Israel and Palestine in a new world (2)
- J Hoenderdos
- Oct 28, 2023
- 16 min read
Updated: Dec 20, 2023
The Hamas attack on Israel of 7 October 2023 holds international politics in a tight grip. Now, three weeks after the initial attack by Hamas, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are seemingly still preparing for a ground operation in northern Gaza, while simultaneously engaging in crossfire with Hezbollah or affiliated militias in southern Lebanon and growing unrest in the West Bank. Negotiations are taking place to guarantee the continuous entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, although Israel does not appear very willing to accomodate it. Meanwhile, the threat of regional escalation still looms. The possible bombing of a large hospital in Gaza—undoubtedly the greatest example of information warfare so far—greatly heightened tensions across the Middle East, from Turkey to Yemen. While I wrote last week that regional escalation seems unlikely, public pressure can sway governments' decision making. Of course, this is especially true in the cases of Iran and Lebanon, but governments in Cairo or Riyadh could also change their strategic calculus if anti-Israel anger expands. All the while, tension builds in anticipation of what Israel's invasion of the Gaza Strip will look like.
In my previous post on the global dimensions of the Hamas—Israel conflict, I pointed out several complexities and unknowns of the regional involvement in the conflict, which are especially relevant given how complicated and dangerous the geopolitics of the Middle East are. Most specifically, I wrote about the roles of Iran and Russia. Their involvement remains to be examined and monitored. A few days ago, Kim Ghattas wrote an interesting analysis in The Atlantic, pointing out the caution of the Iranian government as it maneuvers the unexpectedly large success of the Hamas assault and the reputational fallout of Israel's subsequent attack on Gaza. At the same time, Iran-backed militias in recent days have been increasingly attacking U.S. military posts in Iraq and Syria, while the Houthi rebels in Yemen on 19 October also began launching missiles towards Israel. All these attacks are not yet of a very large scale, but seem to show an intent on the side of Iran's alliance to keep tensions high. Meanwhile, the military build-up of the U.S. in the region also continues.
In other words, the regional complexities of alliances and proxies remain important to follow. At the same time, two weeks after the first week of Israel's response to the 7 October attack by Hamas, it is also good to take stock of the West's early response to the Hamas—Israel conflict. In my view, the West made a fundamental mistake by siding fully and "unapologetically" with the Israeli government during the first week of Israel's retaliation. The decision by the United States and most of the European Union to do so cannot but have big consequences for the West's standing in the rest of the world. It might also seriously hurt the West’s efforts to gain support in the rest of the world for Ukraine.
Israel as a Western project
Before turning to the West's current position in the conflict between Israel and Hamas, I do want to point out that it is very understandable that the West's approach towards Israel deviates from the approach of the rest of the world. After all, Israel is a Western project, most notably founded based on a desire to do justice to the Jewish people who endured so much suffering in the countries of the West—of course with the Holocaust as the most traumatic event of the twentieth century. It were Europeans who betrayed their Jewish compatriots, and it were Europeans who saw the need to seek a Jewish state.
From this perspective, it was understandable to seek that Jewish state in the 'Holy Land' of the Torah, home to Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth. It was also very convenient that in the 1940s this Holy Land was in the de facto colonial possession of the British. Palestine was under British rule after the Ottomans were driven from the region in 1917-18. Eventually, the British Mandate was repealed in 1948, and the Yishuv—the original Jewish inhabitants of Palestine—declared an independent State of Israel, based on recommendations by the newly founded United Nations. The declaration of independence was followed by the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and the invasion of the new Israeli territory by several Arab nations, who were strongly opposed to the U.N.'s accord for a Jewish state in Palestine. Israel's victory in the subsequent 1948-49 Arab—Israeli War resulted in maintenance of its U.N.-proposed territory. Palestinians were forced to relocate to Gaza and the West Bank. Gaza was occupied by Egypt and the West Bank was annexed by Jordan, until both were captured by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War. Since then, the Palestinian territories have been under occupation by the Israeli state.
In other words, the use of Palestine to settle the 'Jewish question' was understandable and convenient—from the Western perspective. The Arabs, of course, had nothing to do with the Holocaust, nor were they seriously involved in any debate about the foundation of a Jewish state in the middle of the Arab world. Arabs in the region, obviously first and foremost the Palestinians, felt betrayed by the British. But they lacked the hard power to prevent the West's decision, and so the Nakba happened: Palestinians were driven from their cities and villages, and Jewish settlers of the new Israeli state took their place. For this reason, the population of Gaza (the 'Gazans') consists for a large part of refugees, perhaps as much as two-third of all inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, a fact that is not acknowledged enough. But in the Western experience of the twentieth century, the Nakba and subsequent conflicts were side effects of a just cause.
(This clearly is also the tragedy of the perennial Israel—Palestine conflict. On the one hand, Jewish people did not ask for centuries-long persecution and anti-Semitism that continues to this day. They did not ask for the Holocaust, and they did not ask for policies that resulted in Palestinian replacement and regional conflict. On the other hand, Palestinian people did not ask for British rule over their land (or Ottoman rule for that matter). They also did not ask, when the British left, for the creation of another Western state on their territory in their stead, one that in its culture and religion completely differed from most Palestinians. Nor did Palestinians, who just happened to live in what became Israel, ask for their expulsion from their own lands to facilitate another oppressed people. Sadly, this dynamic continues to this day: many Israelis did not ask for Netanyahu's extremist government; many Palestinians did not ask for Hamas' militancy.)
The West follows Netanyahu
Considering the West's historical involvement in Israel, its response to the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October unsurprisingly showed a near-unanimous support for Israel, which lasted at least one week. In their earliest reactions, governments in North America and Europe tended to use phrases like "unwavering", "steadfast", "rock solid", and "unequivocal" support for Israel as it suffered through a day-long attack by Hamas fighters on Israeli settlements near Gaza. Leaders expressed their disgust and used terms like 'evil' to describe the violence committed by Hamas: British prime minister Rishi Sunak spoke of "unqualified support [for Israel] in face of evil", European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen described the attack as "an act of war [...] an ancient evil", and Joe Biden similarly characterized Hamas as a "pure, unadulterated evil [...] unleashed on this world."*
"We will not ever fail to have her back."
— Joe Biden on Israel, 7 October 2023
In addition, Western governments made clear their support for Israel's right to self-defense. Von der Leyen stated that "Europe stands with Israel" in its defense, while Sunak considered Israel's right to defend itself "absolute". Biden promised to "make sure that Israel has what it needs to [...] defend itself and respond to this attack." In the first days of the conflict, it was very clear what this self-defense entailed: securing Israeli kibbutzes, expelling remaining Hamas fighters from Israeli territory by either killing them or forcing them back into Gaza, and preventing Hamas missiles from impacting Israeli cities. At the same time, the IDF very rapidly began its aerial bombardment of Gaza. To me it is unclear how much support Israel actually received from the West for its airstrikes because most diplomacy happens behind closed doors, but in public statements Western government did not condemn any airstrikes executed by the IDF, even as the Palestinian death toll skyrocketed.
At least publicly—and that is what matters for the purposes of this post—the West also seemed to be fully on board with Israel's narrative about the Hamas-Israel conflict. It shared the assessment that Hamas had terrorized Gaza before terrorizing Israel; that the attack by Hamas meant a threat to the very existence of the State of Israel; that the attack was anti-Semitic; and that Hamas now needed to be fully eradicated. And there is more. For example, several Western leaders including Biden and Timmermans have adopted Israel's (flawed) frame that "Hamas is ISIS". Others, like British foreign minister Cleverly, have gone along with the not-so-subtle justification of bombing schools and hospitals by emphasizing that Hamas uses innocent civilians as human shields. (Hence, the death of every Palestinian child by an Israeli bomb is not the fault of the Israeli bomber, but Hamas. This reasoning is obviously flawed. If a rational actor knows that the enemy may be located near countless innocent people, it would rule out mass bombardment.)
Palestinians? Not now, please
A few hours after Hamas initiated its attack on Israel, Dutch prime minister Rutte made his first public comments in response to questions by state broadcaster NOS. It is worth quoting his words here, in translation:
"The images [out of southern Israel] are horrific and are also really unprecedented. May I add that they are also really degrading—the images that we just received. This morning, I had a phone call with the Israeli prime minister, Bibi Netanyahu, and told him that we condemn this attack, that we are behind Israel, and that we support Israel to resist against this and to protect itself. We have not often experienced that this conflict targets ordinary people... On the civilians in Israel. Obviously it is terrible when it targets soldiers, but in this case it also targets many normal Israelis, who live there, and are now confronted with the most horrific forms of an unprecedented explosion of violence. For that, it is required that Israel defends itself."
The comments by Rutte capture quite well the European consensus in the first days of the conflict. He expresses his—understandable—anger about Hamas' violence, as well as support for a diplomatic ally, and he reiterates Israel's right (or here, need) to defend itself. But it is also telling for Rutte's belief that "[w]e have not often experienced that this conflict targets ordinary people". That claim is not true, unless Rutte excludes Palestinians as 'ordinary' people. According to the U.N., more than 6,400 Palestinians were killed by Israel in the last fifteen years, including more than 1,400 children. More than 152,000 Palestinians were injured in the same time period. Rutte's comment may have been a slip of the tongue, but it reveals a neglect of Palestinian suffering that was visible in the wider Western response during the earliest period of this conflict.
This began as early as the first weekend of the Hamas attack, when some Western leaders were asked about Israel's initial response. Rutte and several others were questioned about proportionality: at what point does the right to Israeli self-defense end? The answer was clear: Rutte, Sunak, and Von der Leyen repeated their position that a ‘yes, but’ would be inappropriate; the ‘yes’ referred to their support for Israel and its assault on Gaza, the ‘but’ referred to questions about proportionality and adherence to international law. Now that Israel had suffered through the deadliest attack on Jews since the Holocaust, said Rutte, it would be the wrong time to question the limits of Israel's response. It meant a de facto carte blanche for a thorough and violent retaliation, which quickly cost the lives of countless Palestinians in Gaza.
The problematization of 'yes, but' is an interesting frame, because most journalists, activists, and international organisations were not asking for a 'yes, but' at all. Instead, they were looking for a ‘yes, and’: we support Israel and we demand it complies with international law. This became Europe’s position last week, but was completely missing in the first two weeks of the conflict. The problem of 'yes, but' is that it totally ignored the Palestinian people. As the European governments appeared unwilling to criticize Israel after 7 October, this meant that they similarly were unwilling to stand for the Palestinian people in Gaza and their needs.
Western discomfort to properly stand up for the Palestinians is still visible. (Ireland and Spain stand out as exceptions.) The West has found it difficult to explicitly condemn war crimes or violations of international law committed by Israel. Its response to Israel blocking humanitarian aid, water, food, and fuel from Gaza was extremely muted, as was its reluctance to condemn airstrikes on refugee camps and hospitals. Most Western governments reacted similarly when Israel bombed targets in other countries, or when the Israeli Minister of National Security began distributing automatic weapons to illegal settlers on the West Bank. Moreover, the West has found it difficult—and has mostly rejected the opportunity—to place the attack of Hamas and Israel’s reponse in a broader historical context, which asks for an urgent end to Israeli oppression of Palestinian territories and the proclamation of an independent Palestinian state.
Within Europe and the United States, governments have also gone far in their attempts to mute the Palestinian voice in public debate. Several European governments targeted pro-Palestine protests, including Hungary, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, which drew concern from human rights organisations and organisations that monitor freedom of speech. In the U.S., broadcaster MSNBC removed three Muslim reporters from its programming for several days, although the network denied this. And throughout the West, governments did little to prevent Israel from advertising their war propaganda on social media and in gaming apps. These actions indicate little inclination to put the suffering of the Palestinian people, as well as the injustice and irresponsibility of Israel's assault on Gaza, front and center in Western diplomacy. This sets the West apart from the rest of the world.
International backlash to the West's response
The way in which Western governments approached the conflict between Hamas and Israel in the first week has had serious implications for the West's image in large parts of the world, but especially the MENA region.
It is important that the West understands that it is in the minority when it comes to the issue of Israel and Palestine. It is also important that the West understands that for a large part, it is substantively wrong on the issue of Israel and Palestine. The inconsistency of the Western argument is an open invitation for others to call out Western hypocrisy.
Perceptions of the role of the West in the conflict
Here, I have listed six perceptions about the West’s position in the Hamas–Israel conflict. They show a view of global history that is shared by much of ‘the Rest’, but not recognized by the West itself. Many countries, especially former colonies, see much of global events still through the prism of postcolonialism. In this context, this means that (1) they do not like the former colonial powers telling them what to do or what to think, and (2) they are eager for a new world order and forms of global governance that are reflective of the postcolonial world, with more equality amongst states and (thus) less Western dominance.
Consequently, Israel is seen by many as an oppressor state. It was founded by colonial powers, which led to the expulsion of the Palestinian people from their land. Since then, Israel not only behaved as a colonizer—especially through its annexation policies on the West Bank, but also through its treatment of people in the Gaza Strip—but was also supported by its ‘fellow colonizers’ in doing so. This causes resentment in the rest of the world, especially amongst Arab states and former colonies. They share a colonial experience and see strong parallels with the current punishment of the ‘colonized’ Palestinians. In this, the West is complicit: it fails to push Israel towards a diplomatic solution and rejects criticism of the history of the State of Israel, often framing it as anti-Semitic or anti-Zionist. In other words, the colonial frame hurts the West’s standing as is continues to support Israel in what is viewed as a colonial project.
Related to the colonial narrative is a strong belief that the West, which has dominated world politics for such a long time, feels superior and can ignore the rules when necessary. The Israeli compare the Hamas attack to the September 11th, 2001 attack on the United States. Following that analogy, how did the Americans respond to the attack by Al Qaeda? George W. Bush proclaimed an Axis of Evil, existing not of Al Qaeda but of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; his government fabricated evidence to justify a war of revenge in Iraq; and his government invaded both Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to the deaths of countless innocent civilians and decades-long military occupation. Much of the U.S. response to 9/11 was in violation of international law, and it received little international support. Europeans may not connect the dots between the U.S.’ punishment of Iraq and Afghanistan and Israel’s punishment of Palestine, but the rest of the world certainly does. They see a pattern of unsanctioned military invasions that are initiated after an attack by a non-state actor, without proper consultation of the rest of the world and without sufficient regard of international law and human rights.
The West’s almost unanimous support for Israel and its relative silence on the suffering of the Palestinian people in the first week of the conflict made it appear biased. This indeed was how it was perceived by much of the Rest. On 24 October, Queen Rania of Jordan said the following in an interview with CNN:
“[...] we are just shocked and disappointed by the world's reaction to this catastrophe that is unfolding. In the last couple of weeks we have seen a glaring double standard in the world. When October 7th happened, the world immediately stood by Israel and its right to defend itself, and condemnded the attack that happened. But what we are [also] seeing is silence in the world; countries have stopped expressing concern or acknowledging the casualties [in Gaza] but always with a preface with a declaration of support for Israel. Are we being told that it is wrong to kill a family at gunpoint, but it is okay to shell them to death? There is a glaring double standard here, and it is just shocking to the Arab world. This is the first time in modern history that there is such human suffering and the world is not even calling for a ceasefire. The silence is deafening and to many in our region, it makes the Western world complicit through their support for Israel.”
Queen Rania's comments provide good insight in the response of the Arab world to the West's support for Israel. The damage is great, but how large it is exactly, and how long it will endure, is uncertain. However, if Arabs believe that the Western world shares direct responsibility for the atrocities committed in Palestinian territories and believe that the Western world chose not to use its power and influence to prevent a ground invasion in the Gaza Strip, then I do not see how the U.S. or E.U. would restore confidence in any way for a long time.
And then there is Ukraine. Ever since February 2022, the North Americans and Europeans have been working diplomatically to convince the rest of the world that it is important to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and support the Ukrainians in their defense. After the West's unconditional support for Israel in the first weeks of the Hamas—Israel conflict, however, the Rest sees the West’s support of Israel as inconsistent. Why would Europe condemn Russia’s war crimes, but not Israel’s? Why would Europe support Ukraine’s right to self-defense, but not Palestine’s? Why does the West make such an effort to defend the territorial claim of the Ukrainian people (to Donbas and Crimea), but make no similar effort to defend the territorial claim of the Palestinian people (to Gaza and the West Bank)? This inconsistency not only hurts the West’s general image, but it also threatens all diplomatic efforts to convince other parts of the world to support Ukraine in the Russia–Ukraine War. (This is already happening. Last week, E.U. diplomats expressed concern about the implications of the E.U.’s position in the Hamas–Israel conflict for the world’s support for Ukraine.)
Conclusion
In the third week of the conflict, there has been some damage control by the West. The European Union has increased its humanitarian aid for Gaza, after Von der Leyen’s initial unconditional support for Israel; the United States has begun questioning Israeli leadership for its plans in Gaza, after Biden’s initial carte blanche for the IDF; and pro-Israeli leaders like Rutte have changed their rhetoric, changing their complete support for Israel into the ‘yes, but’ that they previously condemned. The West has also engaged in much diplomatic activity, both in bilateral meetings in the Middle East and in the multilateral peace summit in Egypt, which took place on 21 October.
But the damage has been done. Governments all over the world—from Brazil to Turkey and from Jordan to South Africa—have condemned the West’s position as Israel’s assault on Gaza increased and its violations of international law grew in number. Not only Iran, but also Russia and China have amplified the criticism by placing the West’s failure in a broader narrative of a Western-led world order that no longer works. It seems that there is much fertile ground for their narrative in many places, especially in the Arab world, where protesters have not only targeted Israel, but also Western countries—especially the United States—by burning flags and surrounding embassies.
The conflict is ongoing, and if a ground invasion were indeed to happen, it might even expand dramatically. This means that there is still every reason for the West to try to recover from its mistakes at the beginning of the Hamas–Israel conflict. In this, the U.S. might be a lost cause: domestic politics make it very difficult for the government to change its position, and the current political elite (including Biden) seems unwilling to deviate from its strong pro-Israel position.
If the E.U. wants to make a dent in international politics and polish its global image, the current efforts on damage control are not sufficient. European leaders have to acknowledge the European roots of the current conflict and express this understanding publicly. They should support the Israeli people, but push back against the Netanyahu government. They should support the Palestinian people and their right to statehood, but push back against the militants of Hamas. And they should allow an internal debate, giving room to the pro-Palestinian parts of society instead of treating them with undeserved suspicion.
In recent years, several European countries have become more open to acknowledging their history in colonialism and slavery. This trend should be continued. The ways in which the West dominated the world for centuries and the violent implications of this dominance for the rest of the world have been a taboo for too long. While it is understandable that Europeans want to defend the idea of an Israeli state, they cannot do so without conceding that the transfer from the British Mandate to a U.N.-backed State of Israel in 1948 was dubious at best, and that agency of the (Muslim) Palestinians was wrongfully neglected. They should also concede that in the last few decades, the West has not done enough to curtail Israel’s extremists policies in Gaza and the West Bank.
This honesty is required for the European Union to keep up with a changing world in which the Rest is no longer inferior to the West. But this honesty has to go along with concrete actions, as the Rest’s anger about the West’s position in the current conflict has shown. If North American and European governments do not join the calls for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and reconsider their aid to the Israeli military in its ongoing occupation of Palestinian territory, it will damage their credibility greatly. And as Western governments are preoccupied with international conflicts elsewhere, the consequences of the West’s position on Israel could reverberate far beyond the Middle East, in Ukraine and in the South China Sea. This should be a fundamental consideration in the approach of Western governments going forward.
* The comments about 'ancient evil' may refer to anti-Semitism. Both in Israel and in the West, the attack by Hamas is considered anti-Semitic in nature. At the same time others, including pro-Palestinian activists in the West, reject that frame and attribute the attack more to anti-colonialism and Palestinian nationalism. In this way, they also disagree with the idea that the attack constitutes a pogrom. Personally, I think anti-Semitic sentiments played a significant role in the attack, but also agree that other motivations have played a role in Hamas militancy.
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