Bolivia and China: socialist comradery?

Over the past two decades, China has cautiously deepened its engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and gained a fairly strong foothold in the Western hemisphere. While China's presence in Central America should not be overstated, its presence is felt much more in South America, most notably the nations of the Southern Cone.

For the most part, this presence is purely economic. China has succeeded in signing free-trade agreements with several partners in the region, beginning with Chile (2005), while talks for new FTAs are currently underway with both Honduras and Nicaragua, who only recently established diplomatic relations with Beijing. Meanwhile, trade relations with Brazil and (pre-Milei) Argentina remain promising, not only because of complementarity but also because of a shared vision about global finance, most notably dedollarization and trade in domestic currency.

In fact, China has been careful not to be too bold in the Americas, given it still considers it to be the "backyard" (houyuan) of the United States. The efforts to dedollarize bilateral trade are one of the bolder attempts to challenge the Americans on their 'own' turf. The same may be said about a potential trade agreement with MERCOSUR, the South American trading bloc, and the expansion of BRICS, of which Brazil already was a founding member, to include states like Argentina. (The new Milei government has indicated it might ultimately not join BRICS+.)

When it comes to China's motives in the Americas, though, many remain skeptical about the popular narrative that China is trying to replace the U.S. in the Western hemisphere. Many of its activities either serve other purposes or simply fit in the broader trend of a rising power seeking more global influence. First, the Chinese outreach in the region has served the clear purpose of maintaining energy security and obtaining valuable resources, including fossil fuels like oil and critical minerals. Second, China's increased activity in Central America and parts of the Caribbean has not been about trade—these smaller states have relatively little to offer—and instead should be seen as an attempt to establish diplomatic ties with those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan). In other words, China's approach to LAC is rather pragmatic. At the same time, China's foreign policy discourse under Xi Jinping has also included certain important principles and values, including anti-imperialism, pluralism, and post-colonial emancipation.

This makes the case of China's relationship with South America's Bolivia more interesting. After all, in the first two decades of this century Bolivia has been governed almost exclusively by an openly socialist party—the Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS) and has been known for its anti-Americanism. The current Chinese government, of course, is known for its socialism with Chinese characteristics and is outspokenly anti-imperialist. Is this, then, something that makes China—Bolivia relations stand out from China's presence elsewhere in the region?

Evo Morales and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing (2018).

Evo, the flagbearer of socialist antiimperialismo

The leftist turn in Bolivia and, thus, perceived attractiveness to the Chinese government cannot be understood without taking into account the rise of Evo Morales. Under his leadership, Bolivia arguably became the most outspoken anti-U.S. state of the Americas. It has also become one of the most outspoken critics of the global economic system and the results of neoliberal globalization.

Even in a region that is known for its interesting left-wing leaders of the twenty-first century, Evo Morales stands out as a larger-than-life figure, whose influence has transcended Bolivia, into South America and beyond. Before entering national politics, Evo was a coca farmer in the Bolivian highlands. His talents for public speaking and ideological vision revealed themselves while working as a unionist for the cocaleros. While coca is known worldwide for its use in cocaine, in the Andes, the leaves are used for daily consumption—not much more than an energy snack and a traditional medicine. Coca is an important cultural product. Unsurprisingly, the decades-long, vigorous assault of the United States government to prohibit coca production by Bolivian farmers was one of the key causes for Evo's anti-Americanism.

Coca production and consumption in Bolivia is part of indigenous culture (non-indigenous Bolivians tend to look down on their indigenous compatriots, including coca-chewing). And this is what made Evo stand out as he left his union presidency and began running for national office: his indigenous roots. Indeed, in 2006, he became Bolivia's first indigenous president. It was a monumental occasion, especially for the emancipatory movement for indigenous peoples in Bolivia, who ever since Spanish colonization were oppressed and denigrated in Bolivian society, even while forming the country's clear plurality.

As president, Evo oversaw a government that transformed governance, state—society relations, and the economy. Under Evo, the Bolivian economy grew significantly. By 2014, the real income of Bolivians had more than doubled, purchasing power saw big increases, and the domestic currency, the boliviano, had shot up in value considerably. Socio-economic inequality decreased, new social programs ranging from infrastructure to public education proliferated, and the Bolivian population "transformed from being classified as predominantly poor, to mostly middle income" by 2019.

Besides economic policies, Evo's presidency was marked by a new constitution, which made revolutionary steps in recognizing the rights of Bolivia's many indigenous cultures. Bolivia acknowledged and combatted what has been called the 'coloniality of power, knowledge, and being' by Catherine Walsh: the continued dominance of Western ways of living and understanding, even though the Spaniards were defeated centuries ago. Space emerged for indigenous epistemologies and ways of living, on a scale unprecedented in the world. The constitutional reform in Bolivia was ambitious (arguably too ambitious), and results have been dubious at best; Evo's adherence to his principles as stipulated in the constitution have been criticized domestically. Still, with Evo as head of government, Bolivia experienced forms of socialist, indigenist, and anti-imperialist governance not experienced on a similar level in the Americas before.

If one takes into account Evo's socialism, indigenism, and anti-imperialism, then Bolivia would seem a good target for Chinese diplomatic outreach. Evo was ousted as president and fled the country in 2019, but that does not mean that evismo disappeared from Bolivian politics; his close political ally Luis Arce took over leadership within MAS and was elected as Bolivia's current president in 2020. So what has come of the China—Bolivia relationship in recent years?

Jeanine Añez speaks in La Paz (2020). She assumed the presidency after Evo Morales fled the country. A right-wing, Christian conservative, she has been considered the face of the 2019 coup d'état. For her role in the coup, Añez was sentenced to ten years in prison in June 2022.

Political comrades

As it is widely thought that China is constructing deeper relationships with countries in the Western hemisphere, Bolivia would be a logical primary target. Bolivia's relationship with Washington is strained; its economy is in need of new recipient markets and perhaps donors; anti-imperialist and socialist thought have dominated national politics for decades; both Bolivian politics and society are generally open to revolutionary reforms to economy, governance, and international relations, as shown by the successes of the MAS; and Bolivia has recognized the People's Republic of China for almost forty years, beginning in the 1980s, and joined China's flagship diplomatic project the BRI more than five years ago.

But evidence of a sense of 'comradery' from the Chinese government to Bolivia is very limited. As far as I can tell, there seems to be no special treatment of Bolivia, both diplomatically and economically.

China and Bolivia have had quite superficial diplomatic relations, even during the presidency of Evo Morales. Evo did meet Xi Jinping several times, most notably during a state visit to Beijing in June 2018, during which a strategic partnership was established. When speaking with Evo, Xi mentioned that both states "are countries with ancient civilizations" that should naturally explore "the use of [their] ancestral wisdom", while thanking Evo for his support for China's current diplomatic vehicles (mostly the BRI). Evo, meanwhile, thanked China for its bilateral support "without conditions", a clear reference to Western diplomacy, and expressed hope for a "a closer strategic partnership in the future".

But that all sounds more interesting than it truly is. As Li and Ye show, "strategic partnership" in China's taxonomy of diplomatic relationships is nothing special. Bolivia shares the title of 'strategic partner' with numerous countries, including Costa Rica, but also countries like Canada, Qatar, and Sudan—countries with much less ideological and political affinity with China. Even worse, there are numerous countries that have 'higher' levels of partnership, even within the Americas. Countries like Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru are comprehensive strategic partners, and Chile even is a comprehensive strategic cooperative partner. In other words, in China's diplomatic hierarchy (to which the Chinese government attaches significant value), Bolivia takes no special place at all.

Xi's rhetoric during his meeting with the Bolivian leader also does not suggest a special relationship or a recognition of Bolivia's potential as a partner. His reference to Bolivia's ancient civilization, on par with China's, should not be understood as a reference to Evo's indigenism per se; rather, it is a common phrase in Chinese diplomatic discourse when meeting with other 'civilizational powers'. See, for example, Xi's comments during a 2019 meeting with India's Narendra Modi. This fits right in China's diplomatic strategies and the recent development of the Global Civilization Initiative.

Moreover, both during this and other visits, the Chinese leader clearly framed China—Bolivia relations in the wider context of China's engagement with Latin America, and even more broadly, "South—South cooperation". This belies a Chinese tendency (or rather, preference) to approach Latin America as a whole, and not states individually. But the decision to do so also indicates that Xi has not (ostensibly) acknowledged Bolivia's special position in the region, ideological similarities with the Chinese government, and shared anti-Americanism. The same happened in more recent calls with Evo's successor Luis Arce, even during the height of tensions with the U.S. during the Trump administration.

China's passivity after Bolivia's 2019 elections provides further evidence of the shallow partnership. The Chinese government did not raise its voice when Evo was deposed from the presidency after the turbulent elections of 2019, and did not object to the dubious decision to make Jeanine Añez his successor—a turn of events that, argue Becker and Farthing, constituted an anti-indigenous and anti-socialist coup by the country's conservative elites, supported by police and military. Even worse, the ousting of Evo was enthusiastically supported by the U.S., something that would fit right in China's diplomatic narrative about the role of U.S. in world politics. China's silence about the role of the U.S. was telling.

The muted response of the Chinese government was also true for the Chinese embassy in La Paz, which did not publish any news on its official website throughout 2019 and early 2020. To be sure, the Chinese embassy of course did congratulate Arce with his electoral victory in October 2020; it had not congratulated Añez when she ascended to the presidency. In a read-out of a January 2021 call between Xi and now-president Luis Arce, who replaced Añez after new elections, Xi pointedly referred to the strength of bilateral ties "especially during the mandate of former president Evo Morales", excluding any reference to the Añez presidency. However, Xi did not refer to the right-wing, U.S.-supported coup that had taken place more than a year earlier—at least publicly. Perhaps equally telling, China's state-owned overseas media network CGTN America wrote about Evo's flight and Añez's presidency, but did not condemn the events, nor did it characterize it as a coup.

A promotional photo from Chinese state medium Xinhua shows the opening of the Parapeti bridge near Santa Cruz, part of a highway linking the city to the borders with Argentina and Paraguay (February 2020). Construction of the bridge was a project within the Belt and Road Initiative. The banner on the photo translates as "The China Railway Engineering Corporation wishes Bolivia that its economy grows and its people live happily!"

Economic comrades

Just as for most other states in the Western hemisphere, China has become an important trading partner for Bolivia. According to ECLAC's 2023 trade outlook, China—LAC trade reached a record high in 2022. Problematically, the trade balance is negative, as it has been consistently throughout this century; it even reached a record level of negativity in 2022. Bolivia is not an exception in this (p. 97).

Just like for most of the rest of South America, China is Bolivia's main source for imports, mostly high-technology products like machinery and telecommunications equipment (p. 100), as well as vehicles and farming pesticides. At the same time, Bolivia almost exclusively exports natural resources to China: this mainly includes silver, precious metals, tin, and lead (besides natural resources, Bolivia also exports some meat to the Chinese market). An increasing part of bilateral trade is conducted in yuan instead of U.S. dollars, undoubtedly to the satisfaction of the Chinese government.

The trade balance is significantly negative, which is compounded by the relatively low value of Bolivia's export products compared to what it imports from China. As is true for the rest of the region, this has been a recipe for deteriorating terms of trade. As long as Bolivia remains unable to diversify its exports to China away from the low-value primary products, it cannot compete with the relatively high-value end products China delivers. Subsequently, reaching a more equal trade of balance will be very difficult. Reliance on commodities in international trade remains a big problem for the Bolivian economy.

The Chinese government could be expected to support its socialist partner in their diversification efforts, both to strengthen and modernize the Bolivian economy and to protect the environment. Considering how the powerful West has historically oppressed the global South and reaped the benefits of their vast reserves of natural resources, especially in the colonial era, helping Bolivia be able to no longer depend on those resources would make much sense. But the Chinese are not doing that. It is not that China is not capable: for example, its Belt and Road Initiative could be used as an instrument to help Bolivia improve its own production capabilities, leaving it less reliant on exporting commodities. It could also unilaterally decide to focus on other products that Bolivia has to offer, by investing more in Bolivian meat, coffee, or quinoa—products about which were reached memorandums of understanding during the 2018 Evo—Xi meeting.

Instead, just like its capitalist adversaries in the West, China seems happy to exploit Bolivia's abundance of natural resources and critical minerals. Not only does China want to safeguard domestic energy security, for which it needs enormous amounts of fossil fuels and other commodities; but it also needs precious metals and critical minerals, including lithium, for its high-tech manufacturing. The main battle for market dominance now lies in the electric vehicles (EVs) industry, for which a lot of metals and minerals are needed, most importantly lithium.

Bolivian workers are harvesting at the Salar de Uyuni, the salt flat, in Bolivia's southwest.

Bolivia happens to be part of the so-called Lithium Triangle, together with Argentina and Chile, an area in the border region of the three countries with enormous lithium reserves. All three countries have seen much interest from economic powerhouses in order to safeguard access to the lithium, including the United States and the European Union. In Bolivia, the West faces strong competition from China. Since 2019, several Chinese companies have built lithium carbonate plants in the country, either individually or in joint ventures with Bolivian companies. In January 2023, Bolivian state company YLB signed a €1 billion agreement with three Chinese firms "to explore lithium deposits". And five months later, an additional €1.3 billion agreement between YLB and two Chinese and Russian state-owned companies to construct two additional plants was signed, further accelerating China's access to Bolivia's lithium.

The Chinese desire to control as much of the extractive process and subsequent exports as possible fits in a familiar pattern: for decades, its overwhelming economic interest when it comes to the trade relationship with Bolivia comes down to importing commodities. In that regard, Bolivia does not stand out from its regional neighbours in any way: more than eighty percent of South American exports to China are commodities (p. 90-92). Even more, although Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region remains very low, including in Bolivia (p. 42), it shows a pattern in Bolivia as much as elsewhere: brownfield investment dwarfs the amount of greenfield investment (p. 90) and is located overwhelmingly in the energy sector (p. 100). In other words, both in trade and in investment, China is solely preoccupied with satisfying its hunger for commodities, and does not invest in (or stimulate) structural changes in the Bolivian economy.

China's approach to bilateral trade relations also indicates a failure of Evo's economic policies. While in office, Evo displayed a hunger for economic growth that proved incompatible with sustainability reforms and a diversification of the economy. He nationalized the mining of natural resources, but did not end extractivism. Instead, he argued that the extraction of natural resources, while damaging to the environment and thus to Pachamama (Mother Earth), allowed the government to redistribute wealth and expand public services (desarrollismo). In other words, Evo and MAS did not really put up a fight against China's increasing exploitation of Bolivia's natural wealth.

At the same time, it also means that China is not acting as Bolivia's friend, or for that matter, as a strategic partner. The only strategic value of the relationship seems to be China's; meanwhile, Chinese strategic imperatives hurt the long-term development of the Bolivian economy and stimulate the country's continued overreliance on its natural resources.

Conclusion

In short, there seems to be little 'comradery' between China and Bolivia, even though Evo Morales and his MAS party would be a perfect vehicle for Beijing to improve its standing in the country and the region. Diplomatically, there is little evidence that China attributes much value to its relationship with Bolivia; politically, China failed to support its ideological ally when they were ousted in a seemingly anti-leftist coup; and economically, China's hunger for natural resources and minerals supersedes any bilateral attempts to make the Bolivian economy more sustainable and equal. For years, some Bolivian NGOs and government critics have come to the same conclusion, fearing financial dependency and encroachment on state sovereignty.

So what explains China's limited outreach to like-minded Bolivia? The most convincing explanations are simple. First, the Bolivian economy is small. According to the World Bank, it is the region's 16th economy (in GDP), smaller than Guatemala and Uruguay. Given Bolivia's relatively small population size, economic output is inherently limited. As a landlocked country, Bolivia is also less easily accessible for trade flows, especially in comparison to its neighbours on the Pacific coast. Thus, economically, Bolivia's use is limited to its abundance in natural resources, and it is clear that China did act on this, both in trade and investment.

Second, there is not much room for ideology in contemporary Chinese foreign policy. While in Chinese diplomatic history there has been a period of a very ideological approach towards Latin America, namely the first two decades of the Mao era, it seems that the approach has now become very pragmatic. For the most part, engagement has to serve concrete purposes. Two of these have been mentioned above: safeguarding domestic security and drawing diplomatic allies away from Taipei. For the first, Bolivia has some use; for the second, it does not; hence special engagement with Bolivia is not necessary.

This is also true for China's lack of response to the anti-leftist coup that removed Evo from power. Beijing has a tendency to refrain from interference in other country's domestic politics. Even on more impactful events China likes to stay muted—for example when it comes to the Burmese civil war or Haiti's state of lawlessness. Some of this is really based on conviction; but some of it is also pragmatic, as China is often willing to work with, for example, succesful coup leaders, when that serves its broader purposes. (China's cooperation with the Pinochet regime after the removal from power of Marxist leader Salvador Allende is an old, but good example.) Beijing has been rather consistent on this principle for a long time, and taking it into consideration, China's silence becomes more understandable.

Finally (and maybe a bit hyperbolically), the lack of a special treatment of Bolivia by China, or some sort of socialist comradery between its leaders, can also be considered another piece of evidence that there is no ongoing Second Cold War between the U.S. and China, or at least not in the Americas. In any such conflict, Bolivia surely would be a target of both sides, but especially the Chinese. And while some argue that the U.S. Monroe Doctrine is back, not to keep the European colonial powers out of the Americas but to block growing Chinese presence in the U.S.' sphere of influence, such dynamics in the case of Bolivia are not evident.

This does not mean that things cannot change. Evo Morales has announced his candidacy for the 2025 elections, and a new Evo government could mean a new chapter in the Bolivia—China relationship. But in 2023, little suggests that the Bolivian and Chinese share a special comradery.

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