israeli regime’s crimes in Gaza continue, any possibility in the region is likely, and the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue its attempts to halt Israeli war crimes." On the same day, Axios reported that Iran through the U.N. had warned Israel that it would intervene militarily if Israel’s attack on Gaza would continue.

Some analysts have suggested, however, that if Iran coordinated the attack together with its proxies, Iran's objectives may have already been achieved. For that reason, it would not be inclined to further escalate the conflict. After all, Iran has been highly worried about the Abraham Accord that was being negotiated between Israel and Saudi Arabia, arguing that the Saudis would "betray" the Palestinians through such a deal. Not only that, it would also unite two of Iran's enemies, strengthen Israel's position in the Middle East, and it would increase U.S. influence in the region. The Hamas attack succeeded in thwarting the Saudi—Israeli negotiations, delivering Iran its strategic win.

Still, the exact degree of Iran’s involvement in the preparations for the Hamas attacks is unclear. The Washington Post reported a day after the assault that the Iranians helped plan the attacks for weeks, and that Iran’s Republican Guard “gave the final go-ahead [during a Hamas–Iran meeting] in Beirut.” This was supported by multiple geostrategic analyses. Since then, however, many reports have contradicted the story. The U.S. and Israeli governments have also indicated that they have seen no evidence of Iran’s direct involvement in Hamas’ preparations. To the contrary, their findings suggest that Tehran was "surprised" by the attacks. It thus remains a big question to what extent Iran's strategic calculations were part of the 7 October assault.

Notwithstanding this uncertainty, Iran's agency in the conflict is undisputed. It truly is behaving as a regional power. An additional question, then, would be if there has been coordination between Iran and other sympathizers of Hamas' attack on Israeli territory. How about Qatar, for example, which is an important financial donor of the organisation? And what coordination took place between Iran and its ally Syria? President Assad in October 2022 met with a Hamas delegation, setting in motion a bilateral rapprochement. In the Hamas–Israeli conflict, little seems to move without Iran playing a part in it.

Mohamed bin Salman and Bashar al-Assad meet at an Arab summit in May 2023, ending Syria's year-long diplomatic isolation.

Hezbollah and the risk of regional escalation

Iran, Syria, Qatar, and other regional actors are very unlikely to get directly involved in the conflict between Hamas and Israel. As noted, Iran's main objectives have been reached. Even more, every day that Israel continues its assault on Gaza, especially when it would decide to launch a ground invasion, would weaken its military, its societal cohesion, and its international standing, to Tehran's perceived benefit. (Some even suggest that Israel's retaliation is part of Hamas and Iran's master plan to damage Israel's global reputation and make it an international pariah.) Syria is too chaotic and unprepared to assist Hamas directly, and would not want to risk renewed international isolation; Qatar would not risk its relationship with the United States or other partners by directly engaging with the Israeli. In other words, interstate conflict at this point is not likely. Dramatic developments would first have to happen to change its likelihood—for example, mass casualties during the IDF's invasion of Gaza, or Israeli attacks on Iranian territory.

Meanwhile, questions remain about the objectives of Hezbollah, which is the biggest trump card the anti-Israel alliance in the region has to play. Founded in the early 1980s, Hezbollah's militant wing holds significant sway over parts of Lebanon and has been an active part of the pro-Assad coalition in the Syrian civil war. Meanwhile, its political wing holds seats in Lebanon's parliament and has significant influence in the Lebanese government. Hezbollah's military is considered very powerful, its militants well-trained, and its reserves well-stocked with Russian and Iranian supplies. It is much stronger than Hamas.

It is thus for good reason that in the first weekend of the attack, Israelis were very fearful of Hezbollah joining Hamas’ war. It would mean a two-front war and echo the traumatic Yom Kippur War of 1973. Then, Israel was surprised by an attack from its north and south by Syria and Egypt, respectively; only just was the IDF able to repel the assault. Now, it is uncertain if Hezbollah is willing to go all-out and fully join Hamas. It would hurt Israel, but it would also undoubtedly lead to a fierce responce of the U.S. military, which is already gathering in the region. The inevitable subsequent bombing of cities like Beirut would be catastrophic for a country that is already considered a mostly failed state.

Egypt's transparency about Israel's intelligence failure

Another question pertains to the role Egypt plays, or is willing to play, in the conflict. Egypt inevitably has agency—not only for the border it shares with both Israel and the Gaza Strip, but also for its geopolitical and military clout in MENA. Two actions by the Egyptian government stood out this week. First, it has denied Gazans entry into its territory, and has shown little intent to support the Palestinian people living in the Gaza Strip who have nowhere else to go. (At the same time, Palestinians are understandably afraid that a lucrative deal with Cairo will be made by Israel and the U.S. in order to expel them from Gaza, which to them would constitute a second Nakba.) Even more, Egypt is working to reinforce its border with Gaza. For el-Sisi, it is very unattractive to allow two million Palestinians to flee to its territory, especially given that Egypt already is home to eight million migrants from the region. It remains to be seen, however, if Cairo can maintain this position when Israel's ground offensive brings even more violence to Gaza.

Second, it was remarkable how the Egyptian government has publicly acknowledged that its intelligence agency warned Netanyahu in advance of the Hamas attack, even including the claim that Netanyahu shrugged off this warning. Israel, of course, denied Egypt’s claims. There is no way of knowing what really happened. Still, it is the most direct claim of the Israeli prime minister being warned beforehand of an impending attack so far, and if confirmed, it would be something Netanyahu could impossibly shake off. It is also unclear if Egypt had any ulterior motive by making its intelligence and Israel’s response public. As noted in many analyses, the conflict between Hamas and Israel has put el-Sisi in a difficult position. On the one hand, Egypt has close ties with Palestine, and its relations with Hamas have also been improving in the last decade. On the other hand, it has crucial security ties with both Israel and the United States. Egypt is one of Washington's top recipients of military aid ever since its peace deal with Israel after the Yom Kippur War. It also cooperates with Israel in intelligence sharing. Thus, the Egyptian government will certainly attempt to avoid a situation in which it has to choose between the pro-Palestine and pro-Israel camps.

Russia as the foreign kingmaker

This post looked at some of the regional actors. However, such an overview cannot leave out Russia, which has been deeply involved in Middle Eastern geopolitics for a long time. Its role in the Syrian civil war—or better, its countless war crimes—is especially notorious. And when it comes to the fight between Israel and Hamas, a conflict in which there seem to be only losers, Russia certainly seems to be winning a lot.

Ever since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it has detached itself from 'norm-based' international politics and pursued a foreign policy that only serves its self-interest. This was also true before, either by invading other sovereign countries (Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014), by interfering in foreign elections (U.S. in 2016), or by extrajudicially killing Russians on foreign territory (U.K. in 2018), but it has only become more brazen since its isolation from the West in 2022. Now, the baseline is as simple as it is malign: sow international division and create chaos that diverts attention from Ukraine.

Benjamin Netanyahu and Vladimir Putin in Moscow (2018). Netanyahu's balancing act between Ukraine and Russia in their war has failed, as Russia has now chosen the side of its nemeses Iran and Hamas.

Russia's support for Assad, Hezbollah, and now Hamas fits right in this strategy. Not only has the Hamas attack succesfully diverted the West's (financial) attention from Ukraine to the Middle East; it also weakens Israel, the U.S.' key partner in the region, sows division in Western societies, and it pits the (mostly pro-Israel) West against the (mostly pro-Palestine) global South. Sure enough, Vladimir Putin quickly condemned Israel's attack on Gaza, stating that the "core interests" of the Palestinian people should be taken into account. He also blamed the current conflict on Washington's Middle East policies. There is no doubt Russia's position will go down well in large parts of the world, including MENA. (Not coincidentally, Putin happened to make his comments during a meeting with the Iraqi prime minister.)

Similar to Iran, the involvement of Russia in the preparations for the Hamas attack are not clear. Iran's connection with Hamas is much stronger. Still, last year, FM Sergey Lavrov met Hamas leadership in Moscow, and Russia has been diplomatically engaging with the other partners in Hamas' alliance as well: Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran itself. Overt and covert support for pro-Iran militant groups in the region has been modus operandi for the Russians for a long time, especially during the periods of heavy fighting in the Syrian civil war. It is also highly convenient how the Hamas attack coincided with a large-scale offensive of the Russian army around Avdiivka, also in the weekend of 7 October, to which now only few people paid attention. Additionally, it coincided with an ongoing debate in the U.S. about the continuation of financial and material support for the Ukrainian military; now that U.S. lawmakers will want to send aid to Israel, Ukrainians are worried about their own prospects. Still, besides some reports about Wagner training Hamas fighters before their attack and Russian support in cyberattacks on Israel, there so far is little evidence putting direct blame on Russia for what happened on 7 October.

It is no secret that Russian leadership sees much of contemporary world politics as a proxy fight between itself and the West, and it considers many instruments legitimate in such a fight. Moreover, many conflicts that are currently brewing are actively stimulated by Moscow, whether it is the unrest in the Sahel, the threat of conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, or the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (in which Azerbaijan's Aliyev now threatens a full invasion of Armenia, bolstered by the absence of Russian peacekeeping forces around Nagorno Karabakh). For this reason, Russia's agency in the preparations of Hamas for its attack on Israel should not be out of the question and remain an important piece in understanding how Hamas was so succesful in its attack on Israel.

The Israel—Palestine has always been a globalized conflict, and increasingly so (London, 2021).

Conclusion

The Middle East is a complicated region, and so are its conflicts. The perennial conflict between Israel and Palestine is unique for the ways in which it evokes emotions all over the world and involves so many members of the region. When an escalation in the conflict occurs, as happened with last week's Hamas attack on Israel and Israel's subsequent assault on Gaza, it inevitably begs the question which roles key actors in the region play. Above, I highlighted (1) Iran's big role as an established regional power, (2) coordination efforts between Iran's proxies, including Hezbollah's potential involvement, (3) the issue of financial and material support from Syria and Qatar, (4) the role of intelligence and Egypt's statements on the issue, and (5) Russian activity in the conflict. I also indicated that there are still many things unclear about what happened, what is happening, and what is going to happen. Although the motives of most actors are clear, it is unclear to what degree they are willing to act upon them.

There are numerous analyses that see the Israel–Hamas conflict as either a proxy war between the United States and Russia, between the United States and Iran, or both. I am not in favour of shifting to ‘proxy warfare’ narratives too quickly, because it erases local agency and makes it easy to ignore local historical and political complexities. At the same time, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is so globalized that it is uniquely positioned to act as an instrument of proxy warfare, at least in a 'West versus East' conflict. As noted before, there are enough actors who benefit from making the conflict a proxy, mostly Russia and Iran. This means that the ways in which the West (i.e., the European Union and the United States) operates during the conflict is very important. Unfortunately, they have made a serious mistake in their approach towards Israel and Palestine in the past week. I will discuss that mistake and its implications in my next post.

Image references