Search on this website

(A shorter version of this text in Dutch can be found on the China2025 blog.) In 1949, the Chinese civil war ended. Chiang Kai-shek’s troops and millions of Nationalist followers fled to Taiwan, establishing the Republic of China; meanwhile, the Communists claimed victory on the mainland, with Chairman Mao proclaiming the new People’s Republic from the Forbidden City in Beijing. With that, almost two decades of domestic struggle came to an end. Still, the civil war did not really end. There has never been a formalized peace agreement between the Nationalists and Communists; nor has there ever been a formal recognition by either of the other’s statehood. Even more, although the Taiwanese no longer aim for reclaiming the mainland, vice versa, the Chinese very much do intent to reclaim the island. This would not constitute an interstate war, as the Republic of China is not considered to be an independent state by neither the People’s Republic or the international community. Thus, the civil war still is very much alive. This civil war knows many forms, and conflict between the PRC and ROC has mostly taken place in proxy fashion, for instance by rivalling each other in international organizations or targeting third states that support the other China. Although little considered, a relevant and highly interesting battleground in the Chinese civil war has recently been regaining the spotlight amidst political shifts: Central America. Why does this region play a central role in the Chinese rivalry—and what role do recent local political developments play in this rivalry? In 2021, I wrote my master’s thesis on this subject. In this post, I want to explain the historical context of the rivalry. I focus explicitly on Central America and why this small region became a stronghold for Taipei. In my next post, I will focus on the current situation and the prospects of future Central American diplomatic recognition of the Chinas. The Taipei–Kyiv parallel and the quest for legitimacy The conflict between the two Chinas has regained its place in the global spotlight in the past few months, if it had even left that spotlight before. Parallels drawn between Russia’s denial of Ukrainian sovereignty and PR China’s denial of Taiwanese sovereignty are understandable and certainly hold some merit. The parallels have revitalized concerns that the Chinese may sooner, rather than later attempt to capture the island. It makes the Taiwanese the more desperate to cling to any form of international recognition, and it makes the Chinese the more adamant to deny the Taiwanese any form of international recognition. This brings the issue of legitimacy forward as very important. Here, one of the largest problems in the ubiquitous Ukraine–Taiwan parallels becomes apparent. Legitimacy is barely an issue for the Ukrainians: Ukraine is formally recognized by virtually any state on earth as a sovereign, independent state; yet the Taiwanese are formally recognized to a far lower degree. Currently, only fourteen states recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state and maintain full diplomatic relations. Only five of these states may be considered more than microstates. Consequently, invasion of Ukraine by Russia is formally to be regarded as an intrusion of a widely recognized sovereign state, while any invasion of Taiwan by PR China would not necessarily be considered as such: after all, none of the likely opponents of such a move recognizes Taiwan as sovereign, themselves. (The Chinese have suggested this, too.) This understandably makes gaining as much international recognition as possible a real priority for the Taiwanese government. It requires Tsai Ing-wen, the Republic of China’s president since 2016, to constantly reach out to non-recognizing states and international organizations, and to simultaneously maintain the relationship with those few states still recognizing the ROC. Recently, this has included elaborate state visits by the president of the Marshall Islands, the most vocal supporter of the Taiwanese in Oceania, and by a Taiwanese presidental delegation to the newly elected Honduran president. Moreover, earlier in April, a group of United States senators paid a well-publicized visit to Tsai, and in November 2021, a group of Baltic politicians did the same. At the same time, local media keep pushing Tsai to maintain and step up these continuous diplomatic efforts, anxious to lose international support. The PRC–ROC rivalry in Latin America: the early Cold War The history of the PRC–ROC rivalry is extensive, and it is not necessary to include it in excessive detail here. Very broadly, one can distinguish two phases in this rivalry: first, an ideological one, and then, a pragmatic one. After the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, the international recognition for either China was very much the opposite of the current situation: the Republic of China on Taiwan was regarded by most states as the continuation of the Republic of China on the Chinese mainland, constituting a form of government-in-exile. The newly proclaimed People’s Republic was considered an undesirable aberration, and most states preferred to continue their relations with the ROC. In its early days, thus, the PRC found itself in a relatively isolated position. This was the case for bilateral relations, but also for international organizations: for a long time, the ROC held on to its place in international organizations as ‘the China’, most notably in the U.N. Security Council. The PRC found itself in the position of the underdog, surely, but it was not truly isolated. As soon as Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic, the Soviet Union established ties, and was followed by the entire Communist bloc, which included North Korea, East Germany, and Albania. In the years thereafter, more states chose to recognize Beijing over Taipei, yet the number remained low for some time. For the post-Second World War era had quickly entered the first stage of the Cold War, and most states became part of two clearly separated camps: the U.S.-led capitalist, Western bloc; and the Soviet Union-led Communist, Eastern bloc. In this bipolarity, Communist support for PR China’s international recognition was self-evident; yet non-Communist support for PR China proved to be much more difficult to achieve. The Taiwanese benefited: firmly placed in the American camp, it maintained the support from most Western states, and ensured its position in Western-dominated international organizations. In this, the Maoist foreign policy—which eventually even alienated the Russians and the Cubans—of PR China did not help. Although foreign policy under Mao certainly can be considered isolationist when compared with globalist foreign policy, interaction with the world outside China still took place. This foreign policy was distinctly revolutionary in nature. In Latin America, it was noticeable in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese provided material support to anti-government militants in several Latin American countries, most notably in Central America. It was an ideological choice: the region was full of right-wing, militarist governments. Understandably, though, these right-wing governments were consequently not enthusiastic about establishing formal diplomatic relations with Beijing. Moreover, it is questionable whether the United States would have allowed any states in their ‘backyard’ to abandon capitalist Taiwan in this era. Cuba would have been trouble enough. The PRC–ROC rivalry in Latin America: the late Cold War Yet in the early 1970s, this changed. Chinese foreign policy became more pragmatic, and simultaneously for Latin America, interest in the region increased. No longer was supporting leftist revolutions abroad a primary incentive for the PRC; it was made increasingly clear that the government was ready to cooperate with those regimes that differed significantly in their political ideologies. This included, for example, Chile, where the Chinese explicitly continued their diplomatic efforts even after the rightist (and U.S.-sponsored) coup that ousted Chile’s socialist leader, Salvador Allende. This pragmatism, that continues to this day, and the growing interest in Latin America that followed the more internationalist foreign policy and the incentive to participate in a global economy—combined with the PRC’s amazing economic potential—allowed new ties between the region and the People’s Republic. Most importantly, however, the United States and PR China began their rapproachment, which proved to be crucial. In just a few years time, Communist China switched from the United States’ list of enemies to its list of allies, a shift that was made possible by the earlier Sino-Soviet conflict and the increasing pragmatism in the Chinese foreign policy. Beijing’s decision to work with Washington made diplomatic openings possible. Significantly, this also meant the ROC’s expulsion from the U.N. Security Council, as the PRC took its place. Now, the Chinese were really leaving behind their diplomatic isolation. Consequently, in this late Cold War, many states abandoned the Republic of China, instead choosing to formally recognize the People’s Republic. This also was true for Latin America: in the early 1970s, the largest Latin American states (including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela) established diplomatic ties with the PRC. In the late 1980s, the entire South American continent had abandoned the ROC in favour the PRC, except Paraguay. The transformation of Chinese foreign policy, which picked up steam in the Hua era and especially when Deng Xiaoping took over in the late 1970s, into a more outward-looking policy meant a strengthening of ties with the region, including growing diplomatic efforts and increasing economic trade—albeit still relatively little in comparison to interactions with other regions. Central America’s support for Taipei in the late Cold War Although by the end of the Cold War (i.e., when the Soviet Union was dissolved) South America already no longer recognize dthe ROC as ‘the China’, in Central America and the Caribbean, virtually all states still maintained diplomatic ties with Taipei, and had not yet altered their recognition of the ROC. Indeed, in 1991, Cuba was the only state that recognized the People’s Republic, as it had done since 1960. Apparently, the factors that enabled a ‘recognition switch’ in South America from the early 1970s onwards (i.e., a less revolutionary Chinese foreign policy; rapproachment between Washington and Beijing; and growing Chinese interest in the region) did not matter in Central America. In my master’s thesis, I argued that there were four factors that may account for this anomaly. Firstly, the domestic political context in Central American states points to serious obstacles for any diplomatic recognition of the PRC. In some countries, this did not seem likely: in Panama, for example, the authoritarian leader in the 1970s was an enthusiastic supporter of Third Worldism—something he undeniably shared with Beijing. Others, like Nicaragua. Other states with strong dependencies on the United States, like Guatemala and El Salvador, in the early 1970s suddenly saw a permission structure appear after the Sino-U.S. rapprochement; indeed, Washington covertly even stimulated some states to make the recognition switch from PRC to ROC. However, there is more to Central American domestic politics: the nature of both the political regimes in power in the 1970s and 1970s as well as the nature of some individual leaders both proved relevant, too. Suggestions of the Americans to abandon Taipei were not too well-received in those governments that disliked taking orders from the United States, and attempted to not do so whenever possible. Moreover, several governments that were not prominently Third Worldist tended to be very rightist, which made realigning with a Communist government an unlikely course of action. Even more, the prevalence of authoritarian rightist political regimes in Central America easily aligned these states with the ROC, which in the 1970s and 1980s under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership also constituted a rightist and militarist authoritarian regime. Secondly, the regional political context proved to be another obstacle to swift recognition of the PRC from Central American states. The proximity to Cuba impacted Central America to a higher degree than South America. Indeed, Communist leadership in Cuba had repeatedly targeted Central American states in the early Cold War, supporting leftist rebellions throughout the region. As such, anti-Cubanism was fierce in most Central American governments, and by extent, anti-Communist fears were widespread amongst the reactionary authoritarian leaderships. For them, the Cold War was not so cold; and consequently, much was considered through the lens of Cold War bipolarity, including the PRC–ROC recognition rivalry. Indeed, the PRC could be considered the ‘Cuba of the Far East’, with Mao not that different from Castro—which left Central American states with little appetite to make an ostentatious choice for the PRC, even when its foreign policy was moderated in the 1970s. Not all Central American leaders were radically opposed to Fidel Castro: the aforementioned excentric Third Worldist leader of Panama, Omar Torrijos, was on surprisingly good terms with Castro, having regular conversations and discussing many matters, including geopolitics. Yet Torrijos’ ties with the Cuban leader did not increase the likelihood of a recognition switch by the Panamanian government: if Torrijos listened to Castro’s considerations on and suggestions for dealing with Beijing, he would have clearly understood that Castro opposed any state in the region to increase relations with the PRC, despite their ideological alignment. Indeed, the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1960s greatly deteriorated Sino-Cuban relations, too, and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement made Castro determined to oppose the PRC whenever possible. As such, the rare number of leaders in Central America that were on good terms with Fidel Castro still would not have been persuaded to cooperate with Beijing in any way. Thirdly, diplomatic aptitude of both ROC and PRC shaped recognition behaviour of Central American states in the late Cold War. In short—diplomacy of the People’s Republic was relatively underdeveloped, as the isolationist foreign policy had left little room for establishing proper diplomatic netwerks in other regions, including Latin America. As previously mentioned, Chinese interest in Latin America grew, yet this only happened from the early 1970s onwards; as such, Chinese efforts to establish a (diplomatic, political, economic) foothold in the region, other than the previous efforts of revolutionary support, took time. The Taiwanese, on the other hand, were the de facto ‘China’ in the region, and thus had a significant advantage, also logistically: its diplomats had been in Central America for decades, and the Taiwanese diplomatic apparatus knew how to maintain its relations here, even when Beijing’s diplomatic efforts became more apparent. Diplomatic exchanges, trade platforms, academic gatherings, and culture conferences kept Taipei well in touch with both governments and societies throughout the region. What is more, there is scarce yet mounting evidence that the Taiwanese delivered goods and services to several Central American countries that proved the ROC’s value over the PRC’s: most notably, Taipei sent military assistance, including anti-insurgency training, which was highly valued by the authoritarian governments. It was something that Beijing did not, and probably could not provide. As such, both the elaborate diplomatic network of the ROC in the region, as well as its awareness of how to satisfy its allies, ensured support throughout Central America. Fourthly—and in relation to all previous three factors—state size was an important factor in recognition behaviour, especially in explaining the difference between Central America, and North and South America. Central America consists of only smaller powers, while North America (i.e., Mexico) and South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and others) consists of significantly larger powers. This meant several things: in the early 1970s, it caused the PRC to first focus on the larger states of Latin America, relatively neglecting the smaller Central American states; it benefited Taiwanese diplomatic efforts, as it was easier to diplomatically and financially impact smaller states; and the relatively small state size made for interesting targets for Cuba-sponsored rebellions, whereas revolution would be harder to accomplish in the larger states in the region. Concluding note These factors account for the recognition trajectory of Central American states, that unlike other Latin American states in the 1970s and 1980s did not choose to switch recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Consequently, they explain why even now, Central America is in the middle of the Chinese recognition rivalry, as the foundation for Central America’s curious position was laid in the late Cold War. After the Cold War, things did change; and indeed, in the past few decades, several Central American finally chose to establish ties with the People’s Republic. In my next post, I have outlined under what conditions this happened, how the most recent recognition switches can be explained, and what we may expect of this recognition rivalry in the coming years and decades.

On October 27th, former Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang died from a heart attack while vacationing in Shanghai. Li had retired just a few months earlier, when Li Qiang was selected as his successor and put in charge of daily government. Li’s death gained much attention in international news media. In China, it resulted in an outpouring of mourning and support for his relatives. Similar to the period after the death of former president Jiang Zemin, both online comments and physical gatherings were strictly monitored by the Chinese government, afraid of any social unrest. Most analyses described Li as a prime minister who was “sidelined” during his tenure, while others wrote that he was simply “eclipsed” by president Xi Jinping’s dominance. An analysis in Foreign Policy concluded that Li “lived and died in Xi’s shadow.” It is all true. Premier Li was in charge of the economy, but Xi’s accumulation of power meant that he was increasingly unable to put his own stamp on policies. To some extent similar to Jiang, Li was considered a reformer who was in favour of opening the economy and giving more space to private enterprises—something that came into increasing contrast with the direction of his president. In his final years as prime minister, Li oversaw a tightly controlled economy. He also oversaw the continuation of the Trump-era U.S.­–China trade war, continued and intensified under U.S. President Biden. Not only did the economic conflict scare foreign investors and hurt trade relations, it also resulted in more state intervention in the economy. Of course, the same happened during the Covid-19 pandemic. The way in which Li Keqiang was considered an open-minded reformer and his legacy was celebrated by parts of Chinese society says a lot about contemporary China under the leadership of Xi. Ranging from the ever-diminishing space for its civil society to its flagship projects in global governance (BRI, BRICS+), and from environmental degradation to a rapidly aging population, there are a lot of question marks about the current state of China, and its outlook in the (near) future. But there probably is no bigger question mark than the condition of the Chinese economy, about which a lot of concern has permeated global media in recent months. I want to highlight some key issues below. Economic growth as the pillar of China's social contract If it is anything that Chinese people, the Chinese government, and international analysts all are concerned about, it is the trajectory of the Chinese economy. Serious, long-term problems in the Chinese economy, by several metrics the world's largest, could send shockwaves throughout the global economy and damage the economies of China's partners. It would obviously also hurt average Chinese people. Of course, economic growth is of vital importance for China. For decades, the Chinese people have been accustomed to high growth rates. Continuous economic growth meant that China under leadership of the Communist Party was able to lift more than 800 million people out of poverty, according to the World Bank—an accomplishment unparalleled in world history. Two years ago, Xi Jinping celebrated a "complete victory in eradicating absolute poverty" in China, an important milestone in a nominally Communist state. Continuous economic growth meant that for regular Chinese families, each new generation had a more promising future: there was more money, more technological development, and life standards improved steadily. As this happened under Communist Party leadership, many had no reason to question Party rule. There emerged a tacit understanding between state and society: as lives of regular Chinese people kept on improving, the Party did not have to fear for serious challenges to its authority. But after decades of improvement, growth of the Chinese economy has been stagnating in the last few years. This began with the trade war between China and the United States, initiated by Donald Trump (or, some argue, by Xi Jinping) in 2018, which tested the resilience of China's trade and supply chains. Beginning in early 2020, the Chinese economy was hit by the severe lockdowns that were put in place to prevent the spread of the Covid-19 virus. In 2021, the economy was further challenged as the real estate sector began to struggle, especially because of liquidity problems at the Evergrande Group. Crises of the Chinese economy The current problems in the Chinese economy consist mainly of three immediate crises: (1) a crisis in the real estate sector, (2) a crisis in local government debt, and (3) a crisis in public consumption. Problematically, these crises are interconnected to a considerable degree, and there are no easy fixes. First, the previously booming real estate sector is now stagnating, with large companies (most notably Evergrande) in financial trouble, unable to repay their debt and finish their construction projects. Real estate, like infrastructure investment, is one of the most important drivers of the Chinese economy, accounting for roughly 30% of Chinese GDP. For decades, China's economic growth depended for a significant part on an endless number of housing projects, which catered to the immense growth and modernization of China's cities. But property developers like Evergrande went too far, borrowing excessive amounts of money (sometimes in dubious ways) and spending similarly excessively. This went well for a long time, as consumer demand kept up and projects were delivered mostly on time and to consumers' satisfaction. The developers' revenue was steady and enabled the companies to repay many loans without much difficulty. But in the case of Evergrande and several other big developers, debt still reached dangerous amounts. When, a few years ago, the central government decided to restrict the virtually limitless ability to borrow money, there was no way out for these companies. Evergrande filed for bankruptcy in August 2023. Country Garden, another developing giant, defaulted on its debt in October 2023, with other property developers also publicly struggling with their debt. These collapses of property developers have not only posed macro-economic challenges, but also challenges on a smaller level: construction workers and countless third-party companies involved in construction projects are left unpaid, and people who invested in real estate see their investment go up in smoke (first image). According to TIME, real estate accounts for "up to 80% of household wealth", as housing projects are the go-to investment for Chinese families instead of pensions or stocks. Speculating with housing has also been incredibly popular in recent times, although Xi Jinping has come out strong against that tendency. In other words, the instability of the housing market has directly put the financial wellbeing of many ordinary Chinese households on the line. Local government debt Second, local governments are in serious financial trouble. Because of a partial decentralization of governance, local governments have held a responsibility over a broad range of (expensive) tasks, including social security, infrastructure projects, and Covid-19 measures. Containing the spread of the virus alone cost local governments tens of billions of euros. While these tasks may be justifiably attributed to local governments, they stretched resources thin. Debt piled up during the pandemic. And when local administrations were additionally tasked with bailing out suffering local banks in 2023, debt climbed to dangerously high levels. Usually, local governments can rely on a steady source of income. For the most part this comes from the sale of land. Land sale revenue and subsequent land-related tax revenue accounted for 31% of local government income in 2022 (PIIE). This reliance on land sale to maintain spending levels by the local governments is not sustainable, however. The crisis in the real estate market led to a sharp decrease in housing projects, which meant a sharp decrease in land sales. In other words, while local governments' spending has sharply increased in recent years, at the same time, their income has decreased. Hence, debt is swelling. In 2022, local government debt reached 92 trillion yuan, or about 12 trillion (!) euros. While the number for 2023 is not yet known, this amount poses a big risk to the stability of the Chinese financial system, especially because there are no easy ways to repay parts of the debt, let alone large sums. Even more, total debt is difficult to quantify, since large amounts of debt are "hidden": they are stowed away in public-private financing entities—the so-called local-government financing vehicles (LGFVs)—that are used to raise funds for investment in local projects, mostly by issuing bonds and obtaining loans from banks. Inability of LGFVs to repay their debt and unwillingness of borrowers to restructure debt have put local governments in an even more precarious situation. Additionally, as banks play an important role in the financing of the LGFVs, large-scale defaults of these vehicles could be dangerous for China's broader financial sector. In the last few months, the central government has implemented more measures to confront the debt crisis. In October 2023, Beijing asked state-owned banks to renew their loans with local governments, on longer terms and at lower interest rates. The State Council also forbade certain heavily-indebted municipalities of taking on more debt, and appointed a new finance minister. In November, the Chinese government updated its directions for local administrations, which included a stricter policy of engaging with 'problematic' private projects. Relatedly, it of course also enacted measures aimed at reinvigorating housing projects, which could stimulate landsales again, at least for some time. These measures show a willingness to address the issues that caused the ballooning of debt. At the same time, the decision to renew loans for local governments and provide subsibies for the real estate market might suggest that the central government is also willing to kick the enormous problem of local government debt down the road—again. Consumer confidence Third, the Chinese government so far has not found a solution to low consumer confidence. As happened globally during the Covid-19 pandemic, public consumption diminished sharply (a few sectors excluded, such as telecommunications). In most economies, consumers by now have picked up where they left off pre-pandemic. But Chinese people, who are already traditionally prone to saving more money than people elsewhere, have still not fully returned to their consumption habits from before the zero-Covid lockdown. During the first week of October (Golden Week), data showed that spending of Chinese consumers remained below pre-pandemic levels, even if Golden Weeks typically are "peak season for local spending". Similarly, this year's Single's Day (11 November) failed to register an uptick in spending: Reuters reported an "anemic growth in transactions, despite steep discounts by retailers," pointedly adding that consumers will need to "do more" in order to improve China's economy. Even e-commerce giants Taobao (Alibaba) and JD.com have reportedly noticed weak consumer confidence; this year, they did not even disclose their sales figures, a rather ominous sign. (Nevertheless, Chinese state media reported "record figures", eager to claim that the retail sector is back on track.) And, to come back to the aforementioned real estate crisis, the public's interest in buying new property has also decreased significantly, both out of concern about the implications of making large investments and distrust in property developers. Be all that as it may, more consumption is what the Chinese economy desperately needs. For the government, China’s elderly population is a logical target for boosting consumption. They have been so for years, amidst a demographic transition that shifts spending power more and more to seniors. Yet one of the other big challenges currently facing the Chinese central government—large youth employment—does not help at all. First and foremost, it hurts consumption because young people have less money to spend (and the money they do have, they will likely want to save because of the unfavourable economic outlook and unavailability of affordable housing in China’s big cities); but it also means seniors will want to save money for their offspring. Beijing has been attempting to stimulate consumption for some time. For example, in July 2023, it put in motion a “consumption-stimulation plan”, although both the plan and its scope remained vague and did not appear to be very ambitious. Instead, economists like Yu Yongding have argued that Beijing needs to more fundamentally alter its fiscal policies in order to "reverse the trend" of deflation and weak consumer demand, something Xi's government has been unwilling to do so far. Besides, the problem of lacking consumption is largely psychological: as long as people do not feel like it is safe to spend much money, they won’t. And as long as the other systemic issues in the Chinese economy are not sufficiently addressed, consumer confidence will not return, either. Doom or gloom Most economists and analysts agree that the economic challenges the Chinese government faces are daunting. There are no easy fixes. At the same time, there remains disagreement amongst experts about the prospects of the economy in the (near) future. There are numerous experts who are pessimistic and foresee continuous economic stagnation or even decline. Some have even already pronounced that China is over. Still, there are also some experts who are more bullish on China's ability to recover. A somewhat pessimistic analysis by the Carnegie Endowment has pointed to China's debt as its main obstacle for continued economic growth. By calculating several scenarios, they show that the government's high levels of investment in the economy have to be adjusted, in order to prevent the debt from reaching a catastrophic amount; but this adjustment cannot but severely limit GDP growth. In other words, the economy's overreliance on state investment has hurt its growth potential in the long-term. It does not help that "consumption growth must outpace GDP growth"—which, as noted above, seems rather unlikely at the moment. Michael Pettis similarly argues that "[o]ne of the most venerable and compelling explanations [of the worsening economy] is that China is simply reaching the limits of its investment-heavy, export-driven growth model." It means that the emphasis on exports has to end, and China needs to transition from a predominantly manufacturing economy to a service economy. Pettis is doubtful whether that is achievable under Xi, however. He is not alone: numerous analysts think that Xi's Marxism, authoritarianism or desire for global power are obstacles to an improved Chinese economy. As long as he is in charge of the country and its economy, they see little room for a strong recovery. Still, other experts think that concerns about the prospects of the world's second-largest economy are overblown. For example, Nicholas Lardy has interpreted macro-economic data differently, writing that they do not show a permanent slowdown, but rather a temporary set-back with already some early signs of a rebound. Reshma Kapadia emphasizes the size of the Chinese economy, which is such that it can surely absorb a small decline of GDP. She and others also point out that historically, Beijing's economic leadership has proven innovative and resourceful, and it has plenty of options left to solve the current (short-term) problems. While these solutions may not solve the larger, systemic issues in China's economy, they might at least bring back consumer confidence and kick-start a larger evolution of the economy's pillars, including the dominance of the property and manufacturing sectors. Silent killers are the most violent In any case, the Xi government needs to urgently find solutions to the three main crises in order to stabilize the Chinese economy. That, by itself, is already an enormous task. But there is more. China faces several systemic challenges that either are much more difficult to tackle than these current crises, or that are simply unsolvable. Some of these systemic challenges are well-known. The rapidly aging Chinese population, for one, is a known problem. Not only does it mean that the productivity of the Chinese people will drop significantly in the coming decades; it also leads to a range of other challenges, including facilitating a healthcare sector that can accommodate hundreds of millions of elderly. Economists like to discuss this mostly in the context of the threat of Japanification, referring to the end of the Japanese economic boom in the 1990s and subsequent economic stagnation. Other challenges include the politicization of international trade (both by the West and China itself) and large-scale youth unemployment, including the growing disconnect between graduating students and suitable job opportunities. The issue of youth unemployment can be considered a silent killer because, according to some analysts, it is leading to "diminishing aptitude for entrepreneurship and risk-taking spirit among young people." They refer to the lying-flat movement (tang ping), the causes of which are diverse and difficult to solve. In any case, if the government is unable to sufficiently motivate younger generations to fully participate in the economy (specifically, in ways that the government prefers—recall the aforementioned healthcare sector), it has a very big problem. "In July [2023], the National Bureau of Statistics revealed that youth unemployment had hit a record high of twenty-one per cent, nearly twice the rate four years earlier. Then the bureau stopped releasing the numbers. Zhang Dandan, an economics professor at Peking University, published an article arguing that the true rate might be as high as forty-six per cent, because she estimated that up to sixteen million young people have temporarily stopped looking for jobs in order to lie flat." — Osnos in The New Yorker But when it comes to silent killers of the Chinese economy, it mostly comes down to one: China's demographics. It has to do with the low birth rate, which seems unfixable, and the very rapidly aging population, which seems unfixable, too. Even more, it has to do with the enormous gap between city and countryside, and specifically, rural underdevelopment. In their book Invisible China: How the Urban-Rural Divide Threatens China’s Rise, Scott Rozelle and Natalie Hell have argued that actually, the underdevelopment of China's countryside and thus the underdevelopment of China's 'human capital'* constitutes the biggest threat to the Chinese economy in the long-term. I actually found their analysis pretty alarming and will come back to the topic later. Conclusion Economists, both Chinese and foreign, are making good efforts to understand China's economic challenges and suggest pragmatic solutions. At the same time, the days of pragmatism-over-ideology in China's economic governance have long been gone. In the 1990s, Deng Xiaoping famously said that "it does not matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice": if China had to adopt market economics to achieve economic growth, that was justifiable. For Xi, that is not an option. Ideology has become much more important again, also in the economy. From the perspective of Xi—who, as a true Marxist, has never been fond of laissez-faire economics—the current problems in the Chinese economy can easily be considered the result of Beijing's looser control over the economy, local governance, and society. In his view, China has wavered too much from socialism, either with or without Chinese characteristics. Whatever an economic recovery would require, under Xi's leadership there is only one direction: towards more state control. And if his tightening grip over the economy would bring more hardship to China's workers, his message is clear, and it is a classic: eat bitter (chiku). Personally, I think the Chinese government has been right to turn away from neoliberalism and take back more control. Letting the market run free has brought China much welfare and has helped make it a global power; but at the same time, socioeconomic inequality has skyrocketed and environmental degradation has cost much suffering. It would be naive to think that neoliberalism would fix the issues that challenge the economy today. Be that as it may, there is much worry within China about the economic outlook. As noted before, this has hurt consumer confidence; for that reason, one would expect clear communication from the government, explaining which problems it identifies and how it will solve them. But the central government's decision making has always been very opaque, and its use of language is notoriously vague (leading the China Media Project to exclaim "Speak Plainly, Mr. Chairman", earlier this year). For ordinary people, it is a guessing game what is the reasoning behind key decisions, whether it comes to the real estate market, youth employment, or the country's demographic transition. That does not help. As such, building confidence by communicating clearly and convincingly proves to be an additional challenge for Beijing. Unclarity and pretending everything is fine is not working: it leads to young people lying flat, businessmen leaving the country, investors pulling out, and people not spending their money. Subsidies and regulations can go a long way, but without the confidence of the Chinese people in their own economy, these problems will surely remain. * I don't like the term 'human capital', because it implies that humans are some form of capital—and need to possess that capital in order to be considered 'of worth'—and because it suggests that laborers are just as much capitalists as the real (financial) capitalists, which they obviously are not.

A large difference between the international relations theories of realism and constructivism concerns the position of small states or peripheral regions in dynamics of great-power competition. Realists argue that small states have a limited amount of options in their relationships with rivalling great powers, and their considerations are overwhelmingly oriented towards the balance of power. When a great power is perceived to be too powerful, smaller and thus weaker powers can either join the great power in order to avoid an attack, which is called bandwagoning; or they can decide to do the opposite, by balancing with another power in search for protection (p. 243-44). In contrast with realists, constructivists attach much more flexibility to the behaviour of smaller states in complex dynamics of great-power conflict. Whereas realists see international relations as a state of anarchy, in which every state attempts to survive and maximize power, constructivists see international relations as the result of social interaction. States do more than waging war: they also engage with each other in many ways, establishing cultural, political, and ideological relationships. These relationships between states are based on the exchange of ideas, ideologies, and culture. Because every idea, no matter its origin, can be extremely powerful and influential, constructivists are less inclined to underestimate the power of the small state. The 2020s have seen a serious rise of tensions between the world's current two great powers: the United States and China. Of course, international relations (IR) scholars have different opinions on the exact point of beginning of current China–U.S. competition. It makes sense to pinpoint the 2016 U.S. election campaign as the starting point. This is because before the Trump administration, the Obama White House and even his predecessors, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, saw the potential of China's rise, and they—especially Clinton—thought that China's economic growth would inevitably lead to China's democratization and adoption of Western values. Obama in his second term (2012—2016) began to think differently, and this was a partial explanation for the U.S.' famous pivot to Asia. Still, Obama obviously pursued a much more constructive relationship with the Chinese than his successor would. Trump's imflammatory rhetoric during his campaign and subsequent early presidency, together with Xi Jinping's consolidation of power in Zhongnanhai and growing Chinese nationalism, shook the relationship between Washington and Beijing to its core. China–U.S. relations have deteriorated significantly and both sides are attempting to score victories against the other, whether it is in technological dominance, economic power, or their relationship with other parts of the world. While the term 'Cold War' might not be suitable for the current dynamic, worries about an escalation between China and the U.S. is real, especially in smaller or weaker countries that depend a lot on either side, or both. Smaller states are concerned that they have to choose between Washington and Beijing, and worry about the implications of such a choice. Some have already chosen sides; some are hedging any decision; and some are trying to balance both sides in order to benefit from the great powers' ambition to win them over. In any case, the China–U.S. rivalry is a global affair, with consequences for many states, both big and small. Earlier this year, I did some research on the small states of Central America, examining how the great-power rivalry has been received in their media and political discourse. Following the ideas of constructivism, my goal was to show how the relationship of these small states with both great powers has taken shape in those discourses, and how this related to their ideas about the implications of China–U.S. rivalry for Central America. Below, I explain some main conclusions of this research, which specifically focused on Costa Rica and Honduras. Central America and the great powers Before I come to those conclusions, it is good to briefly draw back first, and establish Central America's historical relationship with both great powers. Of course, the relationship with the United States has been especially close. From the perspective of the U.S., the countries of Central America are the closest part of the global South to its borders. The states are admittedly tiny, but relevant, given their role in U.S. national security. Not only can political instability in the region form a breeding ground for hostility towards U.S. territory, but the enormous amount of Central American migrants towards the U.S.–Mexico border in recent years has been defined as a risk to the nation's security. For this reason, the U.S. has always been 'present' in the region, a euphemism for meddling and intervening, both politically and militarily. At the same time, the U.S. has also provided significant development aid and economic investment in the region. One could argue that Central America has seen continuous foreign intervention ever since the fifteenth century, either through colonialism or neo-colonialism. In this framework, the U.S. (and perhaps to some minor degree, China) is the latest in a row of great powers intervening in the region, after the Spaniards, the British, and the Soviets (together with the Cubans). In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, amidst its increasing power, the U.S. waged an expansionist war against Mexico, occupied Cuba and both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The American military intervened repeatedly throughout Central America and the Caribbean in what became known as the Banana Wars (1898—1934), begun under the bellicose Teddy Roosevelt. These wars included military intervention in Honduras to safeguard the interests of the United Fruit Company (it was in this period that an American writer coined the term 'banana republic', in reference to Honduras) and the occupation of newly independent Panama in order to control the Panama Canal. Military presence of the U.S. in the region became perhaps even more dangerous during the Cold War, when a fear that the Soviets could turn the region 'red' held a grip over Washington's foreign policy. Consequently, the U.S. propped up the reactionary, military dictatorships in the region, especially in Honduras and Nicaragua. In Guatemala, the U.S. supported a right-wing military coup, which overthrew the democratically elected left-wing Árbenz government. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.' approach towards the region has differed from president to president. Bush's relationship with the region was notoriously bad, while there was much optimism about the relationship with the U.S. during the Obama presidency, especially when he visited Cuba in 2016. After 2016, relations soured significantly under the leadership of Donald Trump. It was also during this time that China increased its presence in the region. China has historically had a low profile in Central America, most importantly because it did not have many diplomatic partners in the region until the 2010s. During the Cold War, Mao Zedong had supported the Cuban-led rebels in the region (he also received Guatemala's Árbenz in Beijing after his ousting), but the Central American socialist struggle was no large priority for the Chinese government. The geopolitics of the Cold War had also caused a conflict with Castro's Cuba, which endured a long time and further limited China's space in the region. Only after the Cold War did the pragmatic foreign policy of the Deng Xiaoping era lead the Chinese to invest more in the region, both economically and diplomatically. The 2010s were especially important: not only did several states, including Panama and Nicaragua, switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, but also did Xi's government expand the Belt and Road Initiative to Central America. Panama signed up as its first partner in 2018. The U.S. from a Central American perspective From the perspective of Central America, the U.S. has always been the big neighbour. As the illustration above indicates, this is reflected in the discourse of both Costa Rica and Honduras. There is a significant difference between the more specific perceptions in the two countries, however. In Costa Rica, the relationship with the U.S. is perceived primarily in economic terms, which is understandable given trade with the U.S. dwarfs all other trade volumes. At the same time, the relationship is also seen as value-based. Costa Ricans pride themselves on their democracy: in Latin America, only in Uruguay was support for democracy slightly higher in 2023 (p. 12). Moreover, Costa Rica has traditionally voiced strong support for human rights. Costa Rica thus sees its relationship with the U.S. also as a partnership in liberal democratic values. For this reason, Costa Rican politics and society have also at times criticized the U.S. government for what it considered violations of democratic values or human rights. Meanwhile, Honduras' relationship with the U.S. is more complicated. In its media discourse, there is more emphasis on the dominance of the U.S. in bilateral relations. This is in contrast with Costa Rica, where it seems preferred to perceive the relationship as more equal and like-minded. In Honduras, the U.S. is seen as the regional 'sheriff', intervening at will in the country's judicial system. This is not coincidental: for example, countless Honduran politicians and officials have been prosecuted in the U.S., including all its recent presidents. Furthermore, much emphasis is put on the trade relationship: the U.S. dominates as a destination for Honduran exports and imports. There are also clear concerns about overreliance on the U.S. economy: both in media and political discourse, there is a perennial question whether the U.S. is too important for Honduran trade and hurts Honduran sovereignty. This relates also to the remesas, the remittances that Central American workers in the U.S. send back home. An enormous amount of Hondurans has left their country in recent years and now resides in the U.S., often illegally. This further complicates the bilateral relationship and the Honduran perception of the United States. China from a Central American perspective As I wrote earlier, there is a tendency to overestimate Chinese presence in the region, and the content analyses reflect this. In Costa Rica, China is largely perceived as a promising partner, especially in trade, but to some degree also in other areas, including environmentalism. Both in Costa Rica's media and politics, there is little discussion about what China is and how it relates to Costa Rica itself. There are exceptions, of course, and these are mostly found in media on the ideological fringes. Semanario Universidad, a leftist medium, tends to consider China an untrustworthy partner and accuse it of human rights violations, especially in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. (But then again, SU is even more critical of the human rights record of the U.S.) The discourse analysis also shows surprisingly little discussion in Costa Rica about the value of having a relationship with Beijing. The ties are fairly new, having been established in 2007, yet there is no real contemplation about what they have brought the Costa Ricans. There are some exceptions to this, of course—for example, the regional investigative platform Expediente Público has critically assessed China's engagement with its new partners—but there certainly is no evident disappointment with the relationship with Beijing. Meanwhile, the perception of China in Honduras is much more complicated. Honduras, until early 2023, had never recognized the People's Republic of China as 'the China', and had a very strong relationship with Taiwan. Hence, Taiwan in Honduras was, and to a large extent still is considered 'the real China', while the now-recognized mainland China is seen as 'the other China'. President Castro's diplomatic switch, which caused considerable dissatisfaction in Honduras, meant that Honduras had to establish a relationship with China, with which previous relations were minimal. The analysis shows that China in recent years was consistently seen through the prism of Honduras' friendly relationship with Taiwan. Thus, China is frequently considered an aggressor and dangerous great power, and a Communist dictatorship which has hurt the liberal democracy of Taiwan. Interestingly, after the Castro switch, the subsequent debate in Honduras also put emphasis on the limited value of having relations with mainland China. For this, examples of fellow Central American states were used, mostly Costa Rica. Thus, perceptions of having a relationship with China differ within Central America. Left: former Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang welcomes Honduran foreign minister Eduardo Reina to Beijing (March 2023). Right: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and former Costa Rican president Alvaro Quesada meet in San José (June 2021). The great-power rivalry Based on these meanings attributed to the two great powers, it cannot come as a surprise that the analysis indicated a difference between the perceptions of the China–U.S. rivalry in Costa Rica and Honduras. They share a baseline, though, which likely is the same throughout Central America and the Caribbean: the great-power conflict is a potential risk for the small states' economic security, and both great powers thus have to be engaged cautiously. Optimism in Costa Rica In Costa Rica, the discourse analysis showed some concern about the trajectory of the China-U.S. relationship and its implications for smaller states, although it must be noted that the scope of this concern is limited. The main perception is that the great-power rivalry is limited to the trade war that began (or intensified) in 2018; there is little discussion of other aspects of the rivalry, like geopolitics and ideology. Costa Rican media and politics both understand that because of the small size of Costa Rica's small economy and its dependency on U.S. trade, the trade war can have negative consequences for Costa Rican business and subsequently Costa Rican consumers. (The aforementioned Semanario Universidad poses an interesting exception in the Costa Rican mediascape: it takes the explicit position that the U.S.-China conflict is geopolitically and ideologically motivated, and that China was unjustifiably attacked by a U.S. that fears losing its hegemonic position.) But in Costa Rica, some have also perceived the conflict between the great powers as an opportunity. They focus on a side-effect of the trade war: nearshoring by U.S. companies with manufacturing facilities in mainland China. These firms, concerned about the worsening trade war, increasingly consider moving their facilities from mainland China to the Americas, in order to safeguard their supply chains and avoid potential import and export restrictions. The first destination of these 'nearshorers' has been Mexico, which indeed has seen a significant increase in FDI from U.S. companies. A logical secondary destination would be Central America, which consists of states with fairly low wages, strong ties with the U.S., and relatively stable governments. Costa Rica, specifically, has a well-developed high-tech industry and houses numerous manufacturing facilities by global semiconductor powerhouse Intel. In August 2023, Intel already announced an additional $1.2 billion investment in its Costa Rican facilities. Thus, these developments also contribute to some optimism that Costa Rica may be able to benefit from the economic rivalry between the U.S. and China. Uncertainty in Honduras In Honduras, both media and politics began considering the great-power rivalry and its implications in more earnest in early 2023. Before that, there was little consideration of the growing tensions between China and the U.S. and what they meant. The rivalry was perceived as an economic conflict, a trade war that could potentially pose risks for Honduran business and consumers; at the same time, there were also a few mentions of the potential of nearshoring. In March 2023, an editorial in the conservative La Tribunal even proclaimed that the rivalry and subsequent nearshoring by U.S. companies “could be the long-awaited miracle that reverses the agonizing state of the national economy.” Discourse about the great-power rivalry and its implications for Honduras thus was limited and somewhat superficial, not too different from Costa Rica. But the diplomatic switch from Taiwan to mainland China in March 2023 changed the perception of the U.S.–China rivalry in Honduras. Beyond only an economic perspective, the rivalry now also became to be seen in (geo)political and ideological terms. Analysts and lawmakers criticized Castro's rapprochement with China, as it would risk the political relationship with the U.S. as well as investments from the American private sector. Some, especially critics of the Castro government, warned that Castro had drawn Honduras in a conflict between great powers, which could be catastrophic to its international position. In an editorial, El Heraldo argued that by seeking a closer relationship with mainland China, Honduras “becomes less and less trustworthy to the United States.” In this way, relations with China were directly juxtaposed with relations with the U.S. Even more, a popular perception emerged that before any engagement with China, the preferences of the U.S. should be taken into account, in order to prevent Honduras from becoming an even larger part of great-power competition. This frame further acknowledged Honduras' dependency on its northern neighbour, and showed a growing calculation amongst Honduran elites that as such, engaging with China could be detrimental to the country's prospects. Shrimp farmers (camaroneras) processing fresh shrimp in a facility in Honduras (2022). The decision to break off the relationship with Taiwan has caused anxiety in the important shrimp industry. Taiwan was the largest importer of Honduran shrimp, and exporting to China will be extremely complicated. Conclusion The case studies of Costa Rica and Honduras are interesting for multiple reasons, but most importantly, they illustrate the heterogeneity of small states, even in such a coherent cluster of states as in Central America. The analysis—reconstructing the meaning attributed to both great powers and their rivalry—showed that these two Central American states have different perceptions when it comes to China and the U.S., which are mainly rooted in the small states' economic and political contexts. Furthermore, it demonstrated again the agency of small states and their relevance even in great-power conflict. The discourse analysis also showed some evidence that narratives about the China–U.S. rivalry and the small state’s position in this rivalry only tend to become more popular and informed when the small state itself becomes part of the great-power conflict. More direct involvement in the rivalry, even when it is unintended, requires more attentive thinking in the small state about the great powers and how to maneuver their rivalry. The case of Honduras is a convincing example of this: when Castro chose a foreign policy of engagement with mainland China and more distance from the U.S., figures in media and politics became alarmed and began contemplating what it might mean for the country's international position. Honduras can be considered a negative case of small states maneuvering the great-power competition. The Castro administration's relations with Washington are deteriorating, its fruitful friendship with Taiwan is over, and the new relationship with China has brought a lot of headache, but few benefits so far. Disagreements with the White House will make Honduras an unattractive destination for nearshorers; a more hawkish foreign policy in Washington will refrain Beijing from engaging with Honduras more proactively. As such, while Castro's decision to establish ties with China has led to a more salient discourse about the meaning of great-power rivalry, this for now may have been too late. To some extent, Costa Rica shows the other side of the coin. Whereas in Honduras discourse about the great powers increased significantly in 2023, similar discourse is still quite muted in Costa Rica. This is understandable: unlike Honduras, Costa Rica so far has not become part of a U.S.–China dispute. And so far, Costa Rica's neutrality has provided it with the opportunity to possibly become the semiconductor hub of the Americas, even without abandoning its values and foreign policy strategies. In other words, there is still much space for small states to engage with both great powers and navigate their increasing rivalry.

Jurriaan Hoenderdos MA Hi, I am Jurriaan, a China studies, Asian studies, and Latin American studies graduate, having majored in these academic fields at Leiden University, the Netherlands. My principal interests are Chinese society, politics, and international relations, as well as international relations and global governance more broadly. Perhaps most specifically, I am interested in China—Latin America relations, with a particular focus on the ties between the small states of Central America and both mainland China and Taiwan. ​ ​ Cahuita, Costa Rica

Dec 4, 2023 13 min What's up with China's economy? The Chinese economy faces both immediate crises and silent killers, and solving them will be very difficult. HIGHLIGHTED POST MOST RECENT POSTS Blog overview » Dec 27, 2023 12 min Central America and the U.S.-China rivalry Central America, a region of small states, has to increasingly engage with the great powers and their competition. What is it thinking? Dec 19, 2023 13 min Bolivia and China: socialist comradery? Bolivia makes a perfect ideological partner for Xi Jinping—but is anything happening? Dec 4, 2023 13 min What's up with China's economy? The Chinese economy faces both immediate crises and silent killers, and solving them will be very difficult. Nov 23, 2023 12 min The Dutch conservative mediacracy The Dutch general election shows how conservative voices have come to dominate the mediasphere amidst the growth of a new mediacracy. Oct 28, 2023 16 min Israel and Palestine in a new world (2) As the conflict between Israel and Hamas continues, the failure of the West's initial response has become clear. Oct 16, 2023 12 min Israel and Palestine in a new world (1) The Israel—Hamas conflict shows the complexity of Middle Eastern geopolitics and external involvement. Oct 9, 2023 7 min Transnational frames of the Hamas—Israeli conflict The earliest Western response to Hamas' attack ignored relevant truths, creating an unnecessarily one-dimensional frame of the conflict. Sep 27, 2023 11 min Is India the world's largest democracy? Narendra Modi's prime ministership asks for a re-assessment of India as a 'stable democracy'. Sep 17, 2023 5 min Afghanistan, Wagner, and China: the Haiti problem An international security operation in Haiti seems inevitable. What are the risks and opportunities for those involved? Sep 6, 2023 5 min BRICS+ and the Bandung Spirit In August, the members of BRICS decided to invite more states to the group. It shows some resemblance to the 1955 Bandung Spirit. Aug 31, 2023 4 min Is China’s presence in Central America ‘exploding’? A recent analysis saw China's presence in the region 'exploding', but is that true? Apr 14, 2023 4 min The WTA returns to in China There were no good options left for the WTA. Apr 8, 2023 10 min After Honduras, is Paraguay next? Now that Honduras has chosen PRC over ROC, eyes are on Paraguay. Feb 4, 2023 9 min The E.U. and U.S. differ on China The E.U. and U.S. share similar interests when it comes to China, but only to a certain extent. Sep 1, 2022 10 min The Chinese civil war continues... in Central America (2) In 2007, Costa Rica became the PRC's first Central American ally. Why? May 12, 2022 10 min The Chinese civil war continues... in Central America (1) How does Central America matter in the PRC—ROC conflict? Mar 18, 2022 7 min The WTA stands alone against Xi Is there no more support for the WTA and Peng Shuai? Mar 3, 2022 8 min It is a decisive moment for China PR China's position after the Russian invasion of Ukraine is complicated. Feb 22, 2022 7 min Is reliance on NATO still Europe's best bet? Europe should seriously consider looking beyond NATO. ABOUT ME Hello! My name is Jurriaan Hoenderdos. I am a graduate in Chinese/Asian studies and Latin American studies. My main interests lie in Chinese contemporary politics, society, and its international relations, as well as Latin American society and international relations. I enjoy researching and understanding the complexities of the world as it is rapidly changing around us. On this website, I have regularly published posts that relate to my interests. Currently, the website is not being updated. Feel free to contact me by sending me a message below! More » Sep 27, 2023 11 min Is India the world's largest democracy? Narendra Modi's prime ministership asks for a re-assessment of India as a 'stable democracy'. HIGHLIGHTED ASIA Bolivia and China: socialist comradery? Bolivia makes a perfect ideological partner for Xi Jinping—but is anything happening? HIGHLIGHTED AMERICAS OTHER The Dutch conservative mediacracy The Dutch general election shows how conservative voices have come to dominate the mediasphere amidst the growth of a new mediacracy. Contact Get updates about my posts Sign up below to receive notifications when a new post gets published. Enter your e-mail address here Sign up Thank you for signing up!

Academic experience September 2020 - July 2023 September 2020 - July 2021 September 2019 - July 2020 September 2016 - July 2020 In September 2020, I began studying BA Latin American studies , still at Leiden University, to pursue deeper knowledge of this region as my interest in Sino-Latin American relations had grown. The program has a wide range in topics, yet special focus lays on Spanish language acquisition. I graduated in July 2023. I majored in MA Asian studies in July 2021. During the program, I focused on East Asia, PR China most specifically, opting to study international relations in Chinese modern history. My master thesis analysed the historical roots of PR China and Taiwan's rivalry in securing international recognition amongst Central American states, focusing on the late Cold War period. In the school year 2019-20, I studied at a secondary teacher program at ICLON, Leiden, where pedagogy, subject didactics, and other courses were taught, in order to learn how to teach Mandarin at high-school level. For the entire year, I interned as a teacher at a gymnasium in Hilversum, teaching Mandarin classes to students. In 2016, I began studying China studies in Leiden, the Netherlands. During my studies, I increasingly focused on modern history and visual arts. Naturally, most time was spent on studying Mandarin. In 2018, I spent a semester studying at Taipei University (師大 ). In January 2019, I wrote my bachelor thesis on the influence of the Dutch East Indies' Chinese community on diplomatic negotiations on extraterritoriality rights between the Republic of China and the Netherlands in the first half of the twentieth century. Background image: An advertisement for a Chinese restaurant near San Isidro de El General in Costa Rica (2023). Studies Chinese Studies ​ Before finishing high school, I had already gained an early interest in studying foreign cultures and languages, perhaps thanks to the privilege of being able to travel to several countries outside of Europe in my childhood. In that time, I visited mostly countries in Asia and Latin America. For this reason, it may not really be that much of a coincidence that I ended up studying those regions. During my final year at high school, I knew that I wanted to study a non-Western language and culture. I considered several, including Russian and Japanese, but ended up at Chinese, without any good rationale. Mostly, I just wanted to study a complicated language. I knew close to nothing about China when I started studying Chinese studies in 2016—I barely knew the names of its capital and its president. Actually, I also had no idea if I would even like studying Chinese. I had no previous ties to China: I had not been there, nor had I at any point had any form of special interest in the country. Before 2016, I could not have told you what the difference is between Mandarin and Cantonese, or what dumplings are. Still, I gained an interest in China pretty quickly. During the first years of my studies, most attention was on language acquisition, and this especially took off during our Spring 2018 semester at Taipei University (师大 ). Our Taiwanese classes were laser-focused on further improving our language skills. Besides this, living in Taipei and travelling throughout the country enabled me to learn about Taiwanese culture and just experience how it is to live in another part of the world. In 2018, I also travelled through mainland China, trying out conversations with Chinese people (see photo) and experiencing daily life on the mainland. I think it was here that I realized that I made the right choice in studying China. Throughout my bachelor, I increasingly focused on (modern) history, including some art history. In 2019, I wrote my bachelor’s thesis on the Indo-Chinese community in the Dutch East Indies in the first half of the twentieth century, and, drawing from archival documents, I concluded that this community was pivotal in the difficulties of diplomatic consulations between the Dutch and Chinese governments in the 1930s and 1940s about ending colonial-era extraterritoriality rights for Dutch citizens on Chinese territory. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Teaching ​ In 2019, after completing my regular bachelor’s program, I pursued a teacher qualification at ICLON, learning how to teach Mandarin classes at high-school level. Teaching had interested me for some time, and I quickly realized that I really liked it. At the same time, I started teaching seminars at Leiden University to first-year Chinese studies students as a course assistant. The seminars were part of a course on contemporary Chinese politics, economy, and society. By starting both at the same time, I had ample time to practice teaching methods, and I was able to learn what parts of educating I liked. From 2019 to 2023, every first semester of the academic year I worked as the course assistant. Besides teaching seminar sessions, I was also responsible for the course assessment, i.e., grading of exams and papers. During the seminars, besides providing introduction to academic skills, we discussed a broad array of Chinese studies. This ranged from the post-Mao economic reforms to the construction of the Great Firewall, and from the Belt and Road Initiative to the problematic urban–rural divide. Asian Studies ​ In 2020 –21, I studied the MA Asian Studies, focusing on East Asian studies specifically. Like in my bachelor program, I opted for courses on modern history as much as possible, together with more language acquisition courses. In the summer of 2021, I finished my master’s thesis on Chinese relations with Central America. In my thesis, I argued that the remarkable reluctance of Central American states to still side with Taiwan (ROC) over China (PRC) has its roots in the late Cold War, and presented four factors that account for local decision-making in the recognition rivalry between both Chinas. Latin American Studies Simultaneously, in 2020 I began the BA Latin American Studies. Having travelled to the region with family before graduating from high school, this was a region I had a natural interest in. Moreover, I thought it would be interesting to focus on a particular aspect of China’s interna- tional relations, and in order to focus on Sino-Latin American relations, more knowledge of the region itself would obviously be necessary. I also wanted to be able to speak Spanish. In Summer 2023 I graduated from this program, concluding with a third thesis. This thesis built on a discourse analysis of media and political discourse in two Central American states, Costa Rica and Honduras, and examined which narratives about China, the U.S., and their great- power rivalry have emerged in these countries in the period 2018 –23. ​ Research traineeship ​ In 2023, I also participated in a research project as a trainee. We did research on the new constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador (2008–09), how they are bringing the idea of plurinatio- nalism in practice, and how they relate to the rejected new plurinational constitution in Chile (2021–22). ​ (Note: Since 2024, I work at the Ministry of OCW in the Hague.) In Spring 2018, talking to a Shandongnese woman about her reasons to climb the stairs to the top of Taishan (泰山 ), an important Buddhist mountain in Shandong, near Tai'an. In Summer 2018, looking out over the southern port city of Mokpo, Korea Along the road on the main island of Bocas del Toro in Panama (2023). Personal introduction On this page, I would like to tell a bit more about myself. As you will see, although my interests are very (sometimes annoyingly) broad and practically cover the entire globe and multiple aspects of our societies, there is a baseline. From very early on, I have been interested in foreign languages and cultures, and I have always wanted to understand more about other peoples and ways of living, conscious that our (Western) way of thinking and acting is just one of many.