Is India the world's largest democracy?

India, the country that recently became the world’s most populous nation, often proclaims itself the world’s ‘largest democracy’. For some time, this was generally considered to be true. It is a regular trope in media and expert analyses, and in statements from governments like the United States’. And on the surface, it is true: India holds elections on many levels of government, allows the creation of political parties, and facilitates political debate. Many states are governed by party coalitions which demand negotiation and, hence, more balanced governance. Most Indian people are accustomed to a lot of democratic freedoms, including the freedom of press and freedom of expression.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, clear cracks have emerged in the image of India as a stable democracy. Under the rule of Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Indian government’s commitment to democracy has weakened. In my view, it makes it necessary to reconsider the image of India as a functioning democracy, and discuss where the country is heading as Modi (likely) is on his way to a new term as prime minister. There are a few red flags that are especially important.

Red flags of Indian democracy

Narendra Modi has been prime minister of India since 2014. He is a compelling figure, and has reached high levels of popularity both domestically and abroad. In 2023, although being in power for almost a decade, still roughly eighty percent of Indians approve of his leadership, according to research by Pew. The study also shows that Modi is significantly more popular than other political figures, including opposition leader Rahul Gandhi. He also remains the world’s most popular global leader, and it is not even close. 76% of respondents in a September 2023 study by Morning Consult approved of Modi’s leadership, compared to, for example, Sunak’s 26%, Macron’s 23%, and Kishida’s 23%. In other words, no other world leader can match Modi’s domestic popularity. (Internationally, confidence in Modi is mixed. Most approval of Modi’s role in world affairs was found in African countries, while most disapproval was found in Latin America.)

This is very much about Modi himself. His BJ Party is significantly less popular (about half as popular, even). In fact, while much attention in the last few years may have been paid to a growing ‘cult of personality’ in Xi’s China, less attention has been paid to a similar trend occurring in India. An analysis in the Washington Post, two years ago, illustrated this by describing how a rocket sent into outer space by the Indian space agency was decorated by a photo of Modi. While this is a relatively innocent form of celebrating a leader, more problematic is the increasing tendency of the leader’s vehicle (i.e., his political party) and his audience (i.e., his supporters) to not accept any criticism directed at him. A big factor in this development is the popular frame that this one person, Narendra Modi, stands for so much more than himself, namely India, its fortunes, and its survival. A few years ago, a prominent BJP politician publicly claimed that Modi “is God’s gift to India”. The Washington Post analysis highlights more examples of Modi supporters declaring him a near-divine entity. It also highlights actions, taken by central and local governments in recent years, that resemble further efforts to institutionalize the idea of Modi as the nations’ father and saviour—by replacing old pictures of Gandhi by Modi’s, for example, or by forcing students to celebrate Modi’s birthday, or by glorifying Modi’s life through movie productions. In this hides a strategy to make Modi a larger-than-life figure that people increasingly see as synonymous with India’s well-being. It creates support not only for his appearance and his policies, but also for his more autocratic governance.

Such a cult of personality is a red flag for democracy, because it weakens it. It seeks to place the one person above the ideas and institutions of democracy, as he is of such importance and stature that they do not need to abide by the rules. This can lead to an erosion of the rule of law, the trias politica, and prevent healthy debate between government and opposition. Moreover, as criticism of the leader becomes more and more unacceptable, the lack of public accountability leads to less and less reflection on the decisions taken by the government. As the leader is the nation’s saviour, all his actions are good; reflection on whether his policies were truly good or bad, in other words, is inherently unnecessary and even provocative. No accountability can lead to continuously bad governance, which is hurtful to any state, democracy or not. But most importantly, the cult of personality can lead to such a degree of power-grabbing by the one person that democracy evolves into an autocracy or dictatorship.

Hinduization of India

Modi, in other words, is a towering figure in India who has long transcended the day-to-day politics of his government. Along with his increasing grip on the Indian state, Modi’s radical Hindu nationalism has gotten much space, and now is the dominant ideological force in the government. That Hinduism plays a role in Indian politics and civil society is not strange: almost eighty percent of Indians identify themselves as Hindu. A pride in Hindu history and culture is only understandable.

Hindu nationalism, however, is something different from Hinduism. It is instead described as “a belief that Indian national identity and culture are inseparable from the Hindu religion.” Because of this inseparability, society gets divided in the ‘in-groups’ (Hindus) and ‘out-groups’ (non-Hindus) that are the familiar pillars of nationalism. As an analogue term to describe the political ideology, Hindutva (‘Hindu-ness’) holds that Hinduism should be hegemonic and that the Indian state should not be secular (or, as it was before colonization, Islamic), but should become a formal Hindu state. Early proponents of Hindutva “used [perceived] Muslim and Christian encroachment to prop up the bugbear of a dangerous “other,” which increased the perceived vulnerability of Hindus and provided a useful motivational threat.” Of course, the more radical this ideology becomes, the more problems it poses for a multi-ethnic society like India. Christophe Jaffrelot describes contemporary India as an “ethnic democracy”, in which there is a contemporary state of “Hindu Majoritarianism against Secularism.” There is a process of “Hinduization” of the public sphere, where the space for and rights of religious minorities (notably the Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians) are diminished and oppressed.

A symbolic example of this Hinduization were recent rumours that Modi intends to change the name of India to the Hindu name Bharat. Such a change would not only celebrate India’s Hindu heritage, but would also mean a big step towards turning the secular state into a Hindu state, and would clearly sideline the non-Hindu parts of Indian society. Even more dangerously, Modi has been repeatedly connected to explosions of anti-Muslim violence. In 2002, riots in Gujarat resulted in the killing, mutilation, and rape of hundreds of Muslims. The riots have been called a pogrom by scholars, describing a systemic effort to massacre an ethnic or religious minority. Modi served as Chief Minister of the state at the time. While he later was cleared of complicity by India’s Supreme Court, Modi’s responsibility has been well-documented. Tellingly, a January 2023 documentary by the BBC about Modi’s role in Gujarat was censured by the Indian government. The role of Modi and his BJP in inciting or condoning violence against non-Hindu parts of Indian society show an adherence to the darkest side of Hindu nationalism. It hurts India’s democracy: it deliberately polarizes the Indian people, it attempts and often succeeds in disenfranchising non-Hindu voters, and threatens importants freedoms, like freedom of speech and freedom of press.

Security without opposition

In a healthy democracy, a political figure like Prime Minister Modi and a political party like the BJP know that there are limits to their attempts to create a cult of personality and foster their brand of nationalism. These limits lie primarily in the separation of powers and the electoral system. But they lie also in the presence of good, independent media that ‘hold truth to power’. Under Modi, however, attacks on free media are more and more frequent. In May 2023, Reporters Without Borders (RWB) claimed that “pro-government media owners and supporters move to shut down critical stories [of Modi],” while an increasing amount of media are owned by wealthy Indians with close ties to the prime minister. In 2022, Human Rights Watch warned the Indian government to “stop targeting, prosecuting journalists and online critics.” Recently, a BBC investigation uncovered a systemic effort by the Indian government to clamp down on independent journalism in Kashmir. Another study claims that in 2020, more than sixty Indian journalists were arrested, while almost two hundred journalists were physically assaulted. Currently, India is ranked 140 on the World Press Freedom Index, updated annually by RWB.

The increasing politicization of journalism and the growing hold of Modi supporters on media enterprises show that a fundamental pillar of democracy is under great threat in India. Especially when Modi transcends his prime ministership, being portrayed as India’s father and saviour, and becomes more and more powerful, the checks and balances of critical journalism are very important.

Besides the increasing suppression of independent media, securitization of state and society is another worrying sign of Indian democracy in decline. Here, securitization refers to the politicization of ‘threats’ that are in conflict with the state—or in India’s case, with Modi and the BJP. These threats are mainly those entities who differ from Modi: the aforementioned journalists who investigate the policies and networks of Modi and his party; minorities, such as the Muslims in Kashmir who seek to remove themselves from Hindu rule under Modi; political opposition figures; and foreign enemies, most obviously Pakistan, and to a lesser degree China. They are framed as adversaries and enemies of a stable and peaceful (Hindu) India, hence the need to ‘securitize’ the Indian state and society to prevent the people from these threats.

There are two examples of this securitization that pose especially direct threats to democratic politics and society: the mistreatment of religious minorities and political opposition, both in the name of (state) security. First, the rise of Hindu nationalism has not only led to an increase in pride of Hindu identity, but has also led to an increase in derogatory and aggressive sentiments towards non-Hindu Indians. Essentially, these non-Hindus are perceived as a potential threat to the majority-Hindu state. The Muslims are the most obvious example: the BJP’s antagonistic behaviour towards Muslim Indians is very well-known. But relations with other minorities, including the Sikhs in the Sikh-majority Punjab state, are problematic as well, as they are largely unwilling to conform to the Hindu nationalist politics of the Modi government. It is no coincidence that many of the government’s most repressive policies have taken place in parts of India where the non-Hindu population is the largest. The 2019 decision to revoke the decades-long autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in clashes between the Indian state and local Muslim communities, serves as a strong example of state repression of a religious minority for the sake of ‘state security’. Even in academic literature, the theoretical concept ‘securitization’ has been connected to the Modi government’s approach towards ethnic minorities, with one author arguing that “the Indian state has in fact securitized its internal ethnic conflicts.”

Second, not only non-Hindu minorities are considered threats to the (Hindu) state; as the state has become almost synonymous with Narendra Modi himself, opposition to his leadership has become a threat as well. It has resulted in worrying repression of political opposition. Most importantly, the very dubious prosecution of opposition leader Rahul Gandhi of the Congress Party raised suspicion of the deliberate imprisonment of political opposition. This is especially true as Gandhi gained political momentum in 2022 during his popular march, or pilgrimage, through India, rather succesfully rebranding himself as a common Indian who seeks to connect with his fellow people. While the Supreme Court in August 2023 suspended Gandhi’s conviction, postponing any imprisonment and potentially allowing him to challenge Modi in the 2024 election, this did not end accusations of a politically motivated trial to sideline Modi’s political opposition. The central government’s intimidation and investigation of political opposition goes beyond Gandhi, however. In March 2023, a lawmaker accused “central investigation agencies” of being used by the BJP to target opposition leaders. These forms of oppression might even have extended abroad. In September 2023, the Canadian government accused India of being involved in the murder of a Sikh separatist leader who lived British Columbia. These incidents suggest that the Indian government under Modi is increasingly comfortable with sidelining, harassing, and potentially even killing politicians and activists who are in opposition to the BJP.

It goes even further: besides these attacks on non-Hindu minorities, independent journalism, and political opposition, the Indian government engages frequently in efforts to limit freedom of speech and access to information. In 2022, no country imposed internet shutdowns more frequently than India: of 187 registered internet shutdowns worldwide, 84 occurred in India. Not surprisingly, most of these shutdowns were initiated in Kashmir. Between August 2019 and February 2021, phone and internet connections were cut of by the Modi government—eighteen months without access to basic communication technology. The central government justified this “on security grounds”. Blatant efforts to limit access to information in regions where minorities live not only are intended to obstruct criticism and opposition towards the central government; they also allow more space in media and communication for the desired media narrative in New Delhi. This, then, further enables the Hinduization or ‘Modification’ of the media sphere, accomodating government propaganda and Modi’s emerging cult of personality.

Modi greets supporters in New Delhi (January 2023).

Side note: a China comparison

The red flags discussed above merit a quick (and superficial) comparison between the cases of India and China, Asia’s two greatest powers. First, the politics in both states are heavily dominated by one party, although the dominance is much more obvious and complete in the case of China’s Communist Party. Opposition party alliances aside, no party comes close to the BJP in terms of its power, influence, and membership, which is much greater than the membership of the less-accessible Communist Party in China. Second, as mentioned before, the cult of personality that increasingly surrounds Narendra Modi to some extent resembles the cult of personality surrounding Xi Jinping. In China, state-owned media and tech enterprises spend much time and effort on Xi’s image, bringing him closer to ‘the people’ and presenting him as an affable, hard-working but down-to-earth father of the Chinese family. It has made Xi an inevitability, especially since the abolishment of the term limits that would have prevented him from still being China’s president. He is now an omnipresent part of Chinese politics and society. Modi does not share Xi’s benefit of near-total control over media and technology, although he is still able to make progress with the tools at his disposal.

Third, where Modi builds his popularity on Hindu nationalism, the Chinese government is similarly known for its use of nationalism. This pertains both to ethnic nationalism (sovereignty of the Han Chinese identity, wariness of ethnic minorities and separatism) and a popular nationalism that divides the foreign world in those that are with and those that are against China (and thus, Xi). For Modi, India is a Hindu state; its Hindu history and culture is a source of pride. For Xi, China is a Han state; its Han history and culture is a source of pride. Not coincidentally, both Xi (Xinjiang) and Modi (Kashmir) have been criticized for their treatment of Muslims and other minorities.

Fourth, other red flags in Indian democracy—media oppression, securitization of the state, attacks on journalists, opposition figures, and activists—have progressed much further in China. It is why China is generally not considered a democracy, but a dictatorship or totalitarian regime. (Both India and China do claim to be democratic, though: India (at least as of now) does so conform the Western understanding of representative democracy, whereas China does so conform a Leninist understanding of democracy (i.e., the people’s democratic dictatorship and democratic centralism).) In other words, while there are limits to this comparison, it does show that Indian democracy under Modi has worrying similarities with the Chinese government, which should lead to a re-assessment of our understanding of India as a stable democracy.

Conclusion

In short, there are numerous signs that point towards a serious weakening of democracy in India under the leadership of Narendra Modi. In this, the decline of press freedom, imprisonment of political opposition, and media blackouts are most concerning.

As a developing country, India obviously has real potential. Its economy has much room for growth, its population is young and growing, and still much progress can be made in areas like infrastructure and education. India also has a big opportunity to play a larger role in global governance. But it has to be careful with its democracy. A re-election of Narendra Modi as prime minister next year could further weaken democracy and worsen the red flags indicated above. There are some electoral warning signs for Modi, meaning that any trouble in the upcoming elections might incentivize him to increase his repression against opposition and minorities.

India also needs to respect the democracy of others. If Canada’s accusations are true, and India did order the murder of a separatist leader on Canadian territory, that would be unprecedented and would have a big impact on India’s standing in the West. The same is true for the use of Hindu nationalism by combative Indian diplomats under Modi, recently dubbed ‘tiger warrior diplomacy’ in reference to China’s wolf warrior diplomacy, which has contributed to China’s worsening standing in parts of the world. An Indian democracy in decline also means that there are serious challenges for the world’s democracies to find ways to constructively engage with Modi, and find ways to come to the aid of those who are hurting under his politics.

Image reference