Is reliance on NATO still Europe's best bet?

In the Netherlands, NATO is not discussed often—except at those times when military conflicts on the borders of NATO territory loom. With Russia pursuing an invasion into Ukraine and a full-scale attack looming with a considerable military build-up in Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern border regions, discussion on NATO has been revived in the Netherlands, too: representatives of the alliance are present in news media and in public debate, a discussion about Dutch military contribution within the NATO framework is persistent. Foreign Minister Hoekstra frames NATO as a necessary defensive institute. In this, Hoekstra, and thus the Dutch government, still sees NATO as a primary defensive-military organization that is of value for the Netherlands’ defense. Nonetheless, the new, multipolar world order that is rising this century asks for a reconsideration of this position.

At this moment, NATO is not only relevant because it is pushing for de-escalation in the looming conflict between Russia and Ukraine; importantly, it is relevant because the Russian present NATO itself as a potential casus belli. NATO, following Russian thinking, is excessively penetrating the Russian sphere of influence. The Baltic states, directly bordering Russia, are already NATO members, and potential expansion of the pact into Ukraine, Georgia, and perhaps even the Scandinavian states would bring NATO even more emphatically to Russia’s borders. Russia denouncing these developments is understandable, and incorporation of former Soviet states in a Western, U.S.-led military coalition can understandably be appear as provocative. This also begs the question what NATO’s strategy constitutes of. If it is not aiming for provocation, then what does it aim for?

Although the Dutch government sees NATO as something self-evident and highly valuable, NATO in fact is an anachronism in contemporary global geopolitics. NATO was a useful instrument in the Cold War era: it provided military cooperation of the Western, capitalist world against the communist threat. The United States were at the height of their power, and Europe consequently was able to benefit of this American projection of military power through NATO. However, at least two important differences make NATO in the contemporary era less effective than in the second half of the past century: (1) the lack of a bipolar geopolitical confrontation, and (2) the decreasing power and waning hegemony of the United States.

Firstly, during the Cold War, who was the geopolitical opponent was clear: the Soviet Union and her communist satellite states. The Soviets threatened to pull European states into their sphere of influence, which made military cooperation specifically with these European states of critical importance for the United States. After all, by founding a formal institute and declaring in its charter that an attack on one constitutes an attack on all, Washington succeeded in creating a deterrent mechanism in anticipation of increasing Russian pressure on Europe. At the same time, this illustrates the American dominance within NATO: American efforts led to its foundation, and American military dominance carried NATO through the Cold War, providing a much-needed safety net for European states. Indeed, there was—and is—no power equilibrium amongst NATO allies, which the levels of defensive expenditure of individual member states have famously indicated.

Polish forces hold the NATO flag during a practice mission.

In the current era, however, there is no bipolar world as there was during the Cold War. The United States won the War, and the Soviet Union collapsed; the 1990s saw the emergence of a new, unipolar world, with one clear global hegemon—the United States. Russia no longer presented a considerable threat, and other major powers were not of serious influence on world affairs. The first decades of the twenty-first century, however, foreshadow a development that will persist throughout this century: the rise of the People’s Republic of China, the perseverance of Russia, the potential of India, the possible political strengthening of the European Union bloc, and—as will be indicated below—at the same time the waning power of the United States. Although still very powerful, the Americans will not be able to exert world dominance as they used to in the past decades, and the rise of several new major powers makes a seriously multipolar system possible. NATO, still evidently based on the North Atlantic region and focused on the Russian threat, is not meant for such a multipolar system, nor is it prepared for it.

Secondly, supremacy of the United States is waning. During the Cold War and in its direct aftermath, American hegemony was at its zenith. For other NATO members, this made it relevant to stay in NATO, despite the Cold War being over and the Soviet threat being reduced. Indeed, connecting one’s fate to the most powerful military power in the world offers considerable advantage: Article 5 provides security guarantees of invaluable worth. Moreover, in the Cold War’s aftermath, there was not yet any considerable light between the cultural, political, and military values of the Americans and their European NATO allies, which military conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere indicate.

However, American hegemony in the current era is not what it used to be. The hegemonic decline can still take years or even decades, but the trend is clear: economically, politically, and militarily, the United States will have to increasingly acknowledge that it can no longer maintain its unique dominance, especially in light of China’s rise. This is accompanied by a sentiment of unease in Washington, which in recent years has already expressed itself in a growing preference for isolationism. Naturally, an American isolationist foreign policy has significant consequences for NATO’s effectiveness: the organization does not know any better than the Americans taking the lead. Moreover, especially since the Trump administration, there is an increasing sense amongst European allies that one can no longer trust the Americans as in previous decades: a concrete warning signal were Trumps threats to pull the United States out of NATO. When one state exercises such dominance in a military alliance, trust and a unified strategy are crucial. This is less and less the case.

NATO, in other words, is insufficiently apt for the current era: a disappearing unipolar world, an emerging multipolar system, a lack of unified strategy and outdated institutional motive, and an excessively dominant member state, of which power is slowly waning and of which foreign policy is increasingly isolationist and subsequently less trustworthy to allies. Thus, European states would benefit from distancing themselves from a military alliance that is out of balance and unfocused to such degree. This is possible: European states already have a suitable institute that is able to pursue more political and military cooperation—the European Union.

It is a widespread taboo within the Netherlands and, more broadly, the European Union, yet the emerging multipolar system and waning power of the United States ask for more serious military cooperation and integration within the European community. A binding European military alliance or, even more, a European army, would be more appropriate to face the geopolitical reality of the coming decades than NATO, which was more well-suited for the geopolitical reality of the past decades. It provides several advantages: European military cooperation means European states no longer have to rely solely on the increasingly unstable and untrustworthy United States; it enables European States to focus solely on their own community and their own community’s strategic challenges; it limits military cooperation to one continent, making it more easy to demarcate and defend the alliance; it prevents European states from being inevitably drawn in any conflict between the United States and a rising power, most likely China; and it enables the European Union to constitute a serious power bloc and claim its rightful spot amongst other major powers in the new multipolar system.

Frances' Emmanuel Macron and Germany's Olaf Scholz have a meal at a restaurant in Potsdam (June 2023). Germany and France both have not closed the door on more defense cooperation within the European Union.

Letting closer military cooperation within the European Union prevail over NATO cooperation can lead to a more focused, united approach to geopolitics, in which European states do not need to participate in the United States’ fight for its hegemonic position. This provides European states a serious advantage: European military cooperation outside of NATO means a cooperation within a community of shared values, which has already been integrated in several ways—mostly economically, but to some degree also politically and culturally. It is not without reason that Chinese foreign policy advisors are puzzled by this potentially very powerful European power bloc, possibly a serious pillar in the new multipolar order, which nonetheless neglects the political and military aspect of integration and cooperation; only economic integration within the European Union will not be sufficient to operate as a serious geopolitical player.

Of course, this is still a theoretical and utopian prospect: political disunity within the European Union is only increasing, sceptics of further European integration are dominant, and in public debates on European integration, the focus remains mostly on the short term, instead of on (intercontinental) long-term strategy. Potential European military cooperation that aims at making NATO superfluous thus remains, partially because of this disunity within the Union, precarious. When a leading argument to abandon NATO points towards a lack of united strategy, norms, and values, one should also look at the degree of united strategy and shared norms and values within the European community. Can all states in the current Union participate in such a theoretical European military alliance or European army? Which states can participate, and which states divert from the norm to such an extent that participation would inevitably lead to disunity within the new alliance? Do authoritarian regimes like Poland and Hungary fit within such a framework? Is it wise to involve potentially instable non-member states like Serbia and Bosnia? Is a military alliance of Western European states not a more stable and thus forceful prospect—but where does that leave the Union? These are important questions. After all, leaving NATO and focusing on European military cooperation is only valuable when within the European bloc, unity in strategy, norms, and values persists.

In sum—although under current circumstances it is understandable for both the Dutch and other European governments to focus fully on NATO cooperation in light of a looming Russian invasion into Ukraine, it would be wise ro reconsider this focus for the longer term. This text has sketched some basic observations that illustrate the obsolete nature of NATO, and the potential benefits of military cooperation within the European Union, without relying on overseas partners, especially the United States. It goes without saying that, as stressed before, this is at this point a mere theoretic and utopian discussion: right now, there is little fertile ground for such a recalibration, although there are some positive signs from Germany's and France's leadership. For other European states, including the Netherlands, it would be wise to consider these uncomfortable questions in the years ahead, too.

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