BRICS+ and the Bandung Spirit

Two weeks ago, the BRICS group of nations finally decided to allow other nations to become members, evolving BRICS into BRICS+. It is an important step: although concrete results of the expansion are uncertain, in the short term it is of great symbolic value, both for existing members and new members. BRICS is a dynamic group of rising powers, a vehicle of emancipation of world politics, and unlike virtually all other global institutions and groupings of nations, the West is not invited.

The expansion of BRICS made me think of the 1955 Bandung Conference. Both BRICS and the Bandung Conference are not institutions (or in the case of BRICS+, not yet), but rather events with largely undefined practical, but clear symbolic implications; and both in their guest list exclude the developed, Western nations from participation.

The 1955 Bandung Conference was an important gathering of what then would be called ‘Third World’ nations, and what we now consider the ‘global South’. The Conference took place in Indonesia during the early decades of the Cold War, and it was the tension of the global conflict between the liberal United States and the communist Soviet Union that spurred on the event.

The sense of urgency amongst the Bandung Conference participants to deliberate on the emancipation of their postcolonial states, as well as on how to navigate the dangerous geopolitics of the world’s two major powers and the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement, makes the comparison with the many countries that showed interest in joining BRICS interesting. Concerns about the relationship between the United States and China are widely shared throughout the entire world, from Europe to Latin America, and from the Middle East to Oceania. There have been analyses detailing how, while some states may sway more towards Washington and others more towards Beijing, in reality, most states share a desire to stay as neutral as possible and profit from the avances of both major powers. While there is no unified call for a movement of non-aligned states that explicitly express their desire to stay out of conflicts between the U.S. and China–Russia, there is a unified worry that states can now become victims of the unstable geopolitical climate. At the same time, there is a widely shared belief that the twenty-first century will become the era of the global South, which now becomes sufficiently developed to be an equal to the developed West.

Of course, there are major differences between the Bandung Conference and BRICS+, and I do not intend to make a detailed comparison. China itself, as the United States’ nemesis, is part of the BRICS+, while neither major power in the Cold War participated in Bandung. Whereas in the 1950s there was some possibility to stay out of global geopolitics and the U.S.–Soviet conflict, in today’s hyperglobalized world that has virtually become impossible, no matter a state’s alignment. And while Bandung was about politics and ideology, BRICS+ promises to be very pragmatic in nature.

BRICS+ will be focused on pragmatic cooperation in many domains, especially trade and finance, providing existing and new member states with much-needed opportunities for beneficial trade relations (e.g., for Argentina and Ethiopia) and opportunities to diversify existing trade relations (e.g., for Saudi Arabia and the Emirates). For some, especially Russia and Iran, BRICS+ can be a lifeline to circumvent Western sanctions. It seems to me that for China, BRICS expansion is truly about reshaping global order, in line with China’s traditional interest in multilateralism and pluralism in international relations. At the same time, even for the Chinese, BRICS+ is an instrument to achieve other goals: first, to increase cooperation with the largest non-Western economies without Western interference; and second, to secure the import of natural resources, mostly from Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates.

There is a ‘Bandung Spirit’ amongst member states. For some, it is about the emancipation of rising, non-Western economies, that need to work together in the face of adversaries in the developed economies of the West; for others, it is about hedging bets and cooperating as neutrally as possible in both Western-led organizations and China and Russia-led organizations. This Spirit, however, takes the backseat to the economic pragmatism that is of most importance to many of the BRICS+ members.

Prospects

Groupings like the UN Security Council and G20 suffer increasingly from internal differences and, hence, deadlock. The G7 only is able to produce some tangible results, as it consists merely of like-minded nations. The 1955 Bandung Group perhaps did not produce tangible results, but it did alter the way in which African and Asian nations were able to position themselves in the Cold War, and reshaped thinking about the emancipation of postcolonial states.

Like the G7, BRICS+ is capable of delivering tangible results to its member states and subsequently shape the world economy and international politics. This, however, is a choice, not an inevitability. BRICS in its old form did not produce many significant results, besides from a more favourable treatment in bilateral trade relationships amongst members. Current discussions about a joint currency and coordinated efforts to accelerate the process of de-dollarization are interesting, though. Brazil’s Lula has been one of the most vocal advocates of a BRICS trading currency, seeing it as an effective way of depending less on the dollar. China is also an understandable proponent of such measures. In April 2023, it began trading with new BRICS+ member Argentina in the Chinese yuan, circumventing the traditional use of the dollar.

The de-dollarization plan indicates an intent by BRICS+ members to further institutionalize the grouping. That is necessary, because the ‘old’ BRICS remained a somewhat vague grouping, with no clear rules or concrete goals. It also shows an intent to reshape the global (financial) order, and with BRICS+, the members have enough demographic, financial, and economic power to make that happen. This plan, in my view, shows both geopolitical and ideological considerations (especially for Lula and Xi), transcending the mere pragmatism that otherwise characterizes both BRICS and the new BRICS+. While different from the well-known Non-Aligned Movement, it is also here that a larger BRICS may demonstrate something that resembles the old Bandung Spirit of global emancipation and global South cooperation.

Note, 6 December: On 30 November, the incoming administration of Argentinean president-elect Javier Milei confirmed that it would not join the BRICS+ grouping in 2024. During his electoral campaign, Milei used fierce anti-China rhetoric. At the same time, it remains to be seen if Milei cannot be tempted to still join BRICS+ when in office, especially when his financial and economic plans do not deliver immediate results. Moreover, Milei has already softened some of his hard-line rhetoric on foreign policy. For example, he invited left-wing president Lula to his inauguration, despite combative language against Brazil during his campaign.