The E.U. and U.S. differ on China

Recently, discussions about the relationship between Western countries and PR China have developed rapidly. Although it has simmered for a longer time, debate about the future of the West’s (constructive and peaceful) relationship with China especially intensified in the past few years. There are multiple reasons for this—including concerns about government policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and, more generally, China’s increasing hard power and its (mostly justifiable) desire to develop its global influence.

Although ‘the West’ is often used as a term to describe the United States, Canada, and (Western) Europe or the E.U., when it comes to relations with China, using this broad terminology can be misleading. After all, the relationship of the U.S. with China does differ from the E.U.’s relationship with China. Similarly, policy interests and objectives differ. I briefly explain below why, in my opinion, there should be made a more explicit distinction between China’s relations with the U.S. and the E.U. Right now, this especially comes forward in two cases: increasingly militaristic rhetoric about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and competition in advanced technology sectors.

For decades, the relationship between the United States and the European Union has been fairly stable. The reason is simple: both share important strategic objectives, most importantly the sustainability of a ‘rules-based order’ with a solid foundation in international, Western-dominated institutions and an international rule of law. Both the Americans and the Europeans thought it important to promote their norms and values to other parts of the world, including democracy and human rights. This fit right into the position of the United States as the global hegemon and, thus, the de facto policeman of the world.

Moreover, when it came to external threats, the U.S. and the E.U. have often been on the same wavelength. For example, this was (unfortunately) the case in the invasion of both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as broad Western alignment in the Syrian civil war. Both the United States and Western Europe identified the Soviet Union and later Russia as a threat to both their rules-based order and the physical security of the European continent. This concern was institutionalized through the foundation of NATO, which for decades has had one primary objective: containing Russia. Unsurprisingly, almost all E.U. members (23 out of 26) are also part of NATO.

American and European interests are not always the same

However, as much as both sides have had shared norms, values, and strategic objectives in the past and present, this does not mean that this is always the case. It may feel natural for European countries to follow American leadership, as they have so often chosen to do, because of the United States’ immense hard power, soft power, and Europe’s enormous dependence on the U.S.—including through NATO. Similarly, it may feel natural and justifiable for the United States to expect that their European allies follow their lead and support them in what they perceive to be challenges to American hegemony.

But in my opinion, when it comes to the increasing presence of China in Western debates on world order and peace, there is no clear reason why this transantlantic symbiosis should persist. Instead, it would be wise for the Europeans to more forcefully make clear to the Americans that when it comes to issues like China, the European and American positions are not the same, and Europe prefers to enact its own foreign policy and map out its own (geopolitical) strategy. Amongst other things, this would invigorate the E.U.’s hope of becoming a more serious power bloc in the world, decrease its position of dependence on the U.S., and enable it to be a more serious negotiation partner with the Chinese.

Below, I briefly discuss this point in the context of the tensions in the Taiwan Strait and increasing competition in the advanced technology sectors. First, although the U.S. and the E.U. both want to support Taiwan, the E.U. should not automatically go along with larger American plans about containing China and maintaining dominance in the Asia-Pacific. Second, technological and economic competition is fine and not inherently problematic. Again, the U.S. and E.U. share similar interests to a certain extent. However, the Europeans should not passively follow the Americans in their competition with the Chinese. After all, the United States have different incentives to compete with China than the European Union, namely to inhibit Chinese development, and do so with a more antagonistic approach than the Europeans should be comfortable with.

Nancy Pelosi met Tsai Ing-wen in August 2022, enraging China. The visit was not celebrated by European countries.

Why the E.U. should not blindly follow the U.S.’ steps in the Asia-Pacific

One of the most contentious topics in current relations between Western countries and China are the tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and the perennial desire by the Chinese Communist Party to ‘bring back’ Taiwan ‘to the motherland’, either peacefully or forcefully. Although no Western countries recognize Taiwanese statehood (recognizing something that even remotely resembles Taiwanese independence perhaps comes closest in the case of Lithuania and, now, Czechia), they do align themselves with the Taiwanese nation and its norms and values, most notably its democracy.

There are many reasons why tensions are increasing now. They include the ‘re-election’ of Xi Jinping for his third term in office in October 2022, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, and potential parallels between Russia’s (previously considered unthinkable) full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Below the surface, other factors of importance include the Chinese government’s promotion of popular nationalist sentiment and China’s growing military capabilities, which are mostly focused on the specific scenario of an attack on Taiwan.

Amidst these rising tensions, at first sight, there does not seem to be a clear difference in the American and European approaches towards the Taiwan Strait issue. Both the U.S. and the E.U. reject any claims China lays on Taiwan and aim to support Taiwanese democracy. Having witnessed Russia’s agression, they fear that a similar horror may occur elsewhere. This is illustrated by diplomatic visits to Taiwan that have not made as much news as Pelosi’s visit, including delegations from Germany, England, Lithuania, and the Netherlands. American and European interests also align in safeguarding a stable Taiwan Strait and South China Sea for trade purposes and sustaining increasingly complicated (technology) supply chains.

In these regards, the positions of the U.S. and E.U. are the same. But this does not sufficiently take into account the U.S.’ ulterior motives of its increasing presence in the Asia-Pacific region. (By the way, the U.S. never even left the region after winning the Second World War, wanting to maintain a military foothold and the ability to project hard while European countries either left or were expelled from their Asian colonies.) Unlike European countries, the U.S. are concerned about more than defending a fellow democratic country. After all, its activities in the Asia-Pacific are primarily meant to contain an increasingly powerful China. The Americans are concerned that their position of dominance is under threat and are acting accordingly. In other words, in a way, Taiwan is only part of a bigger picture of an American play for maintaining power in Asia, and defending Taiwan is a way of defending American supremacy in the region.

Consider Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, which rapidly heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Was this (rather ostentatious) powerplay in the E.U.’s interest? I do not think it was. The visit can only be considered to be in the U.S.’ interest, as it was a way to showcase American influence and dominance. If anything, the nationalistic and militaristic sentiments that were fed by the visit made constructive dialogue with China on the Taiwan issue more difficult, including for E.U. diplomats. Unsurprisingly, European countries were not openly supportive of Pelosi’s actions.

In line with this, I do not consider it a positive development that NATO is increasingly diverging from its original raison d’être in order to become more active in the Pacific (the ‘other ocean’) to counter China. If the United States—or, for that matter, individual European countries—want to counter China, that is their right, but by using NATO for this objective, European countries risk getting dragged into military Sino-U.S. competition. This aligns with a previous post in which I outlined reasons why at some point, European countries should become more independent militarily from the U.S. in the form of a European defense alliance, instead of relying (solely) on a U.S.-dominated NATO. At some point, interests just begin to deviate too much, and proper coordination with a shared long-term strategy becomes too difficult.

Biden and Rutte in the Oval Office (January 2023). Their most important point of discussion concerned export control of semiconductors to China, on which the Netherlands ultimately relented.

Why the E.U. should not blindly follow the U.S.’ technological competition

The U.S. use their influence to move their European allies towards a more confrontational approach to China when it comes to issues of Asia-Pacific security. By the same token, they are using their influence to move their allies in the direction of a more confrontational approach towards China in the technological domain.

When it comes to advanced technology, in most regards, the United States have a clear edge over the rest of the world, including China. This is beneficial to the Americans in multiple ways. For example, the technology sector is a big part of the U.S. economy, resulting in major income from technology exports; and dominance in certain technology sectors can help the United States secure both hard power and soft power abroad.

However, in many technology sectors, the Chinese are becoming increasingly competitive, including sectors like telecommunication networks (5G), big data, space technology, artificial intelligence (AI), and advanced military capabilities. In some of these sectors, a clear bilateral competition is looming between the U.S. and China. For example, a few years ago, artificial intelligence pioneer Lee Kai Fu published a book in which he described how the development of AI is rapidly becoming a scientific battlefield, as the Americans try to keep their edge over the Chinese, and the Chinese try to make up the deficit and become the dominant force in global AI innovation.

The incentive for the U.S. to outmaneuver China in the advanced technology sector is clear and understandable. And again, parts of American interests absolutely align with European interests, for example when it comes to (exagerrated) concerns about Western-produced semiconducters being utilized by the People’s Liberation Army, potentially even in a future military conflict with Taiwan.

However, it is the bigger picture where American and European interests may deviate. On the one hand, the Americans want to keep ahead of Chinese technological capabilities because of their desire to remain the global hegemon; losing the technology competition to China would be a blow to that desire. (A recent illustration of the American strategy to contain Chinese technological development for the sake of containment is its courting of India as a new partner in technology innovation, in order to further frustrate Chinese development.)

On the other hand, the Europeans have a more narrowed set of concerns when it comes to Chinese technological development, without being directly involved in any hegemonic rivalry. The E.U. should not be concerned about any ‘rise’ of China as the next technology superpower, because this rise cannot be considered a (direct) threat to European safety and development. Instead, European concerns are limited to more concrete cases like fair trade practices and human right concerns (for example, about big data surveillance in Xinjiang).

It would thus be good for the E.U. to make its own assessments when it comes to technology trade and scientific cooperation with China, and not be pressured by the U.S. to take a more confrontational approach. To a reasonable extent, this is already happening, and should be continued. Examples include Germany making up its own mind about the safety of Huawei 5G technology and the Netherlands (before ultimately signing a deal with Washington) persisting in choosing its own path when it comes to semiconductor trade with China. Of course, ideally, decisions about technology trade and scientific cooperation with China would be taken by the E.U. as a whole, and not by individual states (as was the case in both the German and Dutch examples). This would give the Union a much stronger position amidst the increasingly fierce technology competition (often even called ‘tech war’) between the Americans and the Chinese.

What China is (and is not) to the U.S. and E.U.

These two cases bring me back to a broader point: What is China to us? Since the Trump era, the United States have made clear that they consider China their biggest adversary. Biden continued Trump’s hawkish China policy: not even Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to deviate the Americans from the idea that China ultimately is the biggest threat.

But for the European Union, China is not necessarily an enemy. When it comes to the geopolitics and security of the Asia-Pacific, E.U. interests are decidedly different from the U.S’. European countries do not have to defend any sphere of influence in the region, nor do they have to act (or feel like they have to act) as the world’s policeman. Hence, the E.U. should be on the Americans’ side when it comes to supporting Taiwanese freedom, but the E.U. should also caution that it does not go further than that—supporting American hegemony. That is not a priority for Europeans, but for Americans, and should remain so.

Similarly, when it comes to technological trade and competition, E.U. interests are more narrow than American interests. European countries do not have to defend their position as world leader in advanced technology, nor do they have to police other countries in their use of advanced technology as much as the U.S. feel they need to. The E.U. can join the U.S. on matters like unfair trade practices and technology-related human rights violations, but should simultaneously not feel pressured by Washington to take an excessively confrontational approach towards Chinese technological innovation. Instead, it should feel the liberty to search for spaces for constructive diaologue, trade, and cooperation.

Image references

~ Nancy Pelosi and Tsai Ing-wen wave to the press: https://cdn-japantimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/np_file_174444-scaled.jpeg

~ Mark Rutte at the Resolute Desk in the White House: https://images0.persgroep.net/rcs/QF8Y_n1FiJKxCJ4llfE6lY2rybs/diocontent/226392053/_fill/1299/900/?appId=21791a8992982cd8da851550a453bd7f&quality=0.9