The Chinese civil war continues... in Central America (1)
- J Hoenderdos
- May 12, 2022
- 10 min read
Updated: Apr 13, 2024
(A shorter version of this text in Dutch can be found on the China2025 blog.)
In 1949, the Chinese civil war ended. Chiang Kai-shek’s troops and millions of Nationalist followers fled to Taiwan, establishing the Republic of China; meanwhile, the Communists claimed victory on the mainland, with Chairman Mao proclaiming the new People’s Republic from the Forbidden City in Beijing. With that, almost two decades of domestic struggle came to an end.
Still, the civil war did not really end. There has never been a formalized peace agreement between the Nationalists and Communists; nor has there ever been a formal recognition by either of the other’s statehood. Even more, although the Taiwanese no longer aim for reclaiming the mainland, vice versa, the Chinese very much do intent to reclaim the island. This would not constitute an interstate war, as the Republic of China is not considered to be an independent state by neither the People’s Republic or the international community. Thus, the civil war still is very much alive.
This civil war knows many forms, and conflict between the PRC and ROC has mostly taken place in proxy fashion, for instance by rivalling each other in international organizations or targeting third states that support the other China. Although little considered, a relevant and highly interesting battleground in the Chinese civil war has recently been regaining the spotlight amidst political shifts: Central America. Why does this region play a central role in the Chinese rivalry—and what role do recent local political developments play in this rivalry?
In 2021, I wrote my master’s thesis on this subject. In this post, I want to explain the historical context of the rivalry. I focus explicitly on Central America and why this small region became a stronghold for Taipei. In my next post, I will focus on the current situation and the prospects of future Central American diplomatic recognition of the Chinas.
The Taipei–Kyiv parallel and the quest for legitimacy
The conflict between the two Chinas has regained its place in the global spotlight in the past few months, if it had even left that spotlight before. Parallels drawn between Russia’s denial of Ukrainian sovereignty and PR China’s denial of Taiwanese sovereignty are understandable and certainly hold some merit. The parallels have revitalized concerns that the Chinese may sooner, rather than later attempt to capture the island. It makes the Taiwanese the more desperate to cling to any form of international recognition, and it makes the Chinese the more adamant to deny the Taiwanese any form of international recognition. This brings the issue of legitimacy forward as very important.
Here, one of the largest problems in the ubiquitous Ukraine–Taiwan parallels becomes apparent. Legitimacy is barely an issue for the Ukrainians: Ukraine is formally recognized by virtually any state on earth as a sovereign, independent state; yet the Taiwanese are formally recognized to a far lower degree. Currently, only fourteen states recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state and maintain full diplomatic relations. Only five of these states may be considered more than microstates. Consequently, invasion of Ukraine by Russia is formally to be regarded as an intrusion of a widely recognized sovereign state, while any invasion of Taiwan by PR China would not necessarily be considered as such: after all, none of the likely opponents of such a move recognizes Taiwan as sovereign, themselves. (The Chinese have suggested this, too.)
This understandably makes gaining as much international recognition as possible a real priority for the Taiwanese government. It requires Tsai Ing-wen, the Republic of China’s president since 2016, to constantly reach out to non-recognizing states and international organizations, and to simultaneously maintain the relationship with those few states still recognizing the ROC. Recently, this has included elaborate state visits by the president of the Marshall Islands, the most vocal supporter of the Taiwanese in Oceania, and by a Taiwanese presidental delegation to the newly elected Honduran president. Moreover, earlier in April, a group of United States senators paid a well-publicized visit to Tsai, and in November 2021, a group of Baltic politicians did the same. At the same time, local media keep pushing Tsai to maintain and step up these continuous diplomatic efforts, anxious to lose international support.
The PRC–ROC rivalry in Latin America: the early Cold War
The history of the PRC–ROC rivalry is extensive, and it is not necessary to include it in excessive detail here. Very broadly, one can distinguish two phases in this rivalry: first, an ideological one, and then, a pragmatic one. After the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, the international recognition for either China was very much the opposite of the current situation: the Republic of China on Taiwan was regarded by most states as the continuation of the Republic of China on the Chinese mainland, constituting a form of government-in-exile. The newly proclaimed People’s Republic was considered an undesirable aberration, and most states preferred to continue their relations with the ROC. In its early days, thus, the PRC found itself in a relatively isolated position. This was the case for bilateral relations, but also for international organizations: for a long time, the ROC held on to its place in international organizations as ‘the China’, most notably in the U.N. Security Council.
The PRC found itself in the position of the underdog, surely, but it was not truly isolated. As soon as Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic, the Soviet Union established ties, and was followed by the entire Communist bloc, which included North Korea, East Germany, and Albania. In the years thereafter, more states chose to recognize Beijing over Taipei, yet the number remained low for some time. For the post-Second World War era had quickly entered the first stage of the Cold War, and most states became part of two clearly separated camps: the U.S.-led capitalist, Western bloc; and the Soviet Union-led Communist, Eastern bloc. In this bipolarity, Communist support for PR China’s international recognition was self-evident; yet non-Communist support for PR China proved to be much more difficult to achieve. The Taiwanese benefited: firmly placed in the American camp, it maintained the support from most Western states, and ensured its position in Western-dominated international organizations.
In this, the Maoist foreign policy—which eventually even alienated the Russians and the Cubans—of PR China did not help. Although foreign policy under Mao certainly can be considered isolationist when compared with globalist foreign policy, interaction with the world outside China still took place. This foreign policy was distinctly revolutionary in nature. In Latin America, it was noticeable in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese provided material support to anti-government militants in several Latin American countries, most notably in Central America. It was an ideological choice: the region was full of right-wing, militarist governments. Understandably, though, these right-wing governments were consequently not enthusiastic about establishing formal diplomatic relations with Beijing. Moreover, it is questionable whether the United States would have allowed any states in their ‘backyard’ to abandon capitalist Taiwan in this era. Cuba would have been trouble enough.
The PRC–ROC rivalry in Latin America: the late Cold War
Yet in the early 1970s, this changed. Chinese foreign policy became more pragmatic, and simultaneously for Latin America, interest in the region increased. No longer was supporting leftist revolutions abroad a primary incentive for the PRC; it was made increasingly clear that the government was ready to cooperate with those regimes that differed significantly in their political ideologies. This included, for example, Chile, where the Chinese explicitly continued their diplomatic efforts even after the rightist (and U.S.-sponsored) coup that ousted Chile’s socialist leader, Salvador Allende. This pragmatism, that continues to this day, and the growing interest in Latin America that followed the more internationalist foreign policy and the incentive to participate in a global economy—combined with the PRC’s amazing economic potential—allowed new ties between the region and the People’s Republic.
Most importantly, however, the United States and PR China began their rapproachment, which proved to be crucial. In just a few years time, Communist China switched from the United States’ list of enemies to its list of allies, a shift that was made possible by the earlier Sino-Soviet conflict and the increasing pragmatism in the Chinese foreign policy. Beijing’s decision to work with Washington made diplomatic openings possible. Significantly, this also meant the ROC’s expulsion from the U.N. Security Council, as the PRC took its place. Now, the Chinese were really leaving behind their diplomatic isolation.
Consequently, in this late Cold War, many states abandoned the Republic of China, instead choosing to formally recognize the People’s Republic. This also was true for Latin America: in the early 1970s, the largest Latin American states (including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela) established diplomatic ties with the PRC. In the late 1980s, the entire South American continent had abandoned the ROC in favour the PRC, except Paraguay. The transformation of Chinese foreign policy, which picked up steam in the Hua era and especially when Deng Xiaoping took over in the late 1970s, into a more outward-looking policy meant a strengthening of ties with the region, including growing diplomatic efforts and increasing economic trade—albeit still relatively little in comparison to interactions with other regions.
Central America’s support for Taipei in the late Cold War
Although by the end of the Cold War (i.e., when the Soviet Union was dissolved) South America already no longer recognize dthe ROC as ‘the China’, in Central America and the Caribbean, virtually all states still maintained diplomatic ties with Taipei, and had not yet altered their recognition of the ROC. Indeed, in 1991, Cuba was the only state that recognized the People’s Republic, as it had done since 1960. Apparently, the factors that enabled a ‘recognition switch’ in South America from the early 1970s onwards (i.e., a less revolutionary Chinese foreign policy; rapproachment between Washington and Beijing; and growing Chinese interest in the region) did not matter in Central America. In my master’s thesis, I argued that there were four factors that may account for this anomaly.
Firstly, the domestic political context in Central American states points to serious obstacles for any diplomatic recognition of the PRC. In some countries, this did not seem likely: in Panama, for example, the authoritarian leader in the 1970s was an enthusiastic supporter of Third Worldism—something he undeniably shared with Beijing. Others, like Nicaragua. Other states with strong dependencies on the United States, like Guatemala and El Salvador, in the early 1970s suddenly saw a permission structure appear after the Sino-U.S. rapprochement; indeed, Washington covertly even stimulated some states to make the recognition switch from PRC to ROC.
However, there is more to Central American domestic politics: the nature of both the political regimes in power in the 1970s and 1970s as well as the nature of some individual leaders both proved relevant, too. Suggestions of the Americans to abandon Taipei were not too well-received in those governments that disliked taking orders from the United States, and attempted to not do so whenever possible. Moreover, several governments that were not prominently Third Worldist tended to be very rightist, which made realigning with a Communist government an unlikely course of action. Even more, the prevalence of authoritarian rightist political regimes in Central America easily aligned these states with the ROC, which in the 1970s and 1980s under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership also constituted a rightist and militarist authoritarian regime.
Secondly, the regional political context proved to be another obstacle to swift recognition of the PRC from Central American states. The proximity to Cuba impacted Central America to a higher degree than South America. Indeed, Communist leadership in Cuba had repeatedly targeted Central American states in the early Cold War, supporting leftist rebellions throughout the region. As such, anti-Cubanism was fierce in most Central American governments, and by extent, anti-Communist fears were widespread amongst the reactionary authoritarian leaderships. For them, the Cold War was not so cold; and consequently, much was considered through the lens of Cold War bipolarity, including the PRC–ROC recognition rivalry. Indeed, the PRC could be considered the ‘Cuba of the Far East’, with Mao not that different from Castro—which left Central American states with little appetite to make an ostentatious choice for the PRC, even when its foreign policy was moderated in the 1970s.
Not all Central American leaders were radically opposed to Fidel Castro: the aforementioned excentric Third Worldist leader of Panama, Omar Torrijos, was on surprisingly good terms with Castro, having regular conversations and discussing many matters, including geopolitics. Yet Torrijos’ ties with the Cuban leader did not increase the likelihood of a recognition switch by the Panamanian government: if Torrijos listened to Castro’s considerations on and suggestions for dealing with Beijing, he would have clearly understood that Castro opposed any state in the region to increase relations with the PRC, despite their ideological alignment. Indeed, the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1960s greatly deteriorated Sino-Cuban relations, too, and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement made Castro determined to oppose the PRC whenever possible. As such, the rare number of leaders in Central America that were on good terms with Fidel Castro still would not have been persuaded to cooperate with Beijing in any way.
Thirdly, diplomatic aptitude of both ROC and PRC shaped recognition behaviour of Central American states in the late Cold War. In short—diplomacy of the People’s Republic was relatively underdeveloped, as the isolationist foreign policy had left little room for establishing proper diplomatic netwerks in other regions, including Latin America. As previously mentioned, Chinese interest in Latin America grew, yet this only happened from the early 1970s onwards; as such, Chinese efforts to establish a (diplomatic, political, economic) foothold in the region, other than the previous efforts of revolutionary support, took time.
The Taiwanese, on the other hand, were the de facto ‘China’ in the region, and thus had a significant advantage, also logistically: its diplomats had been in Central America for decades, and the Taiwanese diplomatic apparatus knew how to maintain its relations here, even when Beijing’s diplomatic efforts became more apparent. Diplomatic exchanges, trade platforms, academic gatherings, and culture conferences kept Taipei well in touch with both governments and societies throughout the region. What is more, there is scarce yet mounting evidence that the Taiwanese delivered goods and services to several Central American countries that proved the ROC’s value over the PRC’s: most notably, Taipei sent military assistance, including anti-insurgency training, which was highly valued by the authoritarian governments. It was something that Beijing did not, and probably could not provide. As such, both the elaborate diplomatic network of the ROC in the region, as well as its awareness of how to satisfy its allies, ensured support throughout Central America.
Fourthly—and in relation to all previous three factors—state size was an important factor in recognition behaviour, especially in explaining the difference between Central America, and North and South America. Central America consists of only smaller powers, while North America (i.e., Mexico) and South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and others) consists of significantly larger powers. This meant several things: in the early 1970s, it caused the PRC to first focus on the larger states of Latin America, relatively neglecting the smaller Central American states; it benefited Taiwanese diplomatic efforts, as it was easier to diplomatically and financially impact smaller states; and the relatively small state size made for interesting targets for Cuba-sponsored rebellions, whereas revolution would be harder to accomplish in the larger states in the region.
Concluding note
These factors account for the recognition trajectory of Central American states, that unlike other Latin American states in the 1970s and 1980s did not choose to switch recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Consequently, they explain why even now, Central America is in the middle of the Chinese recognition rivalry, as the foundation for Central America’s curious position was laid in the late Cold War. After the Cold War, things did change; and indeed, in the past few decades, several Central American finally chose to establish ties with the People’s Republic. In my next post, I have outlined under what conditions this happened, how the most recent recognition switches can be explained, and what we may expect of this recognition rivalry in the coming years and decades.
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