It is a decisive moment for China

On Thursday, February 24th, Russian president Vladimir Putin broadcasted a television speech in the depth of night, which amounted to a de facto declaration of war against Ukraine. So far, a week into the conflict that followed, international response has been swift and, frankly, overwhelming. The international community has witnessed actions that would have seemed impossible only days ago—including the complete revival of NATO, the emergence of the European Union as a formidable political and, yes, even military union, the remilitarization of Germany, and more. The sanctioning and condemnation of the Russian Federation has been impressive and much discussed. Similarly, states that have not condemned nor sanctioned Russia have come under increasing scrutiny. This includes the People’s Republic of China.

So far, Chinese leadership nor its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外交部) have called the invasion an invasion, nor have they called it a war; consequently, no condemnation has come from Xi or his cabinet members. The Chinese would most likely not have anticipated this degree of Russian agression towards Ukraine: there are some signs that they even may have been played by the Russians. Nonetheless, Beijing now has a fundamental decision to make—a decision that will be watched extremely closely not only by European and North American countries, but crucially also by its neighbours in the region. What will be Xi’s position?

Vladimir Putin talks to Xi Jinping during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Uzbekistan (September 2022).

First, it is relevant to point out that much remains unknown about PR China’s position on the Russian-Ukrainian war. Moreover, much remains unknown about PR China’s potential complicity, or at least beforehand knowledge of the invasion. Did Xi know about Putin’s plans? Or was he tricked, believing that an invasion would not be forthcoming? This remains speculative, yet the seeming lack of preparation for evacuating Chinese citizens from Ukraine may be an important indicator that Beijing, in fact, did not anticipate a large-scale Russian invasion.

Second, in the hours and days after Putin’s declaration of a ‘special military operation’, Chinese officials remained largely quiet, neglecting to say anything of meaning regarding the conflict. Tellingly, Chinese state media on Friday, February 25th completely lacked in coverage of the developing crisis in Ukraine. On the same time, Hua Chunying, the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, briefly commented on the situation, stating that “China determines its position on the Ukrainian issue on its own merits”; moreover, she noted that “China supports Russia in resolving the issue with Ukraine through negotiation”, and “China has a long-standing commitment to supporting every country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”.

These three points of focus—emphasis on self-centered priorities, diplomatic resolution, and commitment to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference—have been brought forward by the Chinese consistently in the past seven days. Similarly, China has quickly criticized the West’s handling of the crisis and NATO’s interference in the region, and has done so consistently. Foreign Minister Wang Yi on February 27th criticized the sanctions as imposed by the West, while also asking NATO “to completely abandon Cold War mentality”. Thus, there are at least four consistencies in Chinese comments on the war.

China and the War

What, then, will the Chinese position be in this war? Does it support Russia, opt for a neutral position, or choose to condemn Russia? What would be the logical position? There are some factors that would suggest a preference for neutrality or a pro-Ukrainian stance, while there are also factors that would suggest a preference for a pro-Russian position.

Firstly, at least theoretically, it would make sense for Xi Jinping to consider some distancing from Russia and some form of condemnation of Putin’s invasion into Ukraine. Ideologically, as noted above, the Chinese have had a clear stance on non-interference for decades. China attaches much importance to sovereignty and independence, is overtly anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist, and has fairly consistently proclaimed that major powers should not interfere in other states. Admittedly, in the Xi era the non-interference principle may have weakened a bit, yet it tellingly has come forward in recent public statements on Ukraine. Thus, a failure to condemn Russia’s clear intrusion of Ukrainian sovereignty seems incongruent with primary principles within the Chinese foreign policy doctrine.

Furthermore, pragmatically, there are reasons for China not to be thrilled with all-out war in Ukraine. Macro-economic stability is of great importance for the Chinese economy, as it is heavily globalized and relies on a fairly steady global trade system. The war, the inevitable collapse of both the Ukrainian and Russian economies, but also the unknown impact of Western sanctions may very well destabilize the global economy, and thus hit the Chinese economy, too. Moreover, Beijing will look with sorrowful eyes not only at the revival of NATO, but also at the unexpected and impressive unity amongst European Union members. Over the past seven days, out of virtually nowhere, the E.U. has demonstrated that it is able to function as a political and military entity; unsurprisingly, when there is unity among its member states, the Union is a potentially extremely powerful major power in global geopolitics. Beijing will not be happy that the Russian invasion has possibly woken a sleeping giant. Thus, abandoning Russia and urging for a quick conclusion of the war might very well be in China’s best interests.

Finally, Chinese condemnation of and distancing from Putin would make sense, because its trade with the West is just more important than its trade with Russia. In recent years, the Russian Federation has not been among China’s most important trade partners; simultaneously, China has consistently been Russia’s most important trade partner, serving as both its most important import and export partner. At the same time, the European Union and the United States are essential to the Chinese economy, both functioning as crucial markets for Chinese export products. (Ukraine also is a relevant trade partner of China, and is part of the Belt and Road Initiative.) From a trade perspective, supporting Russia should be perceived as a great risk by the Chinese. As noted, China probably is surprised by the enormity of the economic sanctions that both the European Union and the United States have instigated, and will worry that any overt support for Putin will lead to these states imposing sanctions on the Chinese economy, too. Thus, staying neutral or condemning Russia would ensure continuity of the prosperous trade relationships with Western economies.

Construction is underway on the Chinese side of a natural gas pipeline between China and Russia (2017). The pipeline began operations in 2019.

Despite these arguments in favour of abandoning Russia—or, at least, adhering to strict neutrality—it might very well be that if push comes to shove, China will in some way voice its support for Russia. Here, also, ideological and pragmatic factors are relevant.

Firstly, it remains important to consider the differences in foreign policy outlooks between ‘the West’ and Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing are, in this regard, fairly similar: they both think in terms of ‘spheres of influence’, which can be superior to respecting sovereign statehood. In this sense, it is also no coincidence that precisely these two states have leaders with similar goals: Putin wants to incorporate Ukraine (and ideally, more) in his sphere of influence; Xi wants to incorporate Taiwan in his sphere of influence. We may not understand it ourselves from a Western point of view, but there is a level of understanding between these leaders that accounts for the lack of condemnation that may be witnessed from Beijing.

This is also why the Chinese explicitly state their support for Russian criticism of NATO, which they have done long before the beginning of the war. Both states see NATO as a threat to their ability to dominate their own spheres of influence. NATO has been present in conflicts although it has never been directly attacked, including the wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Ukraine. China, of course, does not want any NATO interference should it choose to invade Taiwan; hence constructing an anti-NATO alliance might be valuable. Supporting Russia in its ‘special operation’ efforts in Ukraine, explicitly denouncing and blaming NATO, would align with the process of delegitimizing NATO.

Secondly, one indeed should not forget that Xi Jinping wants to invade Taiwan, and sees it as a critical part of his legacy (worryingly, not too different from Putin’s quest for a historical legacy). A clear condemnation of Putin’s invasion of Ukrain would be, well, farcical. It would be hypocritical: condemning the invasion of a sovereign democracy under the banner of ‘reuniting’ and ‘defending brotherhood’, while simultaneously planning for a similar effort. Although Taiwan is not recognized by a significant amount of states, in contrast with Ukraine, other parallels between the situations of these two states are undeniable. (Taiwan is worried for a reason.) Withdrawal of support for Putin’s quest would ultimately undermine legitimation efforts for Xi’s own quest.

Thirdly, more pragmatically, the Chinese see the potential to force Russia into a position of dependency. Russia will become extremely dependent on the Chinese for essentially everything. As mentioned before, China’s economic dependence on Russia is limited, yet for some time, the Chinese have recognized the advantage of importing raw materials from Russia. A few months ago, the New York Times noted that “Chinese purchases of oil from Russia surpassed its purchases from Saudi Arabia”, and trade in materials like coal and wheat has been increasing, too. For China, it is an interesting option to rely more on Russian resources: it enables it to, at least partially, circumvent troubles in trade relationships with the West. An important case study is the bilateral agreement to construct a new gas pipeline from Russia to China, which will continue despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It enables China to acquire much-needed natural gas, assumably for a fairly decent price, while enabling Russia to at least keep some part of its trade in natural resources going.

The gas pipeline agreement is important, because it illustrates how the Chinese, by not condemning Russia, can profit from Russia’s increasingly isolated position in the world. Western investment and trade is leaving Russia, leaving a vacuum; the Chinese are happy to jump in. For Russia, China (and to a lesser extent India) might be the best option left: shunned by the West, it has to settle for increasing economic entanglement with China. Even more, as Russia needs China more than vice versa, there is real opportunity for the Chinese to close some very profitable deals. As such, as long as the response from the West is not too costly, China would be able to secure a steady stream of natural resources and a great amount of lucrative deals, as Russia has virtually nowhere else to go. This extends to the micro-level: indicative are preliminary signs that Russian firms now “rush to open Chinese bank accounts”.

A final note on these rational motives to support Russia—reports indicate that if Chinese leadership was aware of a coming invasion in Russia, it would have been told that the Russian army estimated a very quick victory, with Kyiv falling within days and the Ukrainian political and military establishment fleeing quickly. This, of course, did not happen, and the current escalation will undoubtedly have surprised Beijing; however, this may have been the assessment on which Chinese decisions have been based. This means Xi’s calculations of the cost-benefit analysis may still very well shift.

Conclusion

In short—so far, the Chinese leadership has clearly decided against taking a clear position. It has abstained twice in the United Nations’ General Assembly and Security Council votes on condeming Russia, leaving itself some wiggle room. It is understandable why China’s leaders have done so: as the analysis above has illustrated, there are ample factors on both sides—both for condemning Russia and siding with the West, and vice versa. Surely, Beijing watches the situation in Ukraine closely, and its cost-benefit analysis may alter significantly when Russia’s agression continues and even gets more violent.

In this, two options seem most likely to me: (1) China remains ambiguous about its position, rejecting calls from the West to explicitly condemn Russia, and (2) China cautiously sides with Russia. Despite the pragmatic benefits of abandoning Russia, the ideological similarity that can be noted between Putin and Xi’s visions and ambitions is too strong to ignore; it is difficult to visualize Xi siding with NATO leaders, while consistently blaming NATO for the war. Continued ambiguity, or ‘neutrality’, may be utilised by the Chinese to position themselves for a position as mediator in any future negotiations. It would be nice for Xi to be portrayed as the leader that led Russia and Ukraine to peace. Moreover, ambiguity could be framed within China’s ideological line of non-interference.

Besides remaining ambigious, the Chinese could opt to support Russia. They will not do so enthousiastically, and they will attempt to do it subtly: after all, any support for Russia will be followed by heavy condemnation from China’s most important trade partners, and it might even lead to sanctions. Yet the calculation from Xi might very well be that China can profit significantly from Russia’s isolatedness, and he might sense that he needs to cement his anti-NATO coalition if he plans to invade Taiwan in the coming years. Yet it may ultimately very well be the search for historical legacies of two men—Putin and Xi—that decides China’s position in this escalating war and ushers in a new, forced coalition of Moscow and Beijing.

Image references