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Two weeks ago, the BRICS group of nations finally decided to allow other nations to become members, evolving BRICS into BRICS+. It is an important step: although concrete results of the expansion are uncertain, in the short term it is of great symbolic value, both for existing members and new members. BRICS is a dynamic group of rising powers, a vehicle of emancipation of world politics, and unlike virtually all other global institutions and groupings of nations, the West is not invited. The expansion of BRICS made me think of the 1955 Bandung Conference. Both BRICS and the Bandung Conference are not institutions (or in the case of BRICS+, not yet), but rather events with largely undefined practical, but clear symbolic implications; and both in their guest list exclude the developed, Western nations from participation. The 1955 Bandung Conference was an important gathering of what then would be called ‘Third World’ nations, and what we now consider the ‘global South’. The Conference took place in Indonesia during the early decades of the Cold War, and it was the tension of the global conflict between the liberal United States and the communist Soviet Union that spurred on the event. The sense of urgency amongst the Bandung Conference participants to deliberate on the emancipation of their postcolonial states, as well as on how to navigate the dangerous geopolitics of the world’s two major powers and the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement, makes the comparison with the many countries that showed interest in joining BRICS interesting. Concerns about the relationship between the United States and China are widely shared throughout the entire world, from Europe to Latin America, and from the Middle East to Oceania. There have been analyses detailing how, while some states may sway more towards Washington and others more towards Beijing, in reality, most states share a desire to stay as neutral as possible and profit from the avances of both major powers. While there is no unified call for a movement of non-aligned states that explicitly express their desire to stay out of conflicts between the U.S. and China–Russia, there is a unified worry that states can now become victims of the unstable geopolitical climate. At the same time, there is a widely shared belief that the twenty-first century will become the era of the global South, which now becomes sufficiently developed to be an equal to the developed West. Of course, there are major differences between the Bandung Conference and BRICS+, and I do not intend to make a detailed comparison. China itself, as the United States’ nemesis, is part of the BRICS+, while neither major power in the Cold War participated in Bandung. Whereas in the 1950s there was some possibility to stay out of global geopolitics and the U.S.–Soviet conflict, in today’s hyperglobalized world that has virtually become impossible, no matter a state’s alignment. And while Bandung was about politics and ideology, BRICS+ promises to be very pragmatic in nature. BRICS+ will be focused on pragmatic cooperation in many domains, especially trade and finance, providing existing and new member states with much-needed opportunities for beneficial trade relations (e.g., for Argentina and Ethiopia) and opportunities to diversify existing trade relations (e.g., for Saudi Arabia and the Emirates). For some, especially Russia and Iran, BRICS+ can be a lifeline to circumvent Western sanctions. It seems to me that for China, BRICS expansion is truly about reshaping global order, in line with China’s traditional interest in multilateralism and pluralism in international relations. At the same time, even for the Chinese, BRICS+ is an instrument to achieve other goals: first, to increase cooperation with the largest non-Western economies without Western interference; and second, to secure the import of natural resources, mostly from Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates. There is a ‘Bandung Spirit’ amongst member states. For some, it is about the emancipation of rising, non-Western economies, that need to work together in the face of adversaries in the developed economies of the West; for others, it is about hedging bets and cooperating as neutrally as possible in both Western-led organizations and China and Russia-led organizations. This Spirit, however, takes the backseat to the economic pragmatism that is of most importance to many of the BRICS+ members. Prospects Groupings like the UN Security Council and G20 suffer increasingly from internal differences and, hence, deadlock. The G7 only is able to produce some tangible results, as it consists merely of like-minded nations. The 1955 Bandung Group perhaps did not produce tangible results, but it did alter the way in which African and Asian nations were able to position themselves in the Cold War, and reshaped thinking about the emancipation of postcolonial states. Like the G7, BRICS+ is capable of delivering tangible results to its member states and subsequently shape the world economy and international politics. This, however, is a choice, not an inevitability. BRICS in its old form did not produce many significant results, besides from a more favourable treatment in bilateral trade relationships amongst members. Current discussions about a joint currency and coordinated efforts to accelerate the process of de-dollarization are interesting, though. Brazil’s Lula has been one of the most vocal advocates of a BRICS trading currency, seeing it as an effective way of depending less on the dollar. China is also an understandable proponent of such measures. In April 2023, it began trading with new BRICS+ member Argentina in the Chinese yuan, circumventing the traditional use of the dollar. The de-dollarization plan indicates an intent by BRICS+ members to further institutionalize the grouping. That is necessary, because the ‘old’ BRICS remained a somewhat vague grouping, with no clear rules or concrete goals. It also shows an intent to reshape the global (financial) order, and with BRICS+, the members have enough demographic, financial, and economic power to make that happen. This plan, in my view, shows both geopolitical and ideological considerations (especially for Lula and Xi), transcending the mere pragmatism that otherwise characterizes both BRICS and the new BRICS+. While different from the well-known Non-Aligned Movement, it is also here that a larger BRICS may demonstrate something that resembles the old Bandung Spirit of global emancipation and global South cooperation. Note, 6 December: On 30 November, the incoming administration of Argentinean president-elect Javier Milei confirmed that it would not join the BRICS+ grouping in 2024. During his electoral campaign, Milei used fierce anti-China rhetoric. At the same time, it remains to be seen if Milei cannot be tempted to still join BRICS+ when in office, especially when his financial and economic plans do not deliver immediate results. Moreover, Milei has already softened some of his hard-line rhetoric on foreign policy. For example, he invited left-wing president Lula to his inauguration, despite combative language against Brazil during his campaign.

More than a year ago, I wrote a blogpost about the decision made by the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) to leave China, after the disappearance of former top tennis player Peng Shuai within China. Peng had spoken out on Weibo about Zhang Gaoli, a former member of the Communist Party’s Politburo, and how he had continuously sexually abused here. Peng’s story was quickly censured and the subsequent discussion about what she had been through—and about #MeToo, or 米兔 (mitu) more broadly—were not allowed on social media. The WTA, concerned for Peng’s safety, decided to cancel its tennis tournaments in China, demanding the safe return to public life of Peng and a government investigation into Peng’s allegations. As was clear by March 2022, the Chinese government had not moved an inch on the issue, and now, in April 2023, it still has not. It also will not: the message that the Communist Party will not allow this kind of allegation towards top-ranking officials, fearing similar allegations might end up targeting those even higher in the hierarchy (read: Xi Jinping), is loud and clear. This is certainly not a surprise, and was widely expected in the weeks after Peng’s disappearance. This also made the WTA’s decision the more commendable. On 13 April 2023, the WTA announced on its website that in the second half of this year, women’s tennis will return to China. It argues that “[w]hile we do not regret our decision on the suspension, the WTA and its members feel that now is the time to return to our mission in China. We are hopeful that by returning more progress can be made,” pointing out that it was clear that its initial, twofold demand would never be met. Unsurprisingly, especially in the current heated public discourse on the West’s relationship with China, criticism of the WTA’s decision abound. The important Tennis Podcast expressed their utter disappointment, even suggesting it would be good for the WTA chief executive to resign, and wondering whether top players would now be willing to boycot Chinese tournaments themselves. Tumaini Carayol of The Guardian concluded that “[t]ennis’s support for Peng Shuai has turned to dust with WTA’s China U-turn.” In my view, the decision by the WTA is understandable for multiple reasons. First, as I noted in March 2022, “the WTA [was] the only international organisation that publicly expresse[d] its sorrow over Peng’s situation” and thus “still stands alone.” It seems clear that before making the decision to pull out of China, the WTA in their deliberations expected that their action would be followed by others; solidarity would have seemed probable from organizations like the male tennis players’ association (ATP), the International Tennis Federation (ITF), or others. But although supportive statements were publicized, no other association or organisation joined the boycot. This is regrettable, since a boycot by the WTA alone clearly would not be sufficient to alter any calculations within the Communist Party. Thus, if people are disappointed in the WTA’s decision, they should look at other organisations who did nothing, first. Second, there is no good solution for this problem, so blaming the WTA is too easy. They tried, at least. The situations in which sports events coincide with human rights abuses and the ways in which to handle this are still debated, as there is no ‘quick fix’ to simultaneously admonish a government for the abuses, guarantee that the practice of the abuses is ended, and bring the country’s people into much-needed contact with these sports. It just does not work this way, as not only China, but also states like Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, and even the U.S. have shown. Indeed, withdrawing women’s tennis tournaments from China (a country with 1.4 billion people, that is) has its downsides, too. Most importantly, it is of much value to present such a popular sport to an audience of hundreds of millions of young people, especially girls, who can be inspired to take up tennis and develop their talents. These young people have nothing to do with Zhang Gaoli or other Communist Party officials; is it right to take away their opportunity to interact with the sport? Third, and relatedly, China presents a major audience for women’s tennis, with large audiences at tennis tournaments and significant television viewership. It is no secret that the WTA has money problems, and leaving China meant a disastrous financial hit. In the end, the organisation also needs to get back to financial health in order to ensure a good tournament calendar and sufficient support for athletes. For this, also, the WTA cannot be blamed. In short, I am hesitant to call the WTA’s decision a great disillusionment, because I understand that there were no good options here. The WTA was alone in this matter. If others had offered more forceful support, that would not have been the case, and the situation might have been different. I also do not think this makes the initial decision to pull out of China a farce—to the contrary, I still think it is commendable. It does, however, also make painfully clear how difficult it is to stand up against (perceived) unjustice in the increasingly powerful and rich countries that do not share an understanding of human (and especially women’s) rights. How to manage this going forward remains a very important topic of debate.

On March 26th, 2023, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) scored a significant diplomatic victory when the government of Honduras announced it was severing diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) and switching its recognition to the mainland. Meeting Honduras’ foreign minister in Beijing, the PRC’s new Foreign Minister Qin Gang lauded the decision, describing the decision as “a choice to stand on the right side of history and the side of a vast majority of countries.” It is expected that Honduran president Castro will visit President Xi on relatively short notice—an easy PR opportunity for China. Whether it was intended or not (it very well might have been), the PRC’s coup coincided with ROC President Tsai’s state visit to the two remaining allies in Central America, Belize and Guatemala. There is no doubt that the announcement of Honduras switching sides partially overshadows what otherwise would have been an important opportunity for Tsai to showcase Taiwan’s international standing as an independent entity. (Elsewhere, Tsai’s predecessor also was not really helping.) It is a loss of face for the ROC, which is now left with just thirteen allies—and that number might even dwindle further later this year. Indeed, for those following the trajectory of the PRC–ROC recognition rivalry, eyes are probably next on Paraguay. Taiwan’s largest remaining ally, it has often gone under the radar because of its consistent and somewhat subdued support for the ROC. Yet national elections in April 2023 might alter the political landscape in Paraguay, and thus also its foreign policies. This will sound all too familiar to Taiwanese officials: after all, Honduras’ break-away also began with national elections that decided a new foreign policy outlook. To examine this further, I briefly look at the recognition switch that Honduras made this year. As will be argued below, this switch was not a surprise. Still, it is interesting to keep an eye on the diplomatic fallout and the public perception of the government’s decision within Honduras itself. Next, I make a brief comparison between the cases of Honduras and Paraguay, asking whether it is probable to expect a similar trajectory for Paraguayan decision making. I close with some thoughts about the relevance of these recognition switches. The rise and demise of Taiwan—Honduras relations Since the Taiwan—Honduras relationship now has received considerable attention, one might ask: was this relationship ever special? The answer is twofold. On the one hand, this relationship was like many other bilateral relationship between (far-away) countries, with regular diplomatic exchanges and cooperation, including student exchanges and trade investments. Honduras had diplomatic ties with the Republic of China when it still governed the Chinese mainland, and maintained its ties with the Republic when it withdrew from the mainland to the island of Taiwan. There were two principal reasons for this: most importantly, the established diplomatic relations and subsequent economic exchanges resulted in sufficiently positive outcomes for Honduran development; and the right-wing government of Honduras did not want to pursue ties with a Communist state (i.e., the PRC), opting instead for having relations with the then-authoritarian ROC regime under the Chiangs. Put this way, relations between the Honduran and Taiwanese governments historically align with the relations of other Central American countries with the ROC. On the other hand, numerically, the relationship became increasingly important to Taiwan over time. When Costa Rica switched its recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 2007, the recognition behaviour of Central American states became fluid. Costa Rica was followed by Panama (2017), another significant loss, and also El Salvador (2018) and Nicaragua (2021). The simple fact that only Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras remained as diplomatic allies made these countries increasingly special. With Honduras now joining most of its regional neighbours in developing ties with Beijing, only Belize and Guatemala remain; Tsai’s state visit thus also reflects how important the bilateral relations with those two states will now become. It is good to emphasize here that the decision by Honduran President Xiomara Castro to abandon the diplomatic relationship with the ROC was not a suprise. In fact, it can be traced back as far as ten years ago, when in December 2012 then-President Lobo publicly expressed interest in formally recognizing the People’s Republic, although not following through on this idea. Almost a decade later, during the campaign for the presidential elections at the end of 2021, the left-wing Castro also indicated clearly that she would be in favour of establishing ties with PR China over Taiwan. After her installment as president, she seemed to move on, although the new government’s plan listed pursuing ties with the PRC as its first foreign policy goal. A year later, in January 2023, reports surfaced about the foreign ministry’s clandestine interactions with the PRC, which ultimately culminated in the decision in early March. (The U.S. tried to prevent this from happening, mainly by sending an envoy to the country, but was unsuccessful.) Put this way, Castro’s decision is not much more than the delayed fulfillment of a campaign promise. Additionally, it may be good politics, especially if the Chinese have promised substantial financial support and investment in the Honduran economy—which it desperately needs. Considering the publication of financial demands on the Honduran side earlier this year, which were apparently rejected by the Taiwanese side (and later publicly lamented by the Taiwanese side, too), it is likely that the PRC has agreed at least to some extent to provide a considerable amount of money, either in the form of loans (the preferred method) or foreign aid. In any case, the PRC is continuing its aid in constructing new dams—an ongoing effort that preceded the recognition switch by at least a decade. Now that ties have been established, Honduras might also join the (somewhat faltering) Belt and Road Initiative and also sign up for the (vague) Global Development Initiative, which will surely result in some form of financial investment. It is interesting to take into account how the government’s decision was received domestically. According to reporting in El Heraldo, the government’s decision was not met with great satisfaction amongst the Honduran public. Elsewhere, the Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to Foreign Minister Reina García and subsequently published it, expressing concerns about the recognition switch upending long-established patterns of trade, which could have negative consequences for Honduran enterprises that engage in international trade. Local media also paid attention to other implications of the decision, including uncertainty amongst Honduran students at Taiwanese universities, living there on bilateral scholarship programs; the Foreign Minister made sure to assure that they would be able to continue their studies on the Chinese mainland if they wished. (The students can finish the semester at Taiwanese universities, yet are likely unable to graduate. The importance of these bilateral education programs should not be underestimated; they are very important for countries that want to increase their human capital. The PRC is also very active on this front.) This indicates that, while positive attitudes towards the decision certainly can be found, there does not seem to be immediate, widespread support, as relevant groups in society were rather satisfied with the Taiwan–Honduras relationship. After Honduras, now Paraguay? During the electoral campaign in Honduras, the diplomatic recognition of the ROC and the doors that a recognition switch towards the PRC would open were a talking point. In this light—and in the light of the eventual implications of that debate—the political campaign currently ongoing in Paraguay might also set off alarm bells in Taipei. Even more in Paraguay than in Honduras, the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan is part of the discussion. And similar to Honduras, the choice in Paraguay is clear. The party currently in power, the conservative Colorado Party (Partido Colorado), is in favour of maintaining ties with the ROC, while the leading opposition party, the social liberal PLRA (Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico), overtly opposes maintaining ties with the ROC, instead favouring a recognition switch towards the PRC. Paraguay’s diplomatic relations with the ROC date back to a decades-long dictatorship under Alfredo Stroessner. Stroessner maintained ties with ROC primarily because he liked its political system: it, too, was a militarist, right-wing dictatorship. In subsequent democratic elections, of which there now have been several, the issue of PRC/ROC recognition was not relevant, and ties with Taiwan were rather secure. This is also true for the most recent administration under President Abdo Benítez, who is clearly supportive of his country’s alliance with the ROC. During a recent state visit to Taiwan, he explained the relationship as one that supported democratic values and sought a “peaceful and sustainable world,” clearly moving the relationship beyond any materialist or otherwise shallow considerations. This, for one, goes beyond the depth of the Honduras–Taiwan relationship. Indeed, Abdo Benítez has repeatedly argued that ending diplomatic ties with the ROC would be a “historic mistake.” And still, it might happen. Opposition leader Efraín Alegre, who is either leading or very close to leading in the polls for the upcoming presidential election on 30 April, has stated his position clearly: establishing ties with Beijing is the only decision that makes sense. On his website, while acknowledging that Paraguay values its “cooperation” with Taiwan, it “cannot continue to miss out on the economic opportunities of the Chinese market.” More concretely, Alegre foresees a “flow of potential investment [into the Paraguayan economy], especially in the infrastructure sector.” (What is true for all of Latin America is true for Paraguay: investment in infrastructure is very much needed. Several institutions, including the World Bank, have indicated this problem, and tackling this problem is a relevant topic of debate during the campaign. Seeing China and its Belt and Road Initiative as a solution for this problem makes sense politically.) Alegre’s argument for a relationship with the PRC goes beyond investment opportunities. Most importantly, Paraguayan business argues that the PRC simply offers a bigger market for their export products than the ROC. Although the government in August 2022 announced that the Taiwanese have approved the export of Paraguayan pork, as such increasing trade opportunities for the crucial meat sector, there will always be more Chinese consumers than Taiwanese consumers. For this reason, Paraguayan political parties are under pressure of business lobbyists to establish political relations with PRC in order to facilitate more trade opportunities. When it comes to the question of PRC/ROC recognition, the Paraguayan election thus seems to mostly resemble a debate between pragmatism and ideology. Although Abdo Benítez is not eligible for re-election, his successor Santiago Peña’s position is very similar. Peña has argued in favour of maintaining ties with the ROC, saying that Paraguay “has much to learn” from the Taiwanese. (It is true that Taiwan is helping Paraguay in several domains, including recent public policies targeting women’s participation in the labour force.) He also stressed the importance of strengthening ties with ‘exemplary’ democracies like the U.S. and Taiwan, and that Paraguay should “consider its [ideological] alignment.” The significance of contemporary recognition switches Considering the clear positions of both the Colorado Party and the PLRA in the upcoming presidential election, it is likely that the outcome will reflect the future of Paraguay’s relationship with the ROC. If Peña is elected, the relationship will remain; if Alegre is elected, a severance of ties seems likely, possibly as soon as this year. (This does not take into consideration non-domestic attempts to influence any such decision, i.e., probable attempts by the U.S. to prevent a recognition switch from happening.) Of course, the Taiwanese will observe the results closely, and no matter who wins, they will attempt to sufficiently court them and keep them on board. If that would not help—and Paraguay becomes the next country that switches recognition from ROC to PRC—the question becomes: Does it matter? There are, in my view, two reasons why the problem of the recent setback in Honduras, and possibly even an upcoming setback in Paraguay, is mitigated: (1) the fact that the number of ROC-recognizing states probably always will be more than one, and (2) the growing diplomatic, yet unofficial relations with far more important states. First, although there is no doubt that the ROC dislikes the idea of more countries abandoning it and the issue of growing (formal) isolation in global diplomacy, it is arguable that there is little difference between, say, twenty countries recognizing the ROC and only ten countries doing so. The difference has no political or legal consequences. It is important for the ROC to maintain some formal relations with other countries, because this results in legitimacy; the exact number, however, is not of crucial importance. This might make more sense from the perspective of the PRC. Beijing’s end goal is for the ROC to have no (zero) diplomatic allies left. After all, this would make it very easy to argue that there is no Taiwanese statehood, and that Taiwanese claims of de facto or de jure independence are fallacies: the Chinese could simply point out that nobody in the world recognizes that statehood. For as long as there exist some states that do recognize the statehood, no matter how many, the Chinese argument holds less value. And it is very likely that the ROC will hold onto diplomatic relations with some states for a long time: besides the small island states (of which some are increasingly fed up with Chinese encroachment, pushing them in Taiwan’s arms) and the Vatican (which is at odds with Beijing, too), both Guatemala and Belize also seem rather satisfied with their ties to the ROC. Second, I would argue that although losing Honduras as a diplomatic ally is bad news for the Taiwanese government (and losing Paraguay would be even worse), at the same time, the fact that other countries are significantly increasing their interactions with Taiwan is even more important. As much as President Tsai would like to continue meeting Honduran president Castro, it cannot be denied that meeting U.S. House Speaker McCarthy is much more impactful. The same goes for Czechian President Pavel’s phone call with Tsai and the visit of a German Minister to Taipei. Moreover, a growing number of politicians and government officials from important countries and institutions, including the U.S., U.K., Lithuania, Japan, the European Parliament, and others has recently visited the ROC. These interactions are very important for the Taiwanese: although they remain unofficial, they grant Taiwan a considerable amount of support and legitimacy. As such, they mitigate any formal loss of international recognition, because they provide Taiwan with better opportunities to participate in world politics and safeguard national security than the existing diplomatic relationships with small states with no foreign policy clout. It thus signals that there are still ample opportunities for the ROC to maintain its international standing, and possibly even expand it. Update, May 3rd: By now, it has become clear that Santiago Peña, presidential candidate for the Colorado party, will be sworn in as Paraguay’s next president, later this year. This means that Colorado will remain in control of government, as it has done for most of the past five decades. It seems like Peña did outperform the electoral polling, as it suggested a close race—or even a win for Alegre, the opposition candidate. In any case, relief on the Taiwanese side is clear, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly published a congratulation. Peña, himself, left no doubt after his victory that he was serious about his support for Taiwan, tweeting about his commitment to “continue strengthening [the] historical ties of brotherhood and cooperation between [Paraguay and Taiwan].” Paraguay, for now, will remain Taiwan’s ally.

Recently, discussions about the relationship between Western countries and PR China have developed rapidly. Although it has simmered for a longer time, debate about the future of the West’s (constructive and peaceful) relationship with China especially intensified in the past few years. There are multiple reasons for this—including concerns about government policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and, more generally, China’s increasing hard power and its (mostly justifiable) desire to develop its global influence. Although ‘the West’ is often used as a term to describe the United States, Canada, and (Western) Europe or the E.U., when it comes to relations with China, using this broad terminology can be misleading. After all, the relationship of the U.S. with China does differ from the E.U.’s relationship with China. Similarly, policy interests and objectives differ. I briefly explain below why, in my opinion, there should be made a more explicit distinction between China’s relations with the U.S. and the E.U. Right now, this especially comes forward in two cases: increasingly militaristic rhetoric about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and competition in advanced technology sectors. For decades, the relationship between the United States and the European Union has been fairly stable. The reason is simple: both share important strategic objectives, most importantly the sustainability of a ‘rules-based order’ with a solid foundation in international, Western-dominated institutions and an international rule of law. Both the Americans and the Europeans thought it important to promote their norms and values to other parts of the world, including democracy and human rights. This fit right into the position of the United States as the global hegemon and, thus, the de facto policeman of the world. Moreover, when it came to external threats, the U.S. and the E.U. have often been on the same wavelength. For example, this was (unfortunately) the case in the invasion of both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as broad Western alignment in the Syrian civil war. Both the United States and Western Europe identified the Soviet Union and later Russia as a threat to both their rules-based order and the physical security of the European continent. This concern was institutionalized through the foundation of NATO, which for decades has had one primary objective: containing Russia. Unsurprisingly, almost all E.U. members (23 out of 26) are also part of NATO. American and European interests are not always the same However, as much as both sides have had shared norms, values, and strategic objectives in the past and present, this does not mean that this is always the case. It may feel natural for European countries to follow American leadership, as they have so often chosen to do, because of the United States’ immense hard power, soft power, and Europe’s enormous dependence on the U.S.—including through NATO. Similarly, it may feel natural and justifiable for the United States to expect that their European allies follow their lead and support them in what they perceive to be challenges to American hegemony. But in my opinion, when it comes to the increasing presence of China in Western debates on world order and peace, there is no clear reason why this transantlantic symbiosis should persist. Instead, it would be wise for the Europeans to more forcefully make clear to the Americans that when it comes to issues like China, the European and American positions are not the same, and Europe prefers to enact its own foreign policy and map out its own (geopolitical) strategy. Amongst other things, this would invigorate the E.U.’s hope of becoming a more serious power bloc in the world, decrease its position of dependence on the U.S., and enable it to be a more serious negotiation partner with the Chinese. Below, I briefly discuss this point in the context of the tensions in the Taiwan Strait and increasing competition in the advanced technology sectors. First, although the U.S. and the E.U. both want to support Taiwan, the E.U. should not automatically go along with larger American plans about containing China and maintaining dominance in the Asia-Pacific. Second, technological and economic competition is fine and not inherently problematic. Again, the U.S. and E.U. share similar interests to a certain extent. However, the Europeans should not passively follow the Americans in their competition with the Chinese. After all, the United States have different incentives to compete with China than the European Union, namely to inhibit Chinese development, and do so with a more antagonistic approach than the Europeans should be comfortable with. Why the E.U. should not blindly follow the U.S.’ steps in the Asia-Pacific One of the most contentious topics in current relations between Western countries and China are the tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and the perennial desire by the Chinese Communist Party to ‘bring back’ Taiwan ‘to the motherland’, either peacefully or forcefully. Although no Western countries recognize Taiwanese statehood (recognizing something that even remotely resembles Taiwanese independence perhaps comes closest in the case of Lithuania and, now, Czechia), they do align themselves with the Taiwanese nation and its norms and values, most notably its democracy. There are many reasons why tensions are increasing now. They include the ‘re-election’ of Xi Jinping for his third term in office in October 2022, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, and potential parallels between Russia’s (previously considered unthinkable) full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Below the surface, other factors of importance include the Chinese government’s promotion of popular nationalist sentiment and China’s growing military capabilities, which are mostly focused on the specific scenario of an attack on Taiwan. Amidst these rising tensions, at first sight, there does not seem to be a clear difference in the American and European approaches towards the Taiwan Strait issue. Both the U.S. and the E.U. reject any claims China lays on Taiwan and aim to support Taiwanese democracy. Having witnessed Russia’s agression, they fear that a similar horror may occur elsewhere. This is illustrated by diplomatic visits to Taiwan that have not made as much news as Pelosi’s visit, including delegations from Germany, England, Lithuania, and the Netherlands. American and European interests also align in safeguarding a stable Taiwan Strait and South China Sea for trade purposes and sustaining increasingly complicated (technology) supply chains. In these regards, the positions of the U.S. and E.U. are the same. But this does not sufficiently take into account the U.S.’ ulterior motives of its increasing presence in the Asia-Pacific region. (By the way, the U.S. never even left the region after winning the Second World War, wanting to maintain a military foothold and the ability to project hard while European countries either left or were expelled from their Asian colonies.) Unlike European countries, the U.S. are concerned about more than defending a fellow democratic country. After all, its activities in the Asia-Pacific are primarily meant to contain an increasingly powerful China. The Americans are concerned that their position of dominance is under threat and are acting accordingly. In other words, in a way, Taiwan is only part of a bigger picture of an American play for maintaining power in Asia, and defending Taiwan is a way of defending American supremacy in the region. Consider Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, which rapidly heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Was this (rather ostentatious) powerplay in the E.U.’s interest? I do not think it was. The visit can only be considered to be in the U.S.’ interest, as it was a way to showcase American influence and dominance. If anything, the nationalistic and militaristic sentiments that were fed by the visit made constructive dialogue with China on the Taiwan issue more difficult, including for E.U. diplomats. Unsurprisingly, European countries were not openly supportive of Pelosi’s actions. In line with this, I do not consider it a positive development that NATO is increasingly diverging from its original raison d’être in order to become more active in the Pacific (the ‘other ocean’) to counter China. If the United States—or, for that matter, individual European countries—want to counter China, that is their right, but by using NATO for this objective, European countries risk getting dragged into military Sino-U.S. competition. This aligns with a previous post in which I outlined reasons why at some point, European countries should become more independent militarily from the U.S. in the form of a European defense alliance, instead of relying (solely) on a U.S.-dominated NATO. At some point, interests just begin to deviate too much, and proper coordination with a shared long-term strategy becomes too difficult. Why the E.U. should not blindly follow the U.S.’ technological competition The U.S. use their influence to move their European allies towards a more confrontational approach to China when it comes to issues of Asia-Pacific security. By the same token, they are using their influence to move their allies in the direction of a more confrontational approach towards China in the technological domain. When it comes to advanced technology, in most regards, the United States have a clear edge over the rest of the world, including China. This is beneficial to the Americans in multiple ways. For example, the technology sector is a big part of the U.S. economy, resulting in major income from technology exports; and dominance in certain technology sectors can help the United States secure both hard power and soft power abroad. However, in many technology sectors, the Chinese are becoming increasingly competitive, including sectors like telecommunication networks (5G), big data, space technology, artificial intelligence (AI), and advanced military capabilities. In some of these sectors, a clear bilateral competition is looming between the U.S. and China. For example, a few years ago, artificial intelligence pioneer Lee Kai Fu published a book in which he described how the development of AI is rapidly becoming a scientific battlefield, as the Americans try to keep their edge over the Chinese, and the Chinese try to make up the deficit and become the dominant force in global AI innovation. The incentive for the U.S. to outmaneuver China in the advanced technology sector is clear and understandable. And again, parts of American interests absolutely align with European interests, for example when it comes to (exagerrated) concerns about Western-produced semiconducters being utilized by the People’s Liberation Army, potentially even in a future military conflict with Taiwan. However, it is the bigger picture where American and European interests may deviate. On the one hand, the Americans want to keep ahead of Chinese technological capabilities because of their desire to remain the global hegemon; losing the technology competition to China would be a blow to that desire. (A recent illustration of the American strategy to contain Chinese technological development for the sake of containment is its courting of India as a new partner in technology innovation, in order to further frustrate Chinese development.) On the other hand, the Europeans have a more narrowed set of concerns when it comes to Chinese technological development, without being directly involved in any hegemonic rivalry. The E.U. should not be concerned about any ‘rise’ of China as the next technology superpower, because this rise cannot be considered a (direct) threat to European safety and development. Instead, European concerns are limited to more concrete cases like fair trade practices and human right concerns (for example, about big data surveillance in Xinjiang). It would thus be good for the E.U. to make its own assessments when it comes to technology trade and scientific cooperation with China, and not be pressured by the U.S. to take a more confrontational approach. To a reasonable extent, this is already happening, and should be continued. Examples include Germany making up its own mind about the safety of Huawei 5G technology and the Netherlands (before ultimately signing a deal with Washington) persisting in choosing its own path when it comes to semiconductor trade with China. Of course, ideally, decisions about technology trade and scientific cooperation with China would be taken by the E.U. as a whole, and not by individual states (as was the case in both the German and Dutch examples). This would give the Union a much stronger position amidst the increasingly fierce technology competition (often even called ‘tech war’) between the Americans and the Chinese. What China is (and is not) to the U.S. and E.U. These two cases bring me back to a broader point: What is China to us? Since the Trump era, the United States have made clear that they consider China their biggest adversary. Biden continued Trump’s hawkish China policy: not even Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to deviate the Americans from the idea that China ultimately is the biggest threat. But for the European Union, China is not necessarily an enemy. When it comes to the geopolitics and security of the Asia-Pacific, E.U. interests are decidedly different from the U.S’. European countries do not have to defend any sphere of influence in the region, nor do they have to act (or feel like they have to act) as the world’s policeman. Hence, the E.U. should be on the Americans’ side when it comes to supporting Taiwanese freedom, but the E.U. should also caution that it does not go further than that—supporting American hegemony. That is not a priority for Europeans, but for Americans, and should remain so. Similarly, when it comes to technological trade and competition, E.U. interests are more narrow than American interests. European countries do not have to defend their position as world leader in advanced technology, nor do they have to police other countries in their use of advanced technology as much as the U.S. feel they need to. The E.U. can join the U.S. on matters like unfair trade practices and technology-related human rights violations, but should simultaneously not feel pressured by Washington to take an excessively confrontational approach towards Chinese technological innovation. Instead, it should feel the liberty to search for spaces for constructive diaologue, trade, and cooperation.

In November 2021, Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai posted a message on her Weibo blog, explaining for the first time how former Politburo member Zhang Gaoli had sexually abused her for an extended period of time. Peng’s story was the first public accusation of a high-level politician in the PR China, and led to widespread condemnation. What is more, her subsequent disappearance and removal of her blog post from Weibo led to fears for her safety and anger towards the Chinese government for its mismanagement of the situation, leaving the hashtag #WhereIsPengShuai trending on social media. Besides the personal tragedy for Peng, who has recently announced her abrupt retirement from the sport, the most significant consequence of the Chinese government’s presumed detention of Peng has been the decision by the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) to withdraw all its tournaments from Chinese territory, a step that has been widely considered bold and impressive considering the considerable financial stakes of the association in the Chinese tennis world. For the WTA CEO, the decision was simply inevitable: he refused to forsake his principles for financial gains, and continued his support for Peng. Now, a few months later, the situation has not significantly changed: Peng has not returned to the tennis courts, and women’s tennis similarly has not returned to China. How has this perseverance by the WTA affected the organisation? To what extent has its moral stance been followed by other organisations? And what does this tell us about the conflict between Western values and financial incentives in the Chinese market space? First, it is good to remind ourselves how monumental the decision by the WTA is. Transnational cooperations are notoriously bad in sensing the right thing to do, and international sports organisations are no exception to the rule. Most infamous are organisations like the International Olympic Committee (IOC), hosting the most recent Olympic Games in Russia and China while quelling public criticism on those states’ human rights records, and the FIFA, which has been condemned for a whole range of issues, including its decision to organize the men’s World Cup in Qatar, refusing to acknowledge the thousands of deaths amongst migrant workers. When Peng Shuai publicized her story through Weibo and subsequently disappeared from the public eye, then, the tennis community understandably did not have high hopes that the international tennis organisations would do the right thing. These low expectations, however, turned out to be mostly unnecessary. Soon after Peng’s disappearance, French tennis player Alizé Cornet was the first athlete to introduce the hashtag #WhereIsPengShuai, followed by other players, including the widely known Naomi Osaka, Serena Williams, Andy Murray, and Novak Djokovic. The hashtag and call for clarity quickly went viral, drawing attention from tennis tournaments, national Olympic committees, and politicians, including the White House. Within a few days, Peng’s story was top of mind not only within the world of tennis, but also within the world of sports and even international politics. This international outcry created an environment for international organisations to speak out, and understandably all eyes primarily were on two organisations: the women’s tennis association, responsible for the wellbeing of their athletes, and the IOC. There was no need for a long wait to measure the WTA’s response: very quickly, the association’s CEO published a statement that was widely praised amongst tennis players, fans, and journalists. In the statement, he demanded clarity on the safety and whereabouts of Peng. When no satisfactory Chinese response followed, on December 3rd, the WTA suspended all its activity in China, arguing that “the leadership in China has not addressed this very serious issue in any credible way.” In my view, at the time, these actions of the WTA in November and December were significant. For the first time, a major international organisation completely suspended its (commercial) activities in China due to concerns about human rights violations. Arguably, the actions of the WTA and other organisations in the months after the disappearance were—and still are—even more significant. After all, the attention span of the general public to stories like Peng’s is very limited. As often happens, after some time, the world goes back to its normal state; it acts like little has happened. The analysis above has illustrated that the WTA has not ‘gone back’, and instead has maintained its position. Yet, it still stands alone. To this day, the WTA is the only international organisation that publicly expresses its sorrow over Peng’s situation. The closest to an involvement in the situation by another organisation was, again, the IOC’s embarassing enabling of the Chinese government’s propaganda: during the Winter Olympics, Thomas Bach was so kind to let himself be filmed together with Peng at a skiing event. Besides this, no other organisations have come forward and demanded further investigation or have put pressure on Beijing in any other significant way. Notable, for example, is by the ATP, or men’s tennis association, to continue all their activities in China. This raises an important question: how should civil society—companies, NGOs, sports organisations—approach situations of human rights violations like Peng’s? Broad consensus is that the WTA has acted impressively, but why does it still stand alone? Why did no other organisation provide direct financial assistance to the WTA when it stopped its business in China? Why were there no other sports organisations that even contemplated following the same route? There are several potential answers to these questions. The most likely, of course, is that these companies and organisations are not willing to risk their business in China: the Chinese market is lucrative, and principles are expensive. Yet more fundamentally, below the surface, there is a deep unease in Western countries on matters of human rights abuses in China, to which Peng’s case belongs. This certainly is the case for Western governments and their diplomats. How does one address the Chinese government and put pressure on them for abuses of fundamental human rights, when China is so powerful and willing to punish anyone who provides any criticism? How does one negotiate a discussion on human rights violations when the paradigms on these human rights differ so fundamentally between, say, the Netherlands and China? Is there, realistically, anything that can be done? The West—the United States and the European Union—likes to take the moral high ground, and has done so enthusiastically for decades. Human rights are seen as natural, non-negotiable, and universal. However, one has to acknowledge that a significant part of the world does not share these principles, and intrinsically disagrees on what should be considered ‘violations’ of ‘human rights’. In the past, the West was able to impose its discourse on human rights on other parts of the world, but as the West slowly declines, it loses its capabilities to do so. Increasingly, other states, of which China might be the most powerful example, will respond to any criticism with a shrug: we disagree with your assessment of human rights; we see them differently; and what are you going to do about it, exactly. There is, then, no easy answer. How to cope with human rights violations remains difficult when the violator is one of the two most powerful states in the world. (Note that justifiable accusations of human rights violations addressed at the United States have not met a more positive and constructive response.) Although it is an uncomfortable truth, there may not be much that can be done. The case of Peng Shuai indicates this, too: the WTA still stands alone, and Peng’s career is over. Withdrawing Western sports competitions and organisations, as well as ending all sponsoring deals, would seem righteous, but would also isolate hundreds of millions of sporting fans in China, with little effect on the local human rights situation. Ignoring abuses of human rights in any host country because of the potential awkwardness of confrontation would be considered an abandonment of important norms and values that often are embedded deeply in those exact sports organisations. Considering this difficult situation, two things can simultaneously be true: (i) we do not want to isolate ourselves from Chinese society, economy, and culture; and (ii) we do not want to weaken our position on basic human rights, as they are the foundation of our own society. From this, a new way of engaging China needs to somehow emerge. Here, there is a difference between incidental dependence and strategic dependence. The first refers to the West's engagement with civil society in China; the latter refers to macro-economic and geopolitical relations with China. It is wise to pursue a European economic approach that is less bound to China: that is, implementing measures that limit the dependence on Chinese commodities and other forms of trade in sensitive industries. This is a strategic reorientation that allows for tough measures when necessary. However, the incidental dependence—referring to sports tournaments or NGO activities, for example—should not be eliminated. Isolating the Chinese from Western civil society is not a solution. Macro-economics are cold and platonic, but this is not. Having ‘incidental’ presence in China is good to continue a healthy relationship with the Chinese people, exposing them to our cultural norms and values, and vice versa. This is not a rebuttal of the WTA’s decision to leave China. I just do not think that these decisions should be left to individual organisations, or even individual people. There should be a coordinated (governmental) response that takes up the responsibility. That makes sense: having a single organisation trying to pressure a government as large as China’s is unrealistic, and a coordinated effort might be more impactful. Moreover, it can prevent a situation of isolatedness for the organisation—here, the WTA—where others stay silent. Furthermore, leaving it to a governmental response allows for levels of diplomacy that are not often possible for regular non-governmental organisations. This means that a middle ground should be sought to balance between demonstrating disagreement with the Chinese government’s approach towards human rights on the one hand, and continuing to interact with the Chinese people and Chinese civil society on the other hand. Discussions on the human rights record of Beijing will not go away: there is ample room to discuss the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the oppression of political opposition in Hong Kong, the mistreatment of early whisteblowers during the Covid-19 outbreak, and more. Yet precisely because this is such a large issue, solitary organisations should not be the agents of the discussion. This should be left to national governments, institutions like the European Union, or a union of assembled sports organisations. In this way, an organisation like the WTA is not forced to stand alone.

On Thursday, February 24th, Russian president Vladimir Putin broadcasted a television speech in the depth of night, which amounted to a de facto declaration of war against Ukraine. So far, a week into the conflict that followed, international response has been swift and, frankly, overwhelming. The international community has witnessed actions that would have seemed impossible only days ago—including the complete revival of NATO, the emergence of the European Union as a formidable political and, yes, even military union, the remilitarization of Germany, and more. The sanctioning and condemnation of the Russian Federation has been impressive and much discussed. Similarly, states that have not condemned nor sanctioned Russia have come under increasing scrutiny. This includes the People’s Republic of China. So far, Chinese leadership nor its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外交部) have called the invasion an invasion, nor have they called it a war; consequently, no condemnation has come from Xi or his cabinet members. The Chinese would most likely not have anticipated this degree of Russian agression towards Ukraine: there are some signs that they even may have been played by the Russians. Nonetheless, Beijing now has a fundamental decision to make—a decision that will be watched extremely closely not only by European and North American countries, but crucially also by its neighbours in the region. What will be Xi’s position? First, it is relevant to point out that much remains unknown about PR China’s position on the Russian-Ukrainian war. Moreover, much remains unknown about PR China’s potential complicity, or at least beforehand knowledge of the invasion. Did Xi know about Putin’s plans? Or was he tricked, believing that an invasion would not be forthcoming? This remains speculative, yet the seeming lack of preparation for evacuating Chinese citizens from Ukraine may be an important indicator that Beijing, in fact, did not anticipate a large-scale Russian invasion. Second, in the hours and days after Putin’s declaration of a ‘special military operation’, Chinese officials remained largely quiet, neglecting to say anything of meaning regarding the conflict. Tellingly, Chinese state media on Friday, February 25th completely lacked in coverage of the developing crisis in Ukraine. On the same time, Hua Chunying, the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, briefly commented on the situation, stating that “China determines its position on the Ukrainian issue on its own merits”; moreover, she noted that “China supports Russia in resolving the issue with Ukraine through negotiation”, and “China has a long-standing commitment to supporting every country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. These three points of focus—emphasis on self-centered priorities, diplomatic resolution, and commitment to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference—have been brought forward by the Chinese consistently in the past seven days. Similarly, China has quickly criticized the West’s handling of the crisis and NATO’s interference in the region, and has done so consistently. Foreign Minister Wang Yi on February 27th criticized the sanctions as imposed by the West, while also asking NATO “to completely abandon Cold War mentality”. Thus, there are at least four consistencies in Chinese comments on the war. China and the War What, then, will the Chinese position be in this war? Does it support Russia, opt for a neutral position, or choose to condemn Russia? What would be the logical position? There are some factors that would suggest a preference for neutrality or a pro-Ukrainian stance, while there are also factors that would suggest a preference for a pro-Russian position. Firstly, at least theoretically, it would make sense for Xi Jinping to consider some distancing from Russia and some form of condemnation of Putin’s invasion into Ukraine. Ideologically, as noted above, the Chinese have had a clear stance on non-interference for decades. China attaches much importance to sovereignty and independence, is overtly anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist, and has fairly consistently proclaimed that major powers should not interfere in other states. Admittedly, in the Xi era the non-interference principle may have weakened a bit, yet it tellingly has come forward in recent public statements on Ukraine. Thus, a failure to condemn Russia’s clear intrusion of Ukrainian sovereignty seems incongruent with primary principles within the Chinese foreign policy doctrine. Furthermore, pragmatically, there are reasons for China not to be thrilled with all-out war in Ukraine. Macro-economic stability is of great importance for the Chinese economy, as it is heavily globalized and relies on a fairly steady global trade system. The war, the inevitable collapse of both the Ukrainian and Russian economies, but also the unknown impact of Western sanctions may very well destabilize the global economy, and thus hit the Chinese economy, too. Moreover, Beijing will look with sorrowful eyes not only at the revival of NATO, but also at the unexpected and impressive unity amongst European Union members. Over the past seven days, out of virtually nowhere, the E.U. has demonstrated that it is able to function as a political and military entity; unsurprisingly, when there is unity among its member states, the Union is a potentially extremely powerful major power in global geopolitics. Beijing will not be happy that the Russian invasion has possibly woken a sleeping giant. Thus, abandoning Russia and urging for a quick conclusion of the war might very well be in China’s best interests. Finally, Chinese condemnation of and distancing from Putin would make sense, because its trade with the West is just more important than its trade with Russia. In recent years, the Russian Federation has not been among China’s most important trade partners; simultaneously, China has consistently been Russia’s most important trade partner, serving as both its most important import and export partner. At the same time, the European Union and the United States are essential to the Chinese economy, both functioning as crucial markets for Chinese export products. (Ukraine also is a relevant trade partner of China, and is part of the Belt and Road Initiative.) From a trade perspective, supporting Russia should be perceived as a great risk by the Chinese. As noted, China probably is surprised by the enormity of the economic sanctions that both the European Union and the United States have instigated, and will worry that any overt support for Putin will lead to these states imposing sanctions on the Chinese economy, too. Thus, staying neutral or condemning Russia would ensure continuity of the prosperous trade relationships with Western economies. Despite these arguments in favour of abandoning Russia—or, at least, adhering to strict neutrality—it might very well be that if push comes to shove, China will in some way voice its support for Russia. Here, also, ideological and pragmatic factors are relevant. Firstly, it remains important to consider the differences in foreign policy outlooks between ‘the West’ and Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing are, in this regard, fairly similar: they both think in terms of ‘spheres of influence’, which can be superior to respecting sovereign statehood. In this sense, it is also no coincidence that precisely these two states have leaders with similar goals: Putin wants to incorporate Ukraine (and ideally, more) in his sphere of influence; Xi wants to incorporate Taiwan in his sphere of influence. We may not understand it ourselves from a Western point of view, but there is a level of understanding between these leaders that accounts for the lack of condemnation that may be witnessed from Beijing. This is also why the Chinese explicitly state their support for Russian criticism of NATO, which they have done long before the beginning of the war. Both states see NATO as a threat to their ability to dominate their own spheres of influence. NATO has been present in conflicts although it has never been directly attacked, including the wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Ukraine. China, of course, does not want any NATO interference should it choose to invade Taiwan; hence constructing an anti-NATO alliance might be valuable. Supporting Russia in its ‘special operation’ efforts in Ukraine, explicitly denouncing and blaming NATO, would align with the process of delegitimizing NATO. Secondly, one indeed should not forget that Xi Jinping wants to invade Taiwan, and sees it as a critical part of his legacy (worryingly, not too different from Putin’s quest for a historical legacy). A clear condemnation of Putin’s invasion of Ukrain would be, well, farcical. It would be hypocritical: condemning the invasion of a sovereign democracy under the banner of ‘reuniting’ and ‘defending brotherhood’, while simultaneously planning for a similar effort. Although Taiwan is not recognized by a significant amount of states, in contrast with Ukraine, other parallels between the situations of these two states are undeniable. (Taiwan is worried for a reason.) Withdrawal of support for Putin’s quest would ultimately undermine legitimation efforts for Xi’s own quest. Thirdly, more pragmatically, the Chinese see the potential to force Russia into a position of dependency. Russia will become extremely dependent on the Chinese for essentially everything. As mentioned before, China’s economic dependence on Russia is limited, yet for some time, the Chinese have recognized the advantage of importing raw materials from Russia. A few months ago, the New York Times noted that “Chinese purchases of oil from Russia surpassed its purchases from Saudi Arabia”, and trade in materials like coal and wheat has been increasing, too. For China, it is an interesting option to rely more on Russian resources: it enables it to, at least partially, circumvent troubles in trade relationships with the West. An important case study is the bilateral agreement to construct a new gas pipeline from Russia to China, which will continue despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It enables China to acquire much-needed natural gas, assumably for a fairly decent price, while enabling Russia to at least keep some part of its trade in natural resources going. The gas pipeline agreement is important, because it illustrates how the Chinese, by not condemning Russia, can profit from Russia’s increasingly isolated position in the world. Western investment and trade is leaving Russia, leaving a vacuum; the Chinese are happy to jump in. For Russia, China (and to a lesser extent India) might be the best option left: shunned by the West, it has to settle for increasing economic entanglement with China. Even more, as Russia needs China more than vice versa, there is real opportunity for the Chinese to close some very profitable deals. As such, as long as the response from the West is not too costly, China would be able to secure a steady stream of natural resources and a great amount of lucrative deals, as Russia has virtually nowhere else to go. This extends to the micro-level: indicative are preliminary signs that Russian firms now “rush to open Chinese bank accounts”. A final note on these rational motives to support Russia—reports indicate that if Chinese leadership was aware of a coming invasion in Russia, it would have been told that the Russian army estimated a very quick victory, with Kyiv falling within days and the Ukrainian political and military establishment fleeing quickly. This, of course, did not happen, and the current escalation will undoubtedly have surprised Beijing; however, this may have been the assessment on which Chinese decisions have been based. This means Xi’s calculations of the cost-benefit analysis may still very well shift. Conclusion In short—so far, the Chinese leadership has clearly decided against taking a clear position. It has abstained twice in the United Nations’ General Assembly and Security Council votes on condeming Russia, leaving itself some wiggle room. It is understandable why China’s leaders have done so: as the analysis above has illustrated, there are ample factors on both sides—both for condemning Russia and siding with the West, and vice versa. Surely, Beijing watches the situation in Ukraine closely, and its cost-benefit analysis may alter significantly when Russia’s agression continues and even gets more violent. In this, two options seem most likely to me: (1) China remains ambiguous about its position, rejecting calls from the West to explicitly condemn Russia, and (2) China cautiously sides with Russia. Despite the pragmatic benefits of abandoning Russia, the ideological similarity that can be noted between Putin and Xi’s visions and ambitions is too strong to ignore; it is difficult to visualize Xi siding with NATO leaders, while consistently blaming NATO for the war. Continued ambiguity, or ‘neutrality’, may be utilised by the Chinese to position themselves for a position as mediator in any future negotiations. It would be nice for Xi to be portrayed as the leader that led Russia and Ukraine to peace. Moreover, ambiguity could be framed within China’s ideological line of non-interference. Besides remaining ambigious, the Chinese could opt to support Russia. They will not do so enthousiastically, and they will attempt to do it subtly: after all, any support for Russia will be followed by heavy condemnation from China’s most important trade partners, and it might even lead to sanctions. Yet the calculation from Xi might very well be that China can profit significantly from Russia’s isolatedness, and he might sense that he needs to cement his anti-NATO coalition if he plans to invade Taiwan in the coming years. Yet it may ultimately very well be the search for historical legacies of two men—Putin and Xi—that decides China’s position in this escalating war and ushers in a new, forced coalition of Moscow and Beijing.

In the Netherlands, NATO is not discussed often—except at those times when military conflicts on the borders of NATO territory loom. With Russia pursuing an invasion into Ukraine and a full-scale attack looming with a considerable military build-up in Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern border regions, discussion on NATO has been revived in the Netherlands, too: representatives of the alliance are present in news media and in public debate, a discussion about Dutch military contribution within the NATO framework is persistent. Foreign Minister Hoekstra frames NATO as a necessary defensive institute. In this, Hoekstra, and thus the Dutch government, still sees NATO as a primary defensive-military organization that is of value for the Netherlands’ defense. Nonetheless, the new, multipolar world order that is rising this century asks for a reconsideration of this position. At this moment, NATO is not only relevant because it is pushing for de-escalation in the looming conflict between Russia and Ukraine; importantly, it is relevant because the Russian present NATO itself as a potential casus belli. NATO, following Russian thinking, is excessively penetrating the Russian sphere of influence. The Baltic states, directly bordering Russia, are already NATO members, and potential expansion of the pact into Ukraine, Georgia, and perhaps even the Scandinavian states would bring NATO even more emphatically to Russia’s borders. Russia denouncing these developments is understandable, and incorporation of former Soviet states in a Western, U.S.-led military coalition can understandably be appear as provocative. This also begs the question what NATO’s strategy constitutes of. If it is not aiming for provocation, then what does it aim for? Although the Dutch government sees NATO as something self-evident and highly valuable, NATO in fact is an anachronism in contemporary global geopolitics. NATO was a useful instrument in the Cold War era: it provided military cooperation of the Western, capitalist world against the communist threat. The United States were at the height of their power, and Europe consequently was able to benefit of this American projection of military power through NATO. However, at least two important differences make NATO in the contemporary era less effective than in the second half of the past century: (1) the lack of a bipolar geopolitical confrontation, and (2) the decreasing power and waning hegemony of the United States. Firstly, during the Cold War, who was the geopolitical opponent was clear: the Soviet Union and her communist satellite states. The Soviets threatened to pull European states into their sphere of influence, which made military cooperation specifically with these European states of critical importance for the United States. After all, by founding a formal institute and declaring in its charter that an attack on one constitutes an attack on all, Washington succeeded in creating a deterrent mechanism in anticipation of increasing Russian pressure on Europe. At the same time, this illustrates the American dominance within NATO: American efforts led to its foundation, and American military dominance carried NATO through the Cold War, providing a much-needed safety net for European states. Indeed, there was—and is—no power equilibrium amongst NATO allies, which the levels of defensive expenditure of individual member states have famously indicated. In the current era, however, there is no bipolar world as there was during the Cold War. The United States won the War, and the Soviet Union collapsed; the 1990s saw the emergence of a new, unipolar world, with one clear global hegemon—the United States. Russia no longer presented a considerable threat, and other major powers were not of serious influence on world affairs. The first decades of the twenty-first century, however, foreshadow a development that will persist throughout this century: the rise of the People’s Republic of China, the perseverance of Russia, the potential of India, the possible political strengthening of the European Union bloc, and—as will be indicated below—at the same time the waning power of the United States. Although still very powerful, the Americans will not be able to exert world dominance as they used to in the past decades, and the rise of several new major powers makes a seriously multipolar system possible. NATO, still evidently based on the North Atlantic region and focused on the Russian threat, is not meant for such a multipolar system, nor is it prepared for it. Secondly, supremacy of the United States is waning. During the Cold War and in its direct aftermath, American hegemony was at its zenith. For other NATO members, this made it relevant to stay in NATO, despite the Cold War being over and the Soviet threat being reduced. Indeed, connecting one’s fate to the most powerful military power in the world offers considerable advantage: Article 5 provides security guarantees of invaluable worth. Moreover, in the Cold War’s aftermath, there was not yet any considerable light between the cultural, political, and military values of the Americans and their European NATO allies, which military conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere indicate. However, American hegemony in the current era is not what it used to be. The hegemonic decline can still take years or even decades, but the trend is clear: economically, politically, and militarily, the United States will have to increasingly acknowledge that it can no longer maintain its unique dominance, especially in light of China’s rise. This is accompanied by a sentiment of unease in Washington, which in recent years has already expressed itself in a growing preference for isolationism. Naturally, an American isolationist foreign policy has significant consequences for NATO’s effectiveness: the organization does not know any better than the Americans taking the lead. Moreover, especially since the Trump administration, there is an increasing sense amongst European allies that one can no longer trust the Americans as in previous decades: a concrete warning signal were Trumps threats to pull the United States out of NATO. When one state exercises such dominance in a military alliance, trust and a unified strategy are crucial. This is less and less the case. NATO, in other words, is insufficiently apt for the current era: a disappearing unipolar world, an emerging multipolar system, a lack of unified strategy and outdated institutional motive, and an excessively dominant member state, of which power is slowly waning and of which foreign policy is increasingly isolationist and subsequently less trustworthy to allies. Thus, European states would benefit from distancing themselves from a military alliance that is out of balance and unfocused to such degree. This is possible: European states already have a suitable institute that is able to pursue more political and military cooperation—the European Union. It is a widespread taboo within the Netherlands and, more broadly, the European Union, yet the emerging multipolar system and waning power of the United States ask for more serious military cooperation and integration within the European community. A binding European military alliance or, even more, a European army, would be more appropriate to face the geopolitical reality of the coming decades than NATO, which was more well-suited for the geopolitical reality of the past decades. It provides several advantages: European military cooperation means European states no longer have to rely solely on the increasingly unstable and untrustworthy United States; it enables European States to focus solely on their own community and their own community’s strategic challenges; it limits military cooperation to one continent, making it more easy to demarcate and defend the alliance; it prevents European states from being inevitably drawn in any conflict between the United States and a rising power, most likely China; and it enables the European Union to constitute a serious power bloc and claim its rightful spot amongst other major powers in the new multipolar system. Letting closer military cooperation within the European Union prevail over NATO cooperation can lead to a more focused, united approach to geopolitics, in which European states do not need to participate in the United States’ fight for its hegemonic position. This provides European states a serious advantage: European military cooperation outside of NATO means a cooperation within a community of shared values, which has already been integrated in several ways—mostly economically, but to some degree also politically and culturally. It is not without reason that Chinese foreign policy advisors are puzzled by this potentially very powerful European power bloc, possibly a serious pillar in the new multipolar order, which nonetheless neglects the political and military aspect of integration and cooperation; only economic integration within the European Union will not be sufficient to operate as a serious geopolitical player. Of course, this is still a theoretical and utopian prospect: political disunity within the European Union is only increasing, sceptics of further European integration are dominant, and in public debates on European integration, the focus remains mostly on the short term, instead of on (intercontinental) long-term strategy. Potential European military cooperation that aims at making NATO superfluous thus remains, partially because of this disunity within the Union, precarious. When a leading argument to abandon NATO points towards a lack of united strategy, norms, and values, one should also look at the degree of united strategy and shared norms and values within the European community. Can all states in the current Union participate in such a theoretical European military alliance or European army? Which states can participate, and which states divert from the norm to such an extent that participation would inevitably lead to disunity within the new alliance? Do authoritarian regimes like Poland and Hungary fit within such a framework? Is it wise to involve potentially instable non-member states like Serbia and Bosnia? Is a military alliance of Western European states not a more stable and thus forceful prospect—but where does that leave the Union? These are important questions. After all, leaving NATO and focusing on European military cooperation is only valuable when within the European bloc, unity in strategy, norms, and values persists. In sum—although under current circumstances it is understandable for both the Dutch and other European governments to focus fully on NATO cooperation in light of a looming Russian invasion into Ukraine, it would be wise ro reconsider this focus for the longer term. This text has sketched some basic observations that illustrate the obsolete nature of NATO, and the potential benefits of military cooperation within the European Union, without relying on overseas partners, especially the United States. It goes without saying that, as stressed before, this is at this point a mere theoretic and utopian discussion: right now, there is little fertile ground for such a recalibration, although there are some positive signs from Germany's and France's leadership. For other European states, including the Netherlands, it would be wise to consider these uncomfortable questions in the years ahead, too.

In my previous post, I outlined the historical relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (ROC), and Latin America. Zooming in on Central America, I stated that four factors contributed to its position as a bulwark of support for Taipei in the PRC–ROC recognition rivalry, which picked up steam during the late Cold War. These factors were (1) domestic political context, (2) regional political context, i.e., the Cuba factor, (3) diplomatic aptitude of PRC and ROC, and (4) state size. In this post, I want to follow up on this historical analysis by explaining what happened after the period that I examined: how did the recognition rivalry continue in the post-Cold War era? That Central American support for Taipei eventually did drop, with Honduras (2023) as the latest state to switch its recognition from Taipei to Beijing, is already known, yet focus here lays on the reason behind this drop. Moreover, I will introduce the question what the future may hold for both Chinas’ relationships with Central America, and if Taipei’s last remaining bulwark of support may soon disappear, too. Relations in the Cold War era: ideology is most important The recognition rivalry, which picked up steam in the 1970s when the People’s Republic of China joined the international community more explicitly and even replaced the Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan) in international organizations like the United Nations, can arguably be divided in two phases. These phases may well reflect PR China’s own attitude towards the outside world, too. They are (i) a phase of ideology, and (ii) a phase of pragmatism. Although this distinction certainly is very black-and-white (of course, there is still ideology distinguishable in the post-Cold War recognition rivalry), it does make for an easy starting point to examine how the rivalry developed over time. In the recognition rivalry between the PRC and ROC in Latin America, the first phase (roughly 1970–1990) was characterized by ideology. This is not surprising: this was the Cold War era, when international relations were extremely ideologically charged. As discussed in the previous post, this hurt Beijing and benefited Taipei in their battle for diplomatic ties in the region. Central America was home to many right-wing militarist governments in the 1970s and 1980s; these governments often were heavily influenced by American notions of capitalism and liberalism; and their ideological conflict with the ‘red threat’ in their region, Cuba, shaped their perception of PR China as a similar threat. Furthermore, Central American governments had not forgotten how Mao Zedong’s foreign policy in the early Cold War had led to the dissemination of Maoist propaganda throughout the region, and how Mao had supported his ideological counterparts in the region—leftist militant rebellions. All in all, the ideological nature of these international relations impacted the recognition rivalry severely, and they did not benefit the PRC. Although to a lower degree, pragmatism still did play a role in this period. For example, the rapprochement between the United States and the PR China was a perfect example of pure pragmatism: ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ hardly qualifies as an ideological approach to diplomacy. Moreover, from the perspective of Central American states, although their ideology did bring them closer to the ROC anyway, Taipei’s diplomatic aptitude by attending to these governments’ material needs—for example by assisting authoritarians in their military suppression of leftist rebels—was very pragmatic indeed. Text continues below the illustration. Relations in the post-Cold War era: pragmatism trumps ideology In the decades following the Cold War (i.e., from the 1990s onwards), ideology did not disappear from the relationship between Latin America and the Chinas. Still, anti-Communist sentiments persisted in some parts of the region. (Not too long ago, the U.S. government under President Trump did not shy away from hyping up this anti-Communist sentiment against China, glancing over the fact that little in Chinese society today resembles Communist thought.) Yet pragmatism became more important; not only because the ideologically charged Cold War was over, but also because Chinese foreign policy maintained its course of more pragmatism and less revolutionary ideology. This coincided with other developments in Chinese society in the 1980s and 1990s, most importantly including the transition to a market economy. The Chinese economy globalized at a relentless pace, which culminated in the early 2000s in PR China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). It meant that international trade became more important for the Chinese economy, which consequently meant a further necessity to strengthen ties with places all over the world. For the Chinese, it was clear that to develop its position as a reliable and attractive trade partner, a more pragmatic foreign policy was required. In the 1990s, especially, Beijing gained the upper hand in its presence in Central America. Several factors favoured this development. First, put simply, its interest in the region increased as Central America began to stand out as a pro-ROC base. Second, PR China’s hard power increased rapidly, which gave it more tools to achieve its goals even in far-away regions like Central America. Third, from an isolated, underdeveloped state in the 1970s, the PRC began to slowly transition into the geopolitical powerhouse it is today, which was accompanied by a growing incentive to project influence in other regions than Asia. Fourth, Taiwan underwent a democratic transition, which meant it no longer had a political system similar to many in Central America. And fifth, interest of the United States in Central America deflated sharply, even in Cuba, as they shifted attention to the Middle East. These factors put the PRC in a favourable position to gain momentum in the recognition rivalry with the ROC in the region. Amidst these developments, in the 1990s, there was still work to be done: North and South America already recognized the PRC, but Central America virtually entirely maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC. The successes of dollar diplomacy The factors above describe why the PRC gained momentum in the 1990s—but how did it manage to gain more support in Central America? It comes down to two explanations: one that is a natural result of PR China’s rise—namely, its growing hard power and, perhaps to some extent, soft power—and one that was deliberate policy: dollar diplomacy. Dollar diplomacy in the context of the Chinese recognition rivalry refers to the tactic of both Chinas to pay off any states that may be persuaded to switch their diplomatic relations from the one to the other. Timothy Rich has argued that nowadays, dollar diplomacy is a crucial aspect of diplomatic relations of both PRC and ROC with small states that might change their recognition from one to the other. Elizabeth Larus writes that the practice of buying diplomatic allies is rather explicit, even leading to the smaller states’ practice “to hold out for the highest bidder”. It is a global phenomenon: PRC and ROC have used dollar diplomacy in Oceania, Africa, Asia—and Latin America. What does this look like more concretely? Often, it takes the form of financial aid (or FDI, foreign direct investment): Beijing or Taipei presents an amount to the recipient country under the guise of foreign aid or even humanitarian aid (of course, it is up to the recipients to decide how they actually spend this money; not that the Chinese are too worried). For example, in 2008, Malawi severed ties with the ROC in favour of establishing ties with the PRC after the latter “offered several billions of dollars in aid”, as the BBC reported at the time. Another African country, Burkina Faso, switched from the ROC to the PRC after Beijing offered substantial healthcare assistance during a 1970s epidemic. It maintained its ties with the PRC as Beijing kept supporting the Burkinabè agricultural and healthcare sectors in the next decades—until a seemingly random switch back to the ROC in the mid-1990s. The reason? Taipei donated tens of millions of dollars to the Ouagadougou government. (In 2018, Burkina Faso returned to the PRC’s side when it was promised significant development assistance.) One cannot blame either side in this diplomatic rivalry when considering the benefits of dollar diplomacy. Taipei and Beijing both have the financial resources to allocate money to third countries, either in foreign direct investment or in diverse forms of humanitarian aid (or even, who knows, direct bribes); the recipient countries, those still not fully on either side in the choice between the PRC and ROC, are virtually all poor countries that can seriously benefit from these foreign donations. When considering the position of the leader of Malawi, Burkina Faso, or any other of these states, it is fully understandable that they would attempt to take advantage from this dispute between two large economies. As all these recipient states are located far away from both PRC and ROC, any outcome of the recognition rivalry will barely impact them. Moreover, no longer do ideological imperatives fully guide diplomatic relations; in a globalized world, the ideology of money is what counts. The same goes for those states in Central America and the Caribbean that still supported the ROC after the end of the Cold War. Not surprisingly, these states are generally poor and in need of foreign assistance. For example, the most recent three states in the region that made the recognition switch from ROC to PRC are listed dangerously low on the list of countries by nominal GDP per capita (Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador). The situation was similar in the early post-Cold War era. As mentioned, PR China transitioned into a free market economy that increasingly sought opportunities for expanding trade outside its region. Interest in Latin America and especially Central America was historically limited, which meant there was ample room for growth. Whereas Taipei had decades-long diplomatic connections in the region and its trade volume was limited yet fair, Beijing from this time onwards really could begin to lay the foundation for an economic—and subsequent diplomatic—foothold in Central America. Costa Rica becomes the trendsetter In 2007, Costa Rica became the first state in Central America to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. The decision of San José was lauded by then-President Hu Jintao, who noted the contribution of the decision to “not only Central America’s development, but even the development of the world.” Signaling the importance of Costa Rica’s decision, Hu subsequently went on a formal state visit to meet with the Costa Rican president. It has been well-documented that before PR China’s rise, Taiwan was quite active in Costa Rica: trade relations were good, political visits were fairly frequent, a good system of mutual scholarships existed, and cooperation in the technological domain was substantial. In 2003, the ROC donated a Bridge of Friendship (Puente de La Amistad de Taiwán), which was constructed in the north of Costa Rica. (It was recently reported that the bridge suffers from a lack of maintenance and “the consequences of abandonment”.) Yet while ROC-Costa Rican relations seemed good and beneficial to San José, Costa Rica’s president was simultaneously calculating whether the relations were sustainable. The Costa Rican economy was stagnating and dangerously narrow: it leans heavily on tourism and to a lesser extent on a few raw materials, most notably coffee. Moreover, the economy leans heavily on the United States, both for tourism and coffee. In other words, the president saw the need of tapping into a large new market. Beijing was more than happy to accommodate Costa Rica’s president. Confidentially, the Chinese and Costa Rican governments began holding talks about future trade opportunities for both. Shortly after establishing diplomatic ties, Presidents Arias and Hu Jintao announced formal free trade negotiations, and in 2011, this culminated in the establishment of a binding free trade agreement. Hu and Arias agreed on other economic deals, too. Most of these would not have been possible for the Taiwanese to make: the deals were of a significant magnitude. Moreover, the Chinese knew what could play well in Costa Rica. In 2011, a new football stadium was opened in football-crazy San José, with construction costs reaching at least 100 million dollars (though the construction was done by a company from Anhui). It is considered the most modern stadium in the entire region, which neatly fits in the pattern of Beijing generously offering the construction of buildings of significant importance and prestige. (Compare to the aforementioned abandoned Taiwanese bridge, located not even close to the nation’s capital.) Thus, the tables had turned. Before the late 1990s, the ROC was significantly more present in Costa Rica than the PRC. Its economic ties with the Costa Ricans, as well as frequent state visits and other forms of cultural and scientific exchanges, made recognizing the ROC very worthwhile: why bother to even consider recognizing the PRC instead, when there is another state that regards you as a particularly special ally and is willing to spend serious money on it? Yet amidst PRC’s further integration in the world economy in the early 2000s, President Arias saw that establishing ties with Beijing was the necessary step in order to diversify Costa Rica’s international trade. Beijing was happy to throw some bones to help San José understand the advantages of making the recognition switch. Taipei could do little: it no longer provided enough opportunity. Beijing’s success grows, yet challenges rise Costa Rica was the trendsetter, and as the most prosperous nation of Central America, it was a meaningful victory for the PRC. Later, it was followed by Panama, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and, in 2021, Nicaragua. These nations followed a similar trajectory: they enjoyed good bilateral ties with the ROC for decades, yet it became increasingly difficult to isolate themselves from the benefits formal ties with the PRC would bring. In Panama, the PRC began to invest heavily in the local economy within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (一路一带); in El Salvador, the PRC not only promised enormous infrastructure projects, but also delivered large amounts of rice; and in the Dominican Republic, alongside numerous trade agreements and investment proposals, Beijing guaranteed an aid package of three billion dollars, a staggering amount for a country the size of the Republic. Yet these developments have not all been without any challenges: in several of these countries, most notably Panama, more recently elected governments have been critical of the growing presence of Beijing in their economies and infrastructures. Moreover, the lack of local involvement in Chinese construction projects and disappointing gains in important domestic sectors like tourism can lead to public dissatisfaction with their nations’ closer ties to the PRC. In a future post, I will assess to what extent this can be attributed to the so-called Pink Tide that has been enveloping Latin America over the past few years, and what this may mean for both future PRC–Central American relations and the recognition rivalry between Beijing and Taipei. For although the history of the post-Cold War recognition rivalry points to significant success for the PRC’s dollar diplomacy, money cannot buy everything: local support in Central America must be sustained, too.

In a recent analysis, The Diplomat concluded that China’s presence in Central America “has exploded”, with profound consequences for the region. The author points to the shift in diplomatic support from PRC to ROC in recent years, as well as increasing cooperation between regional institutions and organisations and Chinese counterparts. While Central America’s relationship with China indeed is growing, at the same time, I do not think the growth or importance of these relations should be overstated. There is an ongoing—understandable—tendency to partition the world in regions that are leaning more towards the U.S. or China, or that are more open to diplomatic overtures by either of the two major powers. Such a discussion in the context of Central America, however, can only lead to the conclusion that there is not much evidence for a significant swing towards Beijing. First, in the The Diplomat article, the author points out that “China promises large amounts of infrastructure projects”. Through large-scale investment, the Chinese would be able to expand their footprint in the region, both physically (in the form of highways and ports) and financially (in the form of loans and indebtness). Yet the word ‘promises’ does a lot of work here: the Chinese government promises many things to many countries, but does not always deliver. Most importantly in the context of Central America, this holds true for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Most of Central America’s states have indeed signed up for the BRI by now, most recently including Honduras, in the hope of attracting much-needed investment for the different forms of infrastructure that are lacking in the region. (Central America, for example, still lacks a railroad system, even in more-developed Costa Rica and Panama; the highways, especially in the poorest nations, can be notorious for their low quality). Ever since the BRI came to Latin America in 2018, however, little evidence points towards the Initiative providing real benefits to local governments. In fact, as is true elsewhere, Chinese investment mostly is confined to brownfield investment and sectors that are of stategic importance to China itself (i.e., energy). In Central America, this problem is aggravated by the general stagnation in investment levels, which means total investment is still an insignificant amount—especially compared to the United States’ investment in the region, as is consistently indicated by CEPAL reports. Second, the author writes that Beijing “promotes trade agreements, causing large deficits in the long-term”. This is true: as the recent establishment of ties with Honduras shows, the decision to recognize the PRC is followed by the invitation for a formal state visit—widely reported in Chinese domestic media, illustrating another victory over the hostile Taiwanese government—and then trade talks. Concrete steps go along with this: in Honduras’ case it meant, for example, the establishment of a Chinese embassy in Tegucigalpa and a bilateral trade and investment commission. However, both my own research as well as recent news reports highlight skepticism in Central American countries about the degree to which China can deliver on the economic promises it makes when establishing bilateral diplomatic ties. Data show that trade relations still are not beneficial for these states, being excessively unequal, and there is not much evidence that Beijing is working with them to make the trade balance less unequal. Besides preventing China from expanding its relationships with Central America’s countries, these issues also cause serious resentment in politics, business, and society, tainting China’s image in the region. The third line the The Diplomat analysis highlights is interesting, as they write that “Beijing perpetuates an important coordination of activities and alliances between Chinese state media and Central American media to misinform.” This is undeniably true. A fairly recent report by Central American investigative journalist platform Expediente Público detailed how the Chinese government courted Honduran journalists, inviting them to Beijing for a highly orchestrated demonstration of the benefits of their new relationship. During my own research, I saw how in the case of Costa Rica, the Chinese government through its embassy in San José bought whole special issues of one of the country’s largest newspapers, La República, for which it co-produced numerous positive reports about the benefits of being friends with China and its people. Chinese ambassador Tang Heng has also frequently appeared in left-leaning news media writing op-eds in support of China’s presence in the region (and, simultaneously, against the U.S.’ presence in the region). While this is noteworthy and could be the beginning of a fruitful effort to influence public opinion, so far there is no evidence that this co-optation of local news media actually works, especially because of the lack of subtlety. This is reflected in research on Chinese efforts to expand its television news networks into Latin America, which struggle to find an audience. Finally, although not mentioned in the news report, one component of Chinese efforts in Central America that is worth taking into account is Beijing’s success in replacing Taipei as an observer state in SICA. It is noteworthy because while there was no broad consensus about this move—Nicaragua and El Salvador supported the move, while Guatemala objected most strongly—it still happened. Costa Rica and Panama, most notably, did not prevent it from happening. Taiwan still is an observer in the region’s financial development institution, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration; undoubtedly China will attempt to replace it there, too. For now, however, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this move in SICA. It is not strange that ‘one China’ replaces the ‘other’ when almost all members of SICA have stopped having diplomatic ties with the latter and have begun having diplomatic ties with the former. More relevant developments in the domain of regional governance would have to take place through, for example, the China–CELAC Forum, or through Beijing’s new instruments in global governance—the BRI, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). In short, while Chinese presence in Central America is increasing, this is a logical consequence of China’s presense increasing everywhere in the world. There is little evidence that in Central America, China’s presence is ‘exploding’; to the contrary, its lack of engagement has sowed disappointment and distrust amongst its new allies. When partitioning the world in pro-U.S. and pro-China camps, Central America’s reliance on its northern neighbour has changed very little. To change this to any degree, Beijing would have to significantly increase its effort to expand its activity in the region.

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